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ZOROASTER

By A. T. Olmstead

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One hundred and sixty-eight years have elapsed since Anquetil-Duperron gave the world the first edition of the Avesta, yet the most fundamental questions are still debated among scholars. Particularly is this true of the founder. There is disagreement as to his date, his home, his place of refuge, the events of his life, his teaching and its development. Scholars have utilized in their discussions an extremely late and extremely bulky tradition, which demands the most rigid critical examination, the widely variant concepts of the various portions of the Avesta are cited under the authority of his name, Greek and Latin writers add to the confusion.[1]

It would seem the part of wisdom to attempt his life on the basis of his undoubted sayings, preserved to us in the Gathas. Doubtless many of the Gathas have been lost, their use in the ritual has blurred the meaning of numerous passages in those which survive, ritual usage has disarranged their order, but the peculiar Gathic dialect and the metrical form has preserved surprisingly well their content. For the beginning and end of the prophet's life, we have only tradition, which in lack of better evidence may be used with caution, otherwise we seek information only from his own Gathas. Needless to add, we shall attempt to fit the results into the background of the now well known general history.[2]

Zarathushtra began his mission about the middle of the sixth pre-Christian century.[3] The best tradition places his home in the north

1. The traditional picture is given by A. V. Williams Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran* (New York, 1899), to which is added all the references in classical and oriental literature.

2. For this general background, see now my article, "Darius and his Behistun Inscription," *Amer. Jour. Semit. Lang.*, LV, 1938, 392 ff.

3. No one now asserts that Zoroaster was a mythical personage. Greek dates of 5000 or even 6000 B.C. are no longer accepted. The supposed reference to Ahura Mazda in a tablet of 1700 B.C. turns out to date about 640 B.C. and it is not certain that it does refer to the god (cf. Olmstead, "Ahura Mazda in Assyrian," *Oriental Studies in Honour of Dasturji Saheb Cursetji Erachji Pavry* (London, 1933), 366 ff.). Synchronisms with Semiramis and Ninus are Greek inventions. Parsi tradition from the early Islamic period dates the "preaching of the religion" 258 years before Alexander, or a little after 600 B.C., but this has been unwisely "corrected" to bring the birth of the prophet about 660 B.C. (E. W. West, *Sacred Books of the East* (*Pahlavi Texts*), V (Oxford, 1880), 150 f.; XLVII (1897), xxvii ff.). An

west corner of the Iranian plateau, around Lake Urumia, where 300 years before Assyrians had received tribute in Parsua, the original home of the Persians.[4] His name, Zarathushtra, meant "Old Camel," his father was Pourushaspa, "With Gray Horses," his mother Dughdhova, "Who has milked white cows," all taken from the simple half pastoral life, his race was Spitama, the "White."

His god was Ahura Mazdah, the "Wise Lord," since the days of Ariyaramna, about 640 B.C., the official head of the national pantheon.[5] In vision Ahura Mazdah appeared to Zoroaster:

As the Holy One then I acknowledged thee, Mazdah Ahura,
When at life's birth first I beheld thee,
When thou didst make deeds and words of reward,
Evil for Evil, a good Destiny for the Good,
Through thy wisdom at earth's last turning point,

To which turning point thou shalt come with thy Holy Spirit,
Mazdah, with the Kingdom, there with Good Thought,
By whose deeds possessions increase through Righteousness,
Their judgements Piety shall declare,
Of thy counsel which none can deceive.

As the Holy One then I acknowledged thee, Mazdah Ahura,
When Good Thought once came to me,
And asked me: "Who art thou? Whose art thou?
By what sign shall I make known the days
For inquiry of what is thine and of thyself?"

Then said I to him: "First, I am Zarathushtra,
True foe of the Liar as best I may,
But to the Righteous would be a strong support,
To attain the future blessings of the longed for Kingdom,
As I laud thee, Mazdah, and hymn thee."

As the Holy One then I acknowledged thee, Mazdah Ahura,
When Good Thought once came to me.
To his question: "For whom wilt thou decide?"

---

earlier Sasanid tradition rightly identifies the Vishtaspa of the Avesta with Hystaspes, father of Darius (Ammianus Marcelinus, xxiii, 6, 32, cf. Agathias, ii, 24). It has long been observed that the inscriptions of Darius show plain reminiscences of Zoroaster's language, the second inscription on his tomb at Naqsh-i-Rustam, deciphered by E. Herzfeld, *Altpersische Inschriften* (1938), 10, actually quotes Yasna 44:11 f., not from the Avesta but from personal hearing of the prophet's words, and the question of the date is settled.

4. Olmstead, *History of Assyria* (New York, 1923), 117 etc.

5. E. Herzfeld, *Mitth. aus Iran*, II, 118; *Altpers. Inschr.*, 1 f.

I answered: "At the offering of homage to thy Fire,
I will think on Righteousness so long as I may.

Then show me Righteousness whom I invoke."
"With him, associated with Piety, have I come,
Ask us what should be asked by thee,
For thy asking is as of the mighty,
Since the Ruler would make thee happy and strong."

As the Holy One then I acknowledged thee, Mazdah Ahura,
When Good Thought once came to me,
When first by thy words was I instructed;
Shall my faith bring woe to me
In doing what ye told me was best?

And when thou didst tell me: "To Righteousness go for instruction,"
Thou didst not give me orders unheard;
"Up, go, ere comes my Obedience,
With Destiny, rich in treasure,
Who shall portion to me the Destinies of the Two-fold Reward."

As the Holy One then I acknowledged thee, Mazdah Ahura,
When Good Thought once came to me,
To learn my desire's form. Vouchsafe me this,
What none compels thee to admit, to know the long duration
Of the wished for existence that is said to be in thy Kingdom.

What a knowing man would give his friend were he able,
Grant, Mazdah, careful aid from thee,
If by thy kingdom through Righteousness it be attained,
Let me arise to drive away the scorners of thy doctrine,
With all who bear in mind thy holy words.

As the Holy One then I acknowledged thee, Mazdah Ahura,
When Good Thought once came to me,
Best Silent Thought bade me proclaim:
Let not a man seem to please the many Liars,
For they make all the Righteous foes to thee.

Thus, Ahura, Zarathushtra chooses for himself,
Mazdah, whatever Spirit of thine is Holiest.
May Righteousness be incarnate, mighty in life's strength,
May Piety be in the Kingdom that beholds the sun,
With Good Thought may he assign Destiny to men for their deeds.[6]

6. Yasna 43:5 ff.

Whether or not this represents exactly the visions which first called the prophet to his ministry, it does present the chief features of his teaching. The prophet's alternate use of Ahura, Mazdah, Ahura Mazdah, and Mazdah Ahura, recalls to us days when Ahura and Mazdah were separate deities, but to Ariyaramna a century before Auramazda was one god, to Zoroaster Ahura Mazdah was sole God. Other divinities from dim Indo-Iranian times, the sun god Mithra for example, might be cherished by kings and people, to Zoroaster these daevas were no gods but demons worshipped by the follower of the Lie. Ahura Mazdah was in need of no minor divinities over whom to rule as divine king. Beside him are only his vaguely personified attributes. Spenta Mainyu is his own Holy Spirit. Asha is Righteousness. Voho Manah is Good Thought, or Vahishta Manah, Best Thought, which reveals to the prophet the vision. Khshathra is Ahura Mazdah's divine Kingdom, at the end of days to be supreme. Armaiti, Piety, the Divine Wisdom, Haurvatat, Salvation, and Ameretat, Immortality, complete a vague group of seven attributes, to which are added Ashir, Destiny, Sraosha, Obedience, and Atar, Fire.

After the vision came the call:

To you the Ox Soul complained: "For what didst thou fashion me? Who created me?
Frenzy and force oppress me, cruelty and brutality too.
No other herder than ye have I, procure for me good pasture."

Then the Ox Creator asked Righteousness: "Hast thou for the Ox a judge,
That those in charge care for the Ox with pasture?
Who as lord at his desire can ward off Frenzy with the Lie's companions?"

Righteousness answered: "No helper is there for the Ox without harm.
No understanding have men how the Righteous treat the lowly.
Strongest of beings is he at whose call I come with aid.

"Mazdah remembreth the plots which indeed have already been made
Both by daevas and mortals and those to be made in future.
Ahura is the decider, it shall be as he wills."

"Then indeed with hands outstretched let us pray to Ahura,
My Soul and the Pregnant Cow, we too pressing Mazdah with entreaties,
Let not destruction be for rightlivers or cattle breeders by the Lie's companions."

Then himself spake Ahura Mazdah, who knoweth the law, with wisdom;
"No lord or judge hath been found, in accordance with justice,
But surely the Creator hath formed thee for the cattle breeder and peasant.

"This rule for the fat hath Ahura Mazdah, with Righteousness like-minded,
Made for the cattle, milk for those craving food, by his command, the Holy.
Whom hast thou, Good Thought, to care for us two among mortals?"

"This man is known to me here, who alone hath heard our commands,
Zarathushtra Spitama; he, Mazdah, longs to make known our thoughts
and those of Righteousness,
So let us bestow on him charm of speaking."

But then the Ox Soul lamented: "That for protector must I be content
With useless word of weak man when I long for a mighty ruler.
When shall there ever be one who can give effectual aid?"

This doubt was scarcely flattering to the newly summoned prophet, yet Zoroaster did not hesitate:

"Do ye, Ahura, grant them strength, Righteousness and that Kingdom,
Good Thought, whereby he may establish pleasant dwellings and peace,
I at least have believed, Mazdah, that thou canst bring this to pass.

"Where else are Righteousness and Good Thought and the Kingdom?
So, ye men,
Welcome me for instruction, Mazdah, for the great Community."
"Now Ahura, is help ours, we are prepared to serve those like you."

Ox and Cow are satisfied at last.[7]

Suffering of poor dumb cattle at the hand of raiding nomads gave occasion for the prophet's call. Throughout his preaching there echoes the eternal struggle between the roving men of the steppe and the peaceful tiller of the soil. Agriculture is a holy occupation, the dumb animals on whom falls the burden of labor are sacred.

Ahura Mazdah, clothed with the firmly fixed heaven, is sole God, but in eternal struggle with him is the Evil Spirit. From the beginning there were two spirits, the Better and the Bad; they established Life and Not-Life, the Worst Existence for the companions of the Lie, Best Dwelling for the follower of Righteousness. Also, the daevas took counsel together, delusion came upon them, they chose

7. Yasna 29.

Worst Thought, and together rushed to Frenzy, by whom they sicken the life of mortals. But to man came the Kingdom, Good Thought, and Righteousness, Piety gave continued existence, and indestructability of body, that at the Last Judgement he may have pre-eminence. Man has free will, each must decide for himself before the Great Consumation.[8]

The daevas are all offspring of Bad Thought, the Lie, and Pride, long known for their deeds in the seventh region of earth, the abode of man. Men doing the worst are called pleasing to the daevas, who have defrauded man of Good Life and Immortality, taught by the Evil Spirit, Bad Thought, and Bad Word to ruin mankind. It was Yima, Vivahvant's son, who gave men flesh of the ox to eat and brought evil into the world.

One convert Zoroaster made, his cousin Maidyoi-maongha,[9] but many were his opponents. The false teacher destroys the doctrines and the plan of life, he prevents the possession of Good Thought from being esteemed. He declares the Ox and the Sun are the worst to behold with the eyes; the prophet is denouncing the nocturnal sacrifice of the bull by the followers of Mithra. He turns the wise into Liars, he desolates the pastures and lifts his weapons against the Righteous. The Liars destroy life and attempt to hinder matron and master from attaining their heritage. With shouts of joy, they sacrifice the Ox, they prefer Grehma and his ilk to Righteousness, the Karapan priest of the daevas and the lordship of those who seek the Lie. Grehma shall attain the realms in the Dwelling of Worst Thought; so too the destroyers of this life shall weep in their desire for the message of Ahura Mazdah's prophet, but he shall prevent them from beholding Righteousness. Grehma and the Kavis, the local kinglets, have long attempted to overthrow the prophet, they assist the Liar and say: "Let the Ox be slain, that it may kindle the Averter of Death to help us!" Zoroaster is condemning the use of the intoxicating Haoma drink. Thus the Karapans and the Kavis are brought down to a common ruin.[10]

Bendva, the very great, probably the local kinglet who was his immediate master, has always opposed the prophet; at the Judgement

8. Yasna 30.
9. Yasna 51:19.
10. Yasna 32:3 ff.

may he be ruined through Good Thought! The prophet has also been hindered by the teacher of this Bendva, a Liar long apostate from Righteousness.[11] There are others who seek to kill the prophet, sons of the Lie's creation, of ill will to all who live. Zoroaster recalls an insult, the more bitter as it inflicted pain on his dumb friends: The Kavi's wanton displeased Zarathushtra at the Winter Gate, for he prevented the prophet from stopping there when he came with his two horses, shivering with the cold. The Karapan priests refuse to obey the decrees and laws of pasturage, for the harm they do the herds by their deeds and doctrines, let the doctrine bring them at last to the House of the Lie.[12]

Like all prophets, he has his moments of doubting:

> This I ask, tell me truly, Ahura:
> How should prayer be made to one like you?
> As to a friend, Mazdah, teach thou me.

With this same introduction, he asks all the questions which puzzle his mind. Who was created Father of Righteousness? Who fixed the path of sun and stars? By whom does the moon now wax, now wane? Who upheld the earth from beneath and the sky from falling? Who made the waters and plants? Who yoked swiftness to wind and to clouds? Who created Good Thought? What artificer made light and darkness, sleep and waking, dawn, noon, and night, reminders to the understanding man of duty?

> This I ask, tell me truly, Ahura:
> What I proclaim, is it indeed the truth?
> Will Piety aid Righteousness by deeds?
> Will Good Thought announce thy Kingdom?
> For whom madest thou the fortune-bringing Pregnant Cow?

Can he be sure of the Kingdom? Will they properly observe in word and deed his religion, the best for all men, will Piety extend to those to whom Mazdah's religion is proclaimed? For this was he set apart by Mazdah in the beginning, all others he hates. Who among those with whom he talks is Righteous and who a Liar? He doubts himself and his cause; on which side is the true enemy? How shall they drive from them the Lie to those who are disobedient? Shall the Lie be put in the hands of Righteousness to destroy it by the words

11. Yasna 49:1-4.
12. Yasna 51:10, 12, 14.

of Mazdah's doctrine, to work a mighty destruction among the Liars, to bring upon them torments? Has Mazdah the power to protect his prophet when the two hostile armies come together in battle? To whom will he grant the victory? Let there be signs to make known the healing judge. How shall he attain his goal, union with Mazdah himself?

And then, after this incursion into mysticism, comes an amusing bit of very human nature:

> This I ask thee, tell me truly, Ahura:
> How, Righteousness, shall I earn that reward,
> Ten mares with a stallion and a camel,
> Which was promised me, Mazdah, with Salvation,
> And Immortality, whose giving is thine?
>
> This I ask thee, tell me truly, Ahura:
> He who shall not give the reward to him who earned it,
> Who, true of word, fulfils it for him,
> What punishment for this shall be for him at first?
> I know what his last punishment shall be!

Have the daevas ever been good rulers? This he asks of those who see how, for the sake of the daevas, the Karapan and Usij priests have given the cattle to Frenzy, how the Kavis make them continually mourn, instead of increasing the pastures through Righteousness.[13]

Persecution only fixed his eyes the more eagerly on the future, the awaited coming of the divine Kingdom, the Great Consumation, the Renewing of the World. This Consumation will be brought about by the Saoshyanto, the Saviors, Zoroaster and his followers, and the prophet hopes it will not be long delayed. At the Last Judgement, Righteousness will overcome the Lie, he would know whether even before that the Righteous might overcome the follower of the Lie. How can he know that Mazdah and Righteousness have actually power over the Liars who menace him? Let there be a confirmation of the vision from Good Thought, let the Savior know what his reward shall be. When shall the warriors learn to understand the message? When shall Mazdah smite the filthiness of the intoxicating drink, the Haoma, through which the Karapan priests deceive, and the wicked rulers of the land? Who can make peace with the bloodthirsty Liars? To whom shall the knowledge of Good Thought come?

13. Yasna 44.

They are the Saviors of the lands who strive to fulfil Mazdah's commandment.[14]

One's own Conscience, whether of Righteous or of Liar, will determine his future award. With Zoroaster as associated judge, Ahura Mazdah himself will, through his counsellor Righteousness, separate the wise from the unwise; afterwards, Zoroaster will guide those he has taught to invoke Mazdah across Chinvato Peretav, the Bridge of the Separator. Those who choose wisely will proceed to the House of Song, the Abode of Good Thought, the Kingdom of Good Thought, the Glorious Heritage of Good Thought, to which one travels by the Road of Good Thought, built by Righteousness, on which the Consciences of the Saviors pass to their reward. There they shall behold the throne of mightiest Ahura and the Obedience of Mazdah, the felicity which is in the heavenly lights.[15]

But the foolish shall go to the House of the Lie, the House of Worst Thought, the Home of the Daevas, the Worst Existence. Their evil Consciences shall bring them torment at the Judgement of the Bridge, and lead them to long future ages of misery, darkness, foul food, and cries of woe.[16] He who follows his own inclination, making his thought now better, now worse, whose wrong and right deeds balance, at the last shall dwell apart in an intermediate abode.[17]

Rejected and persecuted at home, Zoroaster thought of flight, but,

> To what land to flee, whither to flee shall I go?
> From nobles and priestly colleagues they separate me,
> Nor are the peasants to me pleasing,
> Nor yet the Liar princes of the land.
> How may I please thee, Mazdah Ahura?

He knows the reason for his lack of success, he has few cattle and so few followers; he cries to Mazdah for support as friend to friend. When shall the sun risings come to win for the world Righteousness, when shall the Saviors appear in accordance with prophecy? The infamous Liar has prevented the Righteous from prospering the cattle, he who deprives him of power or of life shall prepare the ways of sound doctrine (this is almost inciting to assassination of the hated oppres-

14. Yasna 48:1-2, 9-12.
15. Yasna 31:14 ff.; 50:2, 4; 51:9, 13 ff.
16. Yasna 46:10 f.; 49:11; 53:6.
17. Yasna 33:1; 48:4; cf. J. D. C. Pavry, *The Zoroastrian Doctrine of a Future Life* (New York, 1926).

sor). He who converts a Liar, if he is sure, let him announce it to the kinsmen (the slowly developing church); may Ahura Mazdah protect him from bloodshed (persecution is now to the death). Whom can the prophet secure as protector when the Liar attempts to injure him? Let no harm come through the man who thinks to injure Zoroaster's possessions, let his deeds recoil on himself. By their rule the Karapans and Kavis have accustomed men to evil deeds to destroy life; their own Soul and Conscience shall torment them when they come to the Bridge of the Separator, for all time shall they dwell in the House of the Lie.[18]

From his mountain home in north west Iran, Zoroaster set forth with his Spitamid kinsmen in search of a new land where his doctrines might find readier acceptance. While the prophet had labored for the conversion of his neighbors, the face of the world had changed. The once powerful Median empire had fallen, and its place had been taken by the rapidly expanding empire of his own Persians. Between 546 and 539, Cyrus had subjected eastern Iran, and as satrap of the newly subdued Parthia and Hyrcania had appointed Vishtaspa (Hystaspes), son of Arshama, of the rival Achaemenid line. Here the weary prophet found a welcome, and soon Vishtaspa's wife Hutaosa (Atossa) was a convert to the faith.[19] The conversion of the husband naturally followed, and Vishtaspa became the patron of the new religion.

What reward Zarathushtra hath promised to those of his congregation, which in the House of Song Ahura Mazdah hath first attained, with this I have provided myself through thy blessings, Good Thought, and those of Righteousness. Kavi Vishtaspa hath accepted, with the rule of the Congregation and the paths of Good Thought, the doctrine which the holy Ahura Mazdah with Righteousness hath devised.[20]

Thus the prophet hails his first royal convert.

Whoever of mortals rejoices Zarathushtra Spitama is worthy to be renowned, for him shall Mazdah Ahura give life, for him shall he make possessions flourish through Good Thought, him we consider a friend through Righteousness. "O Zarathushtra," asks Ahura Mazda, "what righteous man of thine is a friend of the great Congregation, or who desires to be renowned?" The prophet answers: "It is Kavi Vishtaspa

18. Yasna 46:1-11.
19. Yasht 15:35; cf. 13:139; 9:26; 17:46.
20. Yasna 51:15 f.

at the Judgement. Those whom thou, Mazdah Ahura, wouldst unite in thy house will I summon with words of Good Thought."[21]

Under the protection of Vishtaspa, the prophet spent many happy years. He praises his cousin Maidyoi-maongha, his first convert, his clansmen, children of Haecat-aspa, descendants of Spitama, since they distinguished the wise from the unwise; by their deeds they have won Righteousness, by the first laws of Ahura. Frashaoshtra and his brother Jamaspa, of the Hvogva family, became his loyal supporters, and Frashaoshtra promised the prophet his daughter Hvovi, "Having Fine Oxen," as his wife.

The fair form of a dear one hath Frashaoshtra Hvogva given me; may sovran Mazdah Ahura grant that she attain possession of Righteousness for her good Self.[22]

Many years passed. A son, Ishat-vastra,[23] and several daughters were born and grew up.

The best possession known is that of Zarathushtra Spitama, for Ahura Mazdah will give him through Righteousness forever the delights of the blessed life, and to those who practice and learn the words and deeds of the good doctrine. Then let them gladly seek by thought, words, and deeds his pleasure, and the prayers for his worship, the Kavi Vishtaspa and Zarathushtra's son, the Spitamid, and Frashaoshtra, making straight the paths for the Doctrine of the Savior which Ahura hath ordained.

His daughter is to marry Jamaspa:

This man, Pouruchista, sprung from Haecat-aspa and Spitama, youngest of Zarathushtra's daughters, hath he given thee as thy instructor for union with Good Thought, Righteousness, and Mazdah. So take counsel with thy understanding, wisely perform the holiest deeds of Piety. Jamaspa promises "Fervently will I love her, that she may piously serve father, husband, peasants, and nobles, a righteous woman for righteous men. May Ahura Mazdah grant her the glorious heritage of Good Thought for her good Self."[24]

Gladly would we leave the prophet at this point, surrounded by his loving family and friends. But as old age drew on, the delightful picture darkened. The Yashts or Hymns quote prayers of Vishtaspa or of Zairivairi for success against such enemies at Thathryavant,

21. Yasna 46:13 f.
22. Yasna 51:17 ff.; 46:15 ff.; 49:8.
23. Yasht 13:98.
24. Yasna 53:1-4.

Peshana, Peshochingha, Humayaka, Darshinika, Spinjaurushka, and Ashta-aurvant, son of Vispa-thaurvoashti, they refer to wars with Arejat-aspa of Hyaona.[25] About the same time, it would seem, Vishtaspa's son Darius rebelled against Bardiya, son of Cyrus, and killed him (521), and the empire recently brought together by Cyrus broke out into a perfect orgy of revolts. Bodies of rebels long held out against Vishtaspa himself.[26]

The nomads were threatening, and the holy war must be preached:

So they whose deeds are evil, let them be the deceived and forsaken, let them all cry aloud. Through good rulers let him bring slaughter upon them, and peace from them for the joyful villagers. Let him bring torment upon them, he that is Greatest, with the bonds of death, and soon let it be! To men of evil creed belongs the Place of Corruption. Despising the Law, losing their body, they think to cast down the worthy, where is the Righteous Lord who shall rob them of life and freedom? Thine is the Kingdom, Mazdah, whereby thou canst give to the right living poor the better portion.[27]

The crisis became more acute:

This aid I beg in prayer with outstretched hands, Mazdah, first of all, Righteousness, the works of the Holy Spirit, whereby I may please the counsel of Good Thought and the Ox Soul. I would serve thee, Mazdah Ahura, with Good Thought, grant me through Righteousness the blessings of life, both material and of thought, by which it shall bring its supporters bliss. I would praise thee as never before, Righteousness, Good Thought, and Mazdah Ahura, and those for whom Piety increases the Kingdom, never to be destroyed, come ye to my support at my call.

Zoroaster feels that he is nearing life's end:

I who with Good Thought have set my heart to watch the soul, who have known rewards from Mazdah Ahura for my deeds, while I have power and strength will I teach men to seek after Righteousness. When shall I as one who knows see thee, Righteousness and Good Thought, the throne of mightiest Ahura and the Obedience of Mazdah? Through this holy word on our tongue may we turn the robber horde to the Greatest. Come thou with Good Thought, through Righteousness grant by thy righteous words, Mazdah, an enduring gift, strong support to Zarathushtra, and to us the means to overcome the foe.

Grant, Righteousness, this reward, the blessings of Good Thought.

25. Yasht 5:109, 113; 9:29 ff.; 17:49 ff.; 19:87.

26. For details, cf. "Darius and his Behistun Inscription," *Amer. Jour. Semit. Lang.*, LV, 1938, 392 ff.

27. Yasna 53:8 f.

Grant, Piety, to Vishtaspa and to me our desire. Grant, sovran Mazdah, that your prophet may recite the holy word of instruction. Of thee, the Best, of one will with Best Righteousness, I ask the best, Ahura, desiring for warrior Frashoashtra and myself and those thou wilt give them, gifts of Good Thought for all time. By our use of these thy bounties, Ahura, may we not provoke thy wrath; Mazdah, Righteousness, and Best Thought, we strive to offer hymns of praise to you, since you are best able to advance desire for the beneficent Kingdom. Then for those thou didst know to be worthy, through Righteousness and as understanding Good Thought, fulfil, Mazdah Ahura, their longing with attainment. Then indeed I know that words of prayer, serving a good end, are effectual with you. Therefore would I preserve Righteousness and Good Thought forevermore, do thou teach me, Mazdah Ahura, by thy mouth through thy Spirit to proclaim how the First Life shall be.[28]

With this last prayer, the words of Zoroaster are ended. Late tradition informs us that the same Arejat-aspa of Hyaona, whose wars with Vishtaspa are mentioned in the Hymns, took Balkh by assult and murdered the prophet and his disciples at the altar.[29] Toward the end of 520, as the Darius inscription at Behistun informs us, Bactria was invaded by Frada of Margiana, on the edge of Central Asia; it is not impossible that in this invasion Zoroaster was actually slain.[30]

But we need no late legends of a birth heralded by wonder signs, of a life filled with miracles, of a martyr death, to prove his greatness. From his own words we may trace the events of his life and the development of his thought, even as we may from Jesus' logia. We may realize the loftiness of his aspiriations and the limitations which only make him the more human and more loveable. His doctrines show no slightest trace of influence from the older orient, they are native to his soil and race. They have grown from the older Aryan faiths, but they have risen above the simple Aryan daeva worship to heights never again reached by unaided Aryan religious thought.[31]

Early in his career, the prophet had questioned whether his followers would properly observe the doctrines of his religion. Darius the Great

28. Yasna 28.

29. Jackson, *op. cit.*, 118 ff.

30. Cf. the already cited article, *Amer. Jour. Semit. Lang.*, LV, 1938, p. 404.

31. Important works are A. V. W. Jackson, *op. cit.*, and *Zoroastrian Studies* (New York, 1928); J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism* (London, 1926); C. Bartholomae, *Die Gatha's des Awesta* (Strasburg, 1905); M. W. Smith, *Studies in the Syntax of the Gathas* (Philadelphia, 1929).

was the son of Vishtaspa and must often have talked with the prophet at his father's satrapial court. His own inscriptions are filled with reminiscences of the great teacher's language, and the records on his tomb quote one of the Gathas.[32] Despite his fine words, Darius did not live up to the prophet's teaching, and his constant use of the terms Lie and Liar only bring out the more strongly his own frequent lapses from the truth.

Scarcely was the prophet dead than the inevitable reaction began. While the historical Zoroaster was more and more lost in the mists of the past, as the founder of the religion became increasingly divine, when chanting of the Gathas he composed, even those complaining of his doubts and fears, his hopes of ten mares, a stallion, and a camel, his sympathy with the shivering horses, took on a mystical and efficacious character, to him was ascribed approval of gods and of practices revived from the ancient Aryan paganism, the very gods and practices he had so emphatically condemned. Aryan paganism was in turn submerged in part by Magism, a survival from an older, still more barbarous antiquity.

If his own people now held sacred the "filthy intoxicating drink," the Haoma, to Zoroaster an abomination, if they restored the nocturnal cults of Mithra he had protested, and even those of the mother goddess Anahita, there were others who found his preaching more congenial. In the decay of the older national religions, the best minds found in his doctrines something so new, so fresh, so bracing that his influence may be detected in the majority of the later religious movements. It is no accident that the Gathas of Zoroaster sound so much like the first New Testament.

32. E. Herzfeld, *Archaeological History of Iran*, 1937, 43; *Altpersische Inschriften*, 1938, 4 ff.

IS GOD IMPERSONAL, PERSONAL, OR SUPRA-PERSONAL?

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Science is today giving such evidence of the unity, the uniformity, and the purposiveness of the universe, that one reality as ultimate cause and final purpose may be assumed, whether it can or cannot be so conceived, as to be named *God*. One philosophy finds *nature* as self-sufficient, and assigns little (if any) significance and value to man as nature's interpretation; another seeing in *man* the consummation of the physical evolution, and in his progress in civilization and culture an upward *nisus*, which it is willing to call God, recognizes no need to seek any further interpretation beyond and above man. These philosophies, *naturalism* and *humanism*, disregard or challenge the world-wide and age-long witness of religion that man himself, confessing his own and his world's insufficiency, has ever been reaching out to such a reality, transcendent of and immanent in the Universe. While I admit that there is no sensible evidence and no logical demonstration of the existence of God, conceived as in the development of religion this transcendent and immanent reality has come to be regarded in faith, and that religion has its witness in itself, since "faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen" (Heb. 11: 1); yet half a century in the study of philosophy as well as theology forbids my facile acquiescence in the *agnosticism* into which some theologians allow themselves to fall intellectually.

It is possible that theistic faith might sustain itself out of its own resources, even in a world which appeared godless; yet that is no necessity. It is my tested conviction that faith is *reasonable*, and that the most reasonable interpretation of the Universe is *theistic*. The world which human intelligence is making increasingly intelligible lends support to the belief in divine intelligence as its cause. The world in which the human conscience becomes aware of authoritative standards of conduct, in which there emerges the sense of personal liberty and responsibility for conduct, in which such conduct increasingly prevails, is so constituted that divine moral agency is credible. The world in which religion is a universal and permanent factor would be a deceptive mockery, if no reality corresponded to the object of faith, in

which man has sought security and satisfaction. This is just an indication of two assumptions with which this article starts, assumptions which I believe I could justify, namely, that science and philosophy leave an unsolved problem, and that in theistic faith there is offered a solution which reason can accept from faith, even if it could not apart from faith, gain this solution as independent conclusion. The present purpose is to try to answer the question, How is God to be conceived? Is the monotheistic conception intelligible enough to be credible?

While the speculation of theologians in Egypt, Greece, and India, may have reached a conception of the divine reality, as *impersonal*, the popular polytheisms, which these pantheisms not only tolerated, but justified, continued to believe in personal gods, of like passions with men. While in Greek philosophy the divine unity was speculatively affirmed, it cannot be said that the conception of God of either Plato or Aristotle was clearly and fully personal. It was in the Hebrew nation alone that *monotheism*, the belief in one personal God, was reached. To raise the question whether this was by human discovery or divine disclosure, is to show a misunderstanding of the essential relation of religion and revelation. This conception of God's personality is sometimes impatiently and contemptuously dismissed as *anthropomorphism*. There are some writers who think that they can slay an idea by a word. There are parts of the Old Testament that are crudely anthropomorphic side by side with others where this tendency is avoided. In Gen. 2: 4 ff. God "instead of simply *speaking* or *creating* as in Gen. 1, *fashions*, *breathes* into man the breath of life, *plants*, *places*, *takes*, *sets*, *brings*, *closes up*, *builds*, etc., and even in the allied Gen. 3, *walks* in the garden" (Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, 1891, p. 7). These parts are legendary or mythological survivals. In the prophets there is anthropomorphism for rhetorical effect, but in the conception of God as *holy*, especially in the Deutero-Isaiah, God's difference from man, and His exaltation over all created things is unequivocally asserted; and such conceptions as the *Angel*, the *Spirit*, the *Wisdom* and the *Word* of God as mediating agency emerge for the preservation of His transcendence. Language must often necessarily be more anthropomorphic than the thought which it expresses, not in abstract definitions, but in concrete symbols. It can be said that the developed monotheism of the prophets, like that of the New Testament, is not anthropomorphic in assigning to God human limitations and imperfections.

I am not content with justifying this anthropomorphism as an inevitable, if lamentable, result of the mental impotence of man, for, on the one hand, the mind of man itself recognizes the inadequacy of the crude anthropomorphism which religion in its development leaves behind, and, on the other hand, the correspondence just mentioned between man's reason, conscience, and spirit and the reality of the Universe shows that man thinks as he does, not because he cannot do otherwise, but because his place as the consummation of the cosmic process, and the unique endowments which distinguish him from the creatures he has left behind him in the evolution of life and mind warrant the assumption that he is destined to be the interpretation of the world, to disclose its significance, and so enhance its value. Opponents of theism often show a singularly intimate acquaintance with and a marked partiality for the theology of "the man in the street" as representing the Christianity to be assailed, and a profound ignorance of the philosophical theism into which the Christian theologian fits his personal convictions regarding God as revealed in Christ. Whatever advance they may have made in other studies, they cherish a fond memory of what they learned at their mother's knees, without preserving the personal faith which ennobled even her crude ideas. In the sequel I shall make clear in what sense, and with what qualifications theism is justified in describing God as personal; but before doing so I shall seek to show reasons why we must avoid the pantheism which so identifies God and world as to deny God's personality, and the deism, which so separates God and world as to reduce Him to individual personality.

The first objection to pantheism is that it contradicts the essential and characteristic sentiment of religion, the sense of the *numinous*, man's dependence on, and submission to reality above and beyond self and world, and also the inevitable religious thought which distinguishes the infinite and the eternal from the finite and the temporal. Man as personal needs, seeks, and finds satisfaction only in God as personal, and cannot find rest in an impersonal reality as object of faith, hope, love, as intimate companion. As the history of pantheism has shown, it tends either to *pancosmism* or *ecosmism:* the world only is real, and, as distinguished from the world, God is a mere name for the unity in its multiplicity; or God alone is real, and the world is illusion. Neither God nor world is preserved in distinctiveness. Further, if God and world are identified, man loses his personal liberty

and immortality, and moral distinctions disappear, for what men call wrong is God just as truly as what they call right. Spinoza's piety was not the practical application of his philosophy, but a contraction of it. A fraction cannot know and love the integer, the part the whole. The popular polytheism, which as has been shown, accompanies and is tolerated by the speculative pantheism, shows that impersonality cannot satisfy the personal need. In India the *bhakti* type of piety is a necessary correction of pantheism.

Pantheism attracts the thinker in his quest for rational unity, "thinking things together." The poet or the artist, inspired by the beauty of nature, tends towards pantheism as he becomes aware of the divine presence; but his emphasis on the divine immanence, with no intention to deny the divine transcendence, is better described as *panentheism,* all *in* God, not God all. This term describes Tennyson's poem better than the title, "The Higher Pantheism." The ordinary man, however, runs no risk of becoming a pantheist; distinguishing himself from other persons, he no less distinguishes God, and conceives his relation to God as no less external than that to his neighbor. He does not realize the truth Paul expresses, "in him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28), although he confesses God as Creator and Preserver. In the conscious and voluntary relation of man to God, such personal distinction is necessary; but that communion of man as personal with God as no less personal would be impossible, were there not an immediate dependence on God which transcends these personal distinctions, and is not external as is man's dependence on other men. The controversy between Augustinianism and Pelagianism, Calvinism and Arminianism, as to the relation of divine grace and human faith, God's sovereignty and man's liberty, has always seemed to me due to an inadequate conception of the relation as I have just described it, an immediate dependence as well as an intimate communion. Popular religious thought tends to be *deistic,* not only distinguishing, but even separating God and man or world; and theologians themselves have very often yielded to that tendency. When creation is regarded as a succession of divine acts once completed, when preservation is conceived as a less immediate activity of God than is creation, when nature is accepted as a closed system in which God intervenes only by suspending the laws of nature, there is deism; but that is not Christian monotheism, as presented in the Holy Scrip-

tures. The modern conception of the Universe, if there is to be any recognition of God at all, demands an immediate presence and a universal and constant activity of God, creative, preservative, recreative. "God in all, through all, and over all." "My Father worketh even until now, and I work" (John 5:17). To speak of God as *a person*, as individual personality, is to ignore this relation of God to the Universe. He is not one among many, but the One in whom the many subsist, from whom they derive, and on whom they depend for their existence. When we say God is personal, we do not mean that He is simply and solely personality, but that He *has* personality as that aspect of His reality that is disclosed and imparted in His personal relations to man, whatever other aspects there may be in the infinitude and eternity of His reality.

As has already been indicated, such evidence of God's existence and nature as are divinely revealed and humanly recognized in nature and history justify the assertion that God is at least personal, whatever more He may be; intelligence, conscience, spirit or religion in man are personal functions, which find a correspondence and satisfaction in God so apprehended. As the above argument against deism shows, however, we must beware of an inadequate conception of personality as falsifying the reality of God, when described as personal; and we must further enquire also, whether our conception of God, at its purest, can ever be regarded as an adequate conception of the reality. As regards his own personality, man's reach exceeds his grasp; his ideal excels his actuality; he is not what he ought to be, and wants to be. He has not yet become, but is only becoming personality, as he aspires after, and achieves the ideal—truth, beauty, goodness—goodness in its highest and fullest form according to the Christian standard, love. In attaining he is hindered by his necessary limitations as man, and his voluntary imperfections as sinful. He can conceive personality as perfect truth, beauty, goodness, love, the Eternal Light in whom there is no darkness at all. Even his limitations he strives to escape in "self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control." He hopes for immortality, when, in conditions favorable and not adverse, he will become what God wills that he shall be. The claim which the ideal makes upon him is so absolute that he believes that the values which constitute personality are not values peculiar to man, but intrinsic, and thus values for God also. Their authority is based on their reality in God. "Ye there-

fore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48). Here then is need of faith, "the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen" (Heb. 11:1). Man hopes to become perfect, because he believes that God is perfect. In Christian faith Jesus Christ is not only the human pattern of divine perfection, but the divine pledge and power of its attainment. If God has revealed Himself in nature and history, in His relations to man, in Jesus Christ supremely, it is not presumption in man to conceive God as being, at least, all that perfect personality means to him, apart from all human imperfections and limitations.

When all is believed that we dare believe about the affinity of God and man as the basis of the community of thought and life between God and man, man still remains the creature, and reverence forbids that he should make his ideal for himself the measure of the reality of God. Herbert Spencer rejected the conception of personality on the ground that the Unknown might be more than personal, and then proceeded to explain the world as matter-in-motion. If I close with the confession that I cannot think God as only personal, but must adore Him as in His reality personal and supra-personal, it is not to give a sub-personal interpretation of the Universe. The vastness of the Universe in time and space, the mystery of the relation of God to its creation, and evolution, of God's Providence in history, and even of man's redemption from sin forbid the confidence that by our searching we can find out God, that we can fully know the mind of God, and, therefore, that any conception we can form can be adequate to the reality. This humility does not weaken the certainty that God has revealed Himself as Father in our Lord Jesus Christ, and has through Him redeemed men from sin to become the children of God, called to be saints and destined for eternal life. What God has shown Himself to be as personal in His relations to man, does not leave His supra-personality as darkness, but as a glory for which we have not yet the vision.

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THEOLOGY, VALUATIONAL OR EXISTENTIAL?

By Douglas Clyde Macintosh
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I

In the May number of this Review of Religion there appeared an article in which I undertook to reply to some of the criticisms of my position offered by certain of the authors of the composite volume, *The Nature of Religious Experience*. Having found it impracticable to complete the review and reply within a single magazine article, I decided to postpone for later consideration the stimulating essays of Professors Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr. But now I find that even a summary treatment of the important issues raised by the younger of the two brothers in his very able discussion of "Value Theory and Theology" will require a further postponement of my intended review of Reinhold Niebuhr's discussion of "The Truth in Myths." In the May article I dealt at considerable length with the views of Professor Seelye Bixler, but in the present connection I shall find occasion to refer to his position and point of view again.

Throughout the school year 1922-1923 I conducted a seminar which turned out to be very interesting and stimulating to myself, largely because of the presence in it of J. Seelye Bixler and H. Richard Niebuhr. Sometimes the discussion centered upon religious knowledge and its relation to religious experience. My own position was that religion was rooted both in an appreciation of values felt to be supreme and in the consciousness of our human dependence upon a supreme reality, or power, and that religious thought was especially concerned with the question of how supreme power or being is related to the highest values, so that theology was, at least implicitly, both valuational and existential. In the course of the years, however, Mr. Bixler seems to have come to the conclusion that theology, properly speaking, is valuational rather than existential in the ordinary sense of the word, while Mr. Niebuhr has come to favor an existential theology such as would shun every proposed valuational approach, as being dangerously misleading.

This development of the thought of two of my former students in

opposite directions interests me greatly. I am much more interested, in fact, than I should have been if in their thinking they had "stayed put." I recall in this connection an expression used by a German reviewer of Professor E. S. Ames's *Psychology of Religious Experience* shortly after that book had appeared, "sehr einseitig und sehr interessant." Dr. Ames's psychology of religion was indeed very one-sided and very interesting, and very interesting just because it was so very one-sided. And so it is, I venture to suggest, with the opposed positions of Dr. Bixler and Dr. Niebuhr. They challenge attention largely because, instead of presenting a synthesis in which the religious mind can rest, at least temporarily, with a degree of satisfaction, their sharp antitheses sting the mind awake and force it to re-examine some of its fundamental beliefs. Older members of the American Theological Society will recall as an excellent illustration of the stimulating quality of such antithetical thinking the very challenging one-sidedness, if I may so term it, of the ideas thrown out by the late Professor A. C. McGiffert, in the course of our annual theological discussions.

But, after all, truth is a more important consideration for religion and theology than that of mere psychological stimulus and interest. I think I have heard Mr. Niebuhr defend the antithetical mode of thinking as more likely to lead, in the long run, to the discovery of new truth than the more soporific method of possibly premature synthesis. Due weight should be given this consideration; debate does sometimes lead to conviction and discovery. But one must not be too pragmatic in this connection. It would be a strange perversion of altruism which would deliberately choose something less than the fullest truth available, in order that some one else might at some future time enjoy a fuller knowledge and a greater certainty.

What I am concerned to defend is not any and every uninteresting mean between opposite extremes. A merely mediating theology may be, and often is, the result of a timorous eclecticism which balks the further progress to which either one-sided extreme may prove to be a sharp, stinging stimulus. But there is always a place and often an urgent need for the higher synthesis—not an indiscriminate, forced synthesis of genuine contradictories, but a discriminating synthesis of the valid elements in opposing systems of thought. And in the present instance what we need, as I believe, and what is at the same time quite feasible, as I will try to indicate, is a synthesis of the valuational and

the existential in theology. Only thus, I am persuaded, can we do justice to both immanence and transcendence and avoid ultimately the two extremes of rationalism and irrationalism. Between those two extremes lies the course of rational empiricism and critical intuition, a way which may indeed, as in Bunyan's immortal allegory, lead straight up over the brow of the "Hill Difficulty," but which seems to me to be the only true path for the religious pilgrim's feet. It will be found more rewarding in the end, if I mistake not, than the seemingly safe but very deceptive rationalistic road to the left, called "Danger," where the traveller is led astray into "a great wood"; more satisfactory also than the irrationalistic pathway to the right, well-named "Destruction," by following which the wayfarer is led into "a wide field full of dark mountains, where he stumbles and falls to rise no more."

II

At the valuational extreme, or very near it, we may locate the doctrinal system of the Harvard Professor of Theology, Dr. Bixler. For him the religious object, God, is defined as "absolute value," "an essential rightness in the realm of truth, beauty, goodness, or in all three," "the holy as the absolute good," "a kingdom of ends," "a realm of intrinsic worths," "a world of values," an object of thought belonging exclusively in the realm of the *Sollen*, not in that of the *Müssen* or the *Sein*—in short, not any transcendent Being, but "the transcendent ideal," with its "absolute and undeniable claim" upon us (*The Nature of Religious Experience*, pp. 79, 80, 89, 91, 92). In similar vein he suggests that "immortality should not stand for an unending existence, but for the realization in mortal life of that by which mortality is itself transcended" (*Immortality and the Present Mood*, p. 54). In other words, instead of an existent God we are offered an absolute ideal, and, instead of the existential continuation of conscious existence beyond death, we are reminded of the possibility of participating in permanent values in our three score years and ten, more or less, before our physical death.

In this reduction of God and immortality to abstract ideal values and temporary participation therein, we have the probable explanation of Dr. Bixler's special interest in "phenomenology," or "philosophy without existential presuppositions," as developed by Husserl and applied in the realm of values by Max Scheler, Nikolai Hartmann, and

Kurt Stavenhagen (See Bixler's articles in *Religious Realsm*, 1931, and in the REVIEW OF RELIGION for January, 1937, as well as in *The Nature of Religious Experience*, pp. 80, 82, 83). He is interested apparently only in the pure *what* of Deity, not in the Deity's existence. I do not know to what extent this extreme one-sidedness may have been suggested to Dr. Bixler by my customary insistence that devotion to a Divine Ideal without belief in the existence of a Divine Being would be preferable to belief in God's existence without any concern for obedience to the will of God, or the Divine Ideal. In any case I would remind him that I have always maintained that conscious and generally voluntary relationship to an existent Divine Reality is essential to religion in the full sense of the word.

Dr. Bixler's abstract valuational theology is essentially identical with that of his Harvard colleague, Professor Kirsopp Lake, who uses the term "God" to refer to the "immaterial Reality," or "Values," "Truth, Beauty, and Wisdom" (*The Religion of Yesterday and Tomorrow*, pp. 109-113). Professor Lake seems to complain of Dean Inge that, not satisfied with defending the ultimate reality of "Value" he goes on "to postulate a God of whom the Values are the attributes" (*Ibid.*, p. 112). But just here especially is where the Dean's religious intuition has been the compass which has led him aright, whereas it is his critic who has become as a "wandering star," a flashing meteor, "to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness," religiously speaking, though not, let us hope, "forever"!

The position of Professors Lake and Bixler is reminiscent of Paul Natorp's "religion within the limits of humanity," religion as devotion simply to the ideals of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. It reminds one also of the less radical because more agnostic position of the late Professor Simmel, of Berlin, who maintained that, while there was nothing of which we could be surer than of *what* God is, namely Ideal Personality, there was at the same time nothing of which we must remain more uncertain that *that* God (an Ideal Person) really is. The position of Professors Lake and Bixler is an application in the religious realm of the fallacious logical idealism according to which the entire being of existent entities is to be found in the totality of possible abstract predicates which can be truly attached to them. The position, as I see it, is much less theistic than the semi-theism of the late Professor Howison, of California, who held to the eternal existence of God, the perfect Person, along with all imperfect persons, likewise

eternal, God being defined, however, as the concrete Ideal of all the others, the Final Cause of everything, but the efficient cause of nothing outside of himself.

This exclusively valuational theology or religion, whose God is a mere combination of abstract essences, will never meet the practical religious needs of men. It is a truncated half-religion, providing a worthy ideal as the object of worshipful devotion, but no adequate object of religious dependence and trust. Functionally considered it is like a man whose right leg has been amputated, progressing very slowly and painfully by short hops in the direction of theological truth, and soon tempted to desist with the weary question, "What's the use?" To Dr. Bixler and his companions of the valuational extreme one would like to recommend more "existential thinking," with a view to regaining an existential status for God and for the life immortal.

III

In recent years we have witnessed the rise, or rather the resurrection of that supposedly long dead, exclusively existential theology, in which, as it is claimed, even our ultimate values and valuations have no normative meaning, for this reason among others, that all our values and appreciations of value are so perverted as to be quite worthless as criteria of what is worthful from the point of view of the "wholly other" *Deus absconditus!* Neither the ideal values of spiritual beauty and moral goodness, nor the characteristically religious value of the numinous can be relied upon as criteria of revelation, and rationality is particularly suspect when the genuineness of revelation and the truth of theology are under consideration. *Credo quia absurdum* is again the watchword.

The two individuals who have been most influential in giving impetus to this conservative reaction in theology are Karl Barth among contemporaries and the nineteenth century Danish philosopher, Kierkegaard, whose works have been resurrected and are being translated in the interest of the reactionary movement. A passage from Kierkegaard's *Journals* will serve to illustrate the spirit that is coming to dominate much of what its votaries, curiously enough, like to call "the new theology."

> "Original sin" is guilt. That is the real paradox. How paradoxical that is may best be seen thus. It is formed by compounding qualitatively different categories. To "inherit" is a natural category; "guilt" is an ethical and

spiritual category. Now who would ever think, says reason, of putting them together, of saying that something is inherited which by definition cannot be inherited. It must be believed. The paradox in Christian truth is invariably due to the fact that it is truth as it exists for God. The standard of measure and the end is superhuman; and there is only one relationship possible: faith (*Journals*, Section 1061).

The extreme irrationalism of such a point of view must breed religious scepticism and agnosticism, and in the end prove utterly demoralizing, not only to theology but to religion. And yet it represents a partially justified protest against an extreme rationalism which has left the religious life of many "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." A crude and somewhat ludicrous expression of what many earnest souls have been feeling in these latter days comes to mind as a memory of my student days. An Illinois farmer was talking with his seat-mate on a Monday morning train coming into the city. He had been saying that the church of which he was a member had just lost its minister. He went on to remark, "I suppose now we'll have to take some young fellow from the University of Chicago, with two Isaiahs, no devil, no hell, no nothin'." I would be among the last to advocate a return to the unscientific thinking and irrational beliefs of the "old-time religion," and yet I cannot close my eyes to the fact that the typical rationalistic liberalism of recent years had lost much of the dynamic of the older evangelicalism. In particular, it was too romantically optimistic about evolutionary progress, and needed to think more realistically and "existentially" about sin and its individual as well as social consequences. But while a corrective is needed to counteract the evils of extreme rationalism, it is not to be found by a mere rushing to the opposite extreme. We likened the exclusively valuational theology in which extreme rationalism tends to culminate to a man who has lost his right leg, painfully trying to make progress by hopping about on his left foot. We may quite as appropriately suggest that an exclusively existential theology, with its inevitable irrationalism, is like a man whose left leg has been amputated, and who must needs sit still or else hop about awkwardly on his right foot. For, if no values of any sort, rational or other, are to be used for the testing of claims to divine revelation and theological truth, what standards of measurement can we use? On what ground can we justify our maintenance of our own faith and our dissatisfaction with the revelation-claims of religions more or less antagonistic to our own?

Is the mere letter of the Bible a sufficient criterion? The puerilities and dilemmas of "Fundamentalism" furnish a sufficient warning against that course, and are taken as such by the more circumspect proponents of the revived existential dogmatics.

Is miracle to be the criterion of divine revelation and theological truth? This would be existential enough, if we could be sure that the supposed miracle really happened and that it was really miraculous; but we seem to be without any workable criterion of the miraculous. The scientist seems always justified in trying to explain according to laws, old or new, either the alleged miracle itself or the genesis of the story of miracle. And it will not do to run around in the circle of judging an event to be a credible miracle because of its religious value, and then proving the revelation value of the event by pointing out that it was a miracle.

A device which seems to be finding favor with the existential theologians is that of interpreting their own personal faith or religious intuition as the product of a gracious, wholly unconditioned initiative of God, and then, having taken account of the fact that individuals with similar religious intuitions tend to be drawn into social religious fellowship, attempting to express in existential terms the intuitive faith of the religious fellowship, or church. The result is a more or less coherent body of doctrines of the common faith, a system of "church dogmatics." From this point of view no attempt need be made to show the reasonableness or the moral or religious value of this body of doctrine; not even complete mutual consistency of statements would seem to be insisted upon. So paradoxical and "dialectical" is theological truth supposed to be, so baffling to the incompetent mind of fallen man, that it sometimes seems to the theologican that he can never safely affirm without denying or deny without affirming. The ultimate appeal is neither to reason nor to religious experience, but to a dogmatic faith supposed to have been supernaturally implanted solely through the inscrutable divine initiative, occurring in accordance with the gracious but discriminating election and predestinating decrees of an irresponsible sovereign God. There is no place here for a philosophical interpretation or defence of the content of what is declared to be divine revelation. Dogmatic assertion is the last word. Thus would Barth and his many imitators today claim to cut the Gordian knot of apologetics and philosophy of religion.

My reason for referring to this extreme development in this connec-

tion is that Dr. Richard Niebuhr, the details of whose criticisms of my theological method and point of view I am about to consider, has been deeply influenced in recent years by this mode of thinking, so that his criticisms, to be understood, must be viewed in relation to this contemporary background. Before proceeding further, however, I wish to express my sympathy, not only with the project of a theology that shall be theocentric and thoroughly existential, but also with what I take to be the matter of greatest concern in the current emphasis upon the need for what is called "existential thinking." By this term, the credit for inventing which goes, it would seem, to Kierkegaard, and which is now very freely used by Jaspers and Heidegger among philosophers, and by Barth, Brunner, and many others among the theologians, is meant the undertaking to solve the great problems of personal life and religion not by reasoning and intellectual research, not by having proofs, but by living, by choosing, deciding, taking risks, exercising faith. There is truth in Kierkegaard's insistence that life is understood backwards, by reflective thought, but has to be lived forwards, before it is understood, by the faith that takes the risk of building one's life upon the theoretically uncertain (*Journals*, 465, 1044, 1084).

But I cannot agree with Unamuno, the Spanish admirer of Kierkegaard and advocate of irrationalism, when he goes so far as to speak of reason as the enemy of life (*The Tragic Sense of Life,* Eng. tr., p. 90; cf. pp. 111, 114). One may agree that faith is the friend of life, that faith involves the will, and that there are essentials of faith which reason is unable to demonstrate; but all this is no excuse for going over to irrationalism. Reason and faith are, both of them, friends of life, and, when rightly adjusted, friends of each other. But neither extreme rationalism nor extreme irrationalism is a true friend of life.

IV

It is admitted then, at least so far as I am concerned, that there is important truth in the contemporary critique of rationalism. But as we find it in the irrationalists it is a distorted, one-sided truth. Final truth is not to be found in either an extreme rationalism or an extreme irrationalism. "Not by arguing, but by trying"—this is the watchword, not of irrationalism but of empiricism, a critical, rational, as-far-as-possible scientific empiricism; it must not be taken as a justification of the irrational resolution to believe the absurd and impossible. Existen-

tial thinking about the self and about choice and destiny has its affiliations with an existential theology, a theology of faith in the living God, a theology which leaves room for the expectation of revelation in the present and future, in personal experience and in the history of the world. But all of this can be conserved without a rejection of either a non-agnostic realistic theory of knowledge, or of the scientific method of testing generalizations, or of a critical but constructive philosophy of values, or of a rational empirical theology made up partly of verified religious knowledge and partly of a not fully proved but still reasonable faith. The religious man's faith is not built upon reason alone; nevertheless he should be ready always to give, as an answer to everyone that asks him, a reason for the faith and hope that are in him (cf. I Peter 3:15).

The truth as to theology and theological method, then, as I see it, lies between an extreme rationalism and an extreme irrationalism, in a rational empiricism, continuous with inductive science and common sense, but transcending them by virtue of an intuitional faith and a religious experience which make possible a certain limited body of verified religious knowledge, together with a more extensive content of reasonably defensible religious belief, the theology involved in this religious knowledge and religious belief being both valuational and existential. Religion, as I have said before, is doubly rooted in appreciation of values and awareness of reality, and it is only to be expected that both reality and values should be involved in religious thought and experience. Revelation is or would be manifestation of divine reality in human experience. Reality to be revealed must be causally efficacious; as divine the revealed reality must have a value that is worthy of worship, of supreme devotion. In other words, religious value, holiness, is the criterion of the divine as immanent, or revealed. Now the concept of holiness, as Otto pointed out, is, in spiritual religion, a composite concept, combining with the specifically religious value of the numinous the ideal or spiritual value of the morally good, and perhaps also the beautiful, the true, and in general the socially sacred. From the point of view of critical, ethical religion the numinous is the subjective form of the holy, or divine; its objective content is the ideal, the spiritual. Not all that glitters is gold, and not all that may impress anyone as numinous, as *mysterium tremendum et fascinosum*, is objectively and specifically revelation of the divine. The numinous element

in the holy is comparable to the secondary, mind-dependent qualities of the physical object; the ideal element, on the other hand, is like the primary qualities and relations of things, real independently of the subject's recognition and appreciation of them.

Facts of the promotion of the objectively holy, or divine, within the field of human experience and observation may be taken, then, as instances of empirical revelation of divinely functioning reality, or power, especially when such facts occur within the complex of specifically religious experience, as, for example and especially, in response to a religious adjustment. Such similar instances of dependable empirical revelation are proper data for generalization into laws of empirical theology. In arriving thus at verified theological knowledge, it will be noted, existential causality is necessarily involved, but, that being granted, the criterion of the genuine divineness of the revelation is true holiness, that is, critically determined religious value. The initial criterion may be the subjective value of numinousness, but the ultimate criterion is genuine ideality, spirituality, absoluteness in the realm of value.

There is opened up, then, as I have maintained for many years, a certain limited body of verified religious knowledge, as to what a dependable, divinely functioning reality can be depended upon to produce, and on what specific conditions. But the content of our valuational existential theology is not necessarily restricted to such scientifically verified and verifiable religious knowledge. Even in science there is an element of theory and hypothesis, as well as a growing body of verified knowledge. It is not otherwise in empirical theology. In fact, in empirical theology, broadly defined, there is a large and important place for faith, with its subjective convictions and surmises as to the nature and character of the partially revealed and partially known divine reality, or factor. Moreover, if we were justified in taking the highest spiritual value as criterion of the divine in the verified part of our theology, no doubt we shall be justified in continuing to think of the divine factor in its transcendent aspects as being also characterized by the same ideality, or spiritual value. From this point of view, then, the religious object, God, is not "wholly other," qualitatively speaking, but a being of whom it may be said that man at his best, as rational, aesthetic, social, and moral, exists in his image.

The affiliations of this valuational and existential empirical theology

are neither with the ultrarationalistic nor with the irrationalistic tendency. It holds to both the transcendence and the immanence of God, though not to an equal, distinctionless immanence throughout the whole of life and reality. It asserts revelation of the divine as a recognizable fact in such religious experience as will stand the test of critical thought—a revelation which, while special and specifically religious, might better be called natural, perhaps, than supernatural, even though taken as the effect of the divine agency as cause. With Martineau, this theology would maintain "the unity of God as cause and God as perfection." It would thus integrate more fully than Whitehead does the primordial and perfect nature of God with the full actuality of his "consequent" nature. It would avoid the impasse of the critical philosopher (e.g., Simmel) who claims to know *what* God is, or would be, namely, perfect Spirit, but confesses that he has no assurance *that* God is; at the same time it would avoid the opposite impasse of the mystic, who claims to be certain *that* God is, but finds it impossible to express in concepts *what* God is.

In their different and even mutually antagonistic ways, the negative theology of the extreme mystic and the revived authoritarian, exclusively existential theology would be agreed in rejecting any such theology of the rational-empirical, valuational-existential type as I am defending here. However, let me make it doubly clear and sure how willing and even anxious I am that irrationalism be given its due. There is always, as an empiricist I maintain, more in the concrete subject-matter of our ordinary judgments than we can get completely into any predicate, even a true predicate, or into any number of abstract predicates. But our judgments may be true, even if they never amount to the whole truth. And when the reactionary "dialectical" theologians discount all our value-judgments as being inevitably deflected from God's truth by the corrupting influence of "original sin," only this much should be conceded to them, namely, that evil desire does often tend to make our reasoning a misleading "rationalization" of what we *want* to do, so as to make it look like what we *ought* to do, and that a thorough moral conversion of the will may be needed to clarify the judgment as to good and evil, right and wrong. But in the realm of logical values especially, and the same thing might be said of much that belongs to other realms, the influence of the imperfect moral will on the valuation process is negligible. Two and two make four, whether

your will is bad or good. The judgment that no human value-judgment can be quite true is self-refuting, for this judgment itself is a value-judgment. We are well acquainted with absolute values—in the logical realm, if nowhere else. But if some absolute truth is a human possession in the logical realm, it is accessible also, to some extent, in the ethical realm. Other considerations remaining the same, it is ethically preferable and morally better to be consistent in our conduct than to be undependably inconsistent; the social good involves, as well as being involved in, the rational good for the individual. In ethics, as well as in other realms of interest, instead of despising what little we can know by using our minds, because there is so much that we don't know, let us hold on to what we do know, and it may be that with this as a beginning we may come to know more.

The existential theologian is on defensible ground when he insists that, instead of violently forcing the facts into the mold of our a priori religious conceptions, we should let ourselves be taught by reality what God is. Just so; but unless one has learned, through acquaintance with a dependable, ever-accessible, divinely functioning power, to distinguish between the divine factor and factors which are very far from being divine, the result of being taught by reality (nature and history) what God is may prove very confusing and misleading. History is the product in large part of the interplay of free human wills, many of them very far from being in accord with the will of God, so that we cannot safely affirm the reign of God in all history. And even in nature the "reign of law" is better understood after the analogy of established physical habit than as the present consciously willed activity of the ever-creative God. God may be creatively at work today, but the special field of his creative work at present may be largely in the spiritual sphere. He does not "temper the wind to the shorn lamb," nor does he miraculously deliver the well-intentioned from the natural consequences of their innocent mistakes. There is a reality, or power, however, which does afford, especially on condition of cultivation of the right religious adjustment, spiritual preparedness for anything that history or nature can bring upon us. This is divinely functioning reality revealed.

V

I turn now to my belated reply to the more important criticisms directed by my valued former student and present colleague, Dr.

Richard Niebuhr, against some of the salient points of my theological and philosophical system. In doing so I will not enter meticulously into the question as to just how far my critic is in agreement with the irrationalism and the exclusively existential character of the theology associated with the names of Kierkegaard, Barth, Brunner, Unamuno, and others more or less like them. Suffice it to say that in recent years he has been deeply influenced by them, in spite of the fact that he is himself a highly original, as well as profoundly religious, thinker. His dualistic theory of knowledge naturally and, as I think, logically leads him to a more or less sceptical and agnostic position with regard to the possibility of religious knowledge through religious experience. He seems inclined toward a sceptical rejection of all spiritual valuations except those made possible through supernatural revelation, and toward a fundamental irrationalism which can find no rational or other valuational criterion to justify the acceptance of any revelation-claim as valid. Consequently his theology of what he accepts as historic revelation comes to be a mere system of church dogmatics, a body of doctrine which we should not even attempt to defend on rational grounds. I speak here of what I take to be present tendencies only, and not, so far as I know, of finally chosen positions. The presuppositions of theology and the theological method which my colleague seems at present to favor appear to me to be inadequate, and at some points very vulnerable; but I have hopes of him, especially in view of his very pertinent criticisms of a position more one-sided still than his own, but lying in the same general direction. I may be mistaken, but as I see his situation it is this: The night of Kantian agnosticism is dark, and while I would hesitate to say that he is far from home, the clouds of Barthian irrationalism have hidden from his sight the stars of those eternal values which might otherwise have served to guide his feet aright amid the encircling Kantian gloom. As I remember, he was not ever thus, and I am full of confident hope that the kindly light of his innate rationality will yet lead him on "o'er moor and fen, o'er crag and torrent," till the agnostic night or, if not that, the obscuring irrationalism—or whatever it is—is finally and forever gone!

Dr. Niebuhr criticizes what he calls my "double definition of religion" as meaning that, despite my realistic interest, value is given precedence over being and eclecticism reintroduced (*The Nature of Religious Experience*, p. 96). For the reader's information let me say

that I have sometimes used the term "fundamental religion" for devotion to spiritual values (values which are absolute, eternally valid, "divine" in the sense of being worthy always of absolute devotion), and the term "experimental religion" for dependence and practical adjustment (prayer, trust, etc.) toward supreme being, but I have always insisted that the latter belongs to the essence of religion. Perhaps it would have been less misleading if I had used the terms spirituality and religion to indicate this distinction, although I still regard my former usage as very defensible. With this change of terms I would say that, while much spirituality has come out of religion, especially out of religion which is already to some extent spiritual, it is also true that there are other roots of spirituality besides characteristic experimental religion. And if we had to choose between the two (which fortunately we don't), it would be better to choose spirituality without religion than religion without spirituality. Spirituality without religion is deficient in dynamic; religion without spirituality is defective in direction.

If all this be "eclecticism," let my critics make the most of it. I do not think it involves eclecticism in any objectionable sense. Religion is means as well as end, and as in the case of art and friendship the appreciative contemplation of objects or persons as ends generally grows out of experience of their value as means, so it is, generally speaking, in religion. Disinterested worship of God as end commonly grows out of gratitude for what is regarded as his grace and goodness to us. And, may I ask my critic, Is the objectivity of scientific investigation necessarily vitiated when the investigator is interested in the possible value of his results, as in engineering and medical science and educational psychology? As a matter of fact, the practical importance of his problem may make the investigator all the more careful lest he be deceived. It seems to me that the objection to regarding religion as instrumental to other spiritual values (as well as being itself of intrinsic value) would be justified only if it were in fact true that religion *has* no value for morality or any other spiritual value. That this is the case I do not believe that Mr. Niebuhr himself would maintain. I am not at all intimidated or driven out of countenance, therefore, by the insinuation that an empirical theologian who is interested in values is thereby incapacitated from giving a straightforward, scientifically accurate report of the facts (pp. 98-101). The temptation to

let "wishful thinking" tamper with the record must always be guarded against, but this is no temptation but such as is common to observers, and it is gratuitous to assume that it is only in all other cases except that of the theologian that, with the temptation, there will be provided a way of escape, so that he may be able successfully to endure it. If I, for instance, in formulating the laws of empirical theology have "spoken evil" in the sense suggested, let my critic bear specific witness of the evil; but if not, I would ask him, Why smitest thou me?

There are, of course, many theological questions which mere scientific observation and description cannot settle, and here, I freely admit, I should want to give due weight to what I may call an essentially Christian faith and hope. Among such questions are those of freedom, immortality, and the future of the reign of God's will on earth. I see no reason to suppose that where knowledge is not yet possible hopeful thinking is bound to be more misleading than hopeless thinking or chronic pessimism.

In pointing out that systematic theology, despite its recourse to empirical modes of thought, has not been able to show progress in recent years at all comparable with that made by the "disinterested" sciences of the history and the psychology of religion, Mr. Niebuhr is careful to parry an apparently expected thrust to the effect that this is largely the consequence of the philosophical agnosticism characteristic of most contemporary theologians. His main argument here is that the philosophical agnosticism of the natural scientist does not prevent his gaining new scientific knowledge, and that the agnostic attitude should not of itself prove more of an obstacle to the discovery of new truth about God (pp. 98, 99). To this there is a definite answer. The natural scientist who is an epistemological dualist, that is, who maintains that the independently existing world in which he believes is never experienced to any extent by him directly, is not really in the position which his theory supposes. If he could never have perceptual experience of objective nature he could never verify any of his ideas about it. But, just because his dualistic theory is *not* true, he *can* test his theories about the physical world by direct experience of the world, and thus make progress in scientific knowledge. In other words, in his actual procedure he is not guided by his dualistic and logically agnostic philosophy, but by his common sense, according to which direct experience and knowledge of independent reality are

possible. But philosophical dualism, with its consequent theoretical agnosticism, is much more of a deterrent to the use of scientific method in religion and theology than it is in the realm of ordinary sense-experience and natural science. The assumption that divine reality is not and cannot be discovered, or revealed, in religious experience is in itself enough, naturally, to inhibit any attempt to extend our knowledge of divine reality on the basis of its manifestation within the field of human experience and observation. But where this agnostic inhibition is not present, as in naïve, common-sense religion, there has been throughout the centuries a growing body of empirical religious knowledge stated in definitely theological terms. This *virtually scientific* knowledge of the plain man I have attempted to throw into *explicitly scientific* form in a series of "laws of empirical theology." It may be that the absence of any conspicuous progress beyond what was known before is due, in part, to all the more important empirically discoverable facts and laws having been discovered by somebody already. But even so, the stating of this knowledge in generalized form should have positive value in guiding others to make the verification for themselves. Furthermore, it is to be expected that a normative psychology of religion may yield scientific results which, when formulated in terms of the dependable, divinely functioning factor, will make important new knowledge possible in theology, as well as in religious psychology.

I am not greatly impressed by Mr. Niebuhr's warning that a valuational approach will mean that theology will lose its independent status, becoming "dependent on the prevailing systems of ethics." Borrowing its first principles from ethics, or sociology, or psychology, it will become, he claims, "a part of one of these sciences" (pp. 100, 101). I do not see this at all. Every science beyond mathematics presupposes the results of other sciences, but it is free to turn aside on occasion to re-examine the "results" of those other sciences. It does not "lose its independence" in any sense in which independence is desirable. And why should the theologian be *obliged* to accept some *prevailing* system of ethics? If, however, as the only alternative, no place whatever be given in theology to an appreciation of spiritual values, what consequences are to be expected? The answer, as I see it, is either agnosticism or a return to something like the instability of primitive, superstitious religion. Only by combining the valuational with the empirical test has historic religion progressed as it has toward the spirituality and reasonableness of what it is at its best today.

VI

Mr. Niebuhr objects to value-theology as being religiously unsatisfactory, for the alleged reason that "religion demands that God be loved for his own sake, rather than for the sake of any value, high or low, material or spiritual, which he is conceived to conserve, promote, or increase" (p. 102). But why should we love God, if he is not worthy of our love? And how can we believe that he is worthy of our love if he is not concerned with the fate of any value, even the most ideally spiritual? Shall we love him just because he is a sort of cosmic dictator? How can we distinguish a God from a devil, save in terms of value? Why worship being as such, even a being supreme in power, unless that being is good enough to be worthy of our worship? And if a Supreme Being is good enough to deserve our worship as end, must he not be good enough to justify our trust for the promotion of the highest values?

To think of God as instrumental to values is not necessarily to regard values as "of greater value than God" (p. 102). According to ethical theism the highest values are realized in God's own character; they are part of what God is. God can thus be the supreme end and the supreme means for the promotion of the highest ends in others. The only sense in which the view I am defending would make spiritual values "logically prior to God" (p. 102) is that they are worthy of our absolute devotion, even if we may be in doubt as to God's existence. It may be that God is the original source of all true values, but unless we believe with the extreme monist and the mystic in the sole reality of God, it is difficult to see why we should be required to hold to "the sole value of God" (p. 103).

It seems to me the nemesis of the repudiation of all spiritual values as criteria of the divine, when objection is made against regarding "spirituality, personality and moral goodness as essential elements in the Godhead" (p. 102). Mr. Niebuhr goes on to say that when God is thus viewed, after the manner of ethical theism, theology "faces increasing difficulties in explaining much of the divine behavior and needs to exclude a great deal in human experience as irrelevant to the knowledge of God" (pp. 102, 103). But why should we interpret as "divine behavior" what is antagonistic to moral goodness? If man is a free agent, we cannot be sure of the reign of God in history unless man freely dedicates his will to the carrying out of the good will of God, and makes good use of his opportunities for finding out what the

right thing to do, or the will of God, is. Divine judgment may come upon human evil in accordance with the law of cause and effect, but, if it be true that "God is love," this fact of "judgment," while it may vindicate in some sense the sovereignty of God, does not mean that in the fullest sense God's will is being done in this world of sin and its necessarily evil consequences. It may even be questioned whether it is not misleading to take all particular events in nature without distinction as being, apart from considerations of the necessity of cosmic order, revelation of the will of God. It is only as being necessarily involved in the dependable order of nature, which is on the whole good as basic to the evolution and education of spiritual beings, that we can look upon certain natural catastrophes which we intuitively feel to be disastrous, at least for the time being, to precious human values, and reasonably judge them to have happened in accordance with the permissive will of a perfectly trustworthy God.

Mr. Niebuhr's criticism of what he stigmatizes as "religious narcissism" (pp. 103, 104) seems to me rather far-fetched. To love God is religion and to love one's neighbor is morality, and these, in his opinion, are all right—very good in fact. But to love the love of neighbor is moralism and to love the love of God is religionism, and these are moral and religious narcissism, which are very bad! But what is Mr. Niebuhr himself doing when he commends morality and religion? Is he not mildly loving the love of man and the love of God? Is he too among the narcissists? But surely this is very natural and even inevitable for a reflective person. Is Professor Royce's *Philosophy of Loyalty* a glorification of narcissism? May not a person be loyal to loyalty without ceasing to be loyal to persons and causes? Generally speaking, it is the person who appreciates the value of morality and religion both as means and as ends who is most likely to *be* moral and religious.

Mr. Niebuhr deprecates the tendency of valuational theology "to neglect the principle of individuality in religion" (p. 104). Religion is "stubbornly individual," whereas "value-theologies tend to make the revelations [of particular religions] incidental" (p. 105). But I would point out that real revelations cannot contradict each other, and so cannot, in so far as they are valid, keep the people of different religions apart. It seems to me to be one of the strongest considerations in favor of a critical empirical valuational theology that it may be expected to make ultimately for universality and unity in religion. In

saying this I do not mean to advocate any complaisant yielding on essentials for the mere sake of syncretism and union. What is called for is the application to all religions of the most rigorous valuational and empirical tests. What stands such tests in one religion is not likely to conflict with what stands the same tests in other religions.

VII

To his objections to valuational theology on scientific and religious grounds Mr. Niebuhr adds criticisms in the name of philosophy. Ethics is necessarily dogmatic, he claims, and to base theology on ethics is to make it partake of the dogmatism of the ethical system (pp. 105 f). That intrinsic values must be appreciatively intuited and cannot be demonstrated, either deductively or by mere scientific investigation, is pretty commonly admitted, and rightly so. In that sense ethics, like most normative sciences, may be said to be dogmatic. But Dr. Niebuhr's ethics is extraordinarily dogmatic. It rests upon an appreciation of values which is itself dependent upon his already very dogmatic theology. According to Mr. Niebuhr we have no knowledge of any absolute values which we can make fundamental in ethics or theology (pp. 101, 111). Our values are so inevitably relative and subjective as to be probably quite "out of line with divine ideas of goodness and justice" (pp. 109, 110). God's will, it is held, is not determined by any such ideals as we can recognize; rather is God's will the source and creator of all value. Only God has intrinsic value, it would seem, and instead of God being worshipful because he is good, he is good because he is God, that is, because he is the supreme power in the universe, and right ways of acting are right only because he decrees that they shall be (pp. 102, 103). Dr. Niebuhr decries devotion to universally valid values such as may be recognized by every man, and would substitute therefor allegiance to an individual God or gods (p. 104), thus making man dependent in his ethics as in his theology upon some unique special revelation for the authenticity of which one has no criterion—with the possible exception of miracle, which, however, my critic hesitates to stress (pp. 111, 112).

Mr. Niebuhr charges value-theology with not taking value relativity seriously (pp. 106 ff). All our values are necessarily relative, he holds, and so none of them can be absolutely valid. Now I would readily admit that there is a sense in which all values are relative to some

process, but at the same time I would maintain that some of the values we can appreciate are absolutely valid. Value may be defined as that special kind of quality which things, persons, or processes have by virtue of their relation to some end-directed process. From this point of view values may be classified, not only by their species (logical, aesthetic, moral, religious, economic, etc.), but also as either positive or negative, and as either instrumental or terminal. The value of a process may be appraised in relation to its end, and the value of the end in relation to the process directed toward it, while the value of instrumental means may be estimated in relation to either ends or end-directed processes. Thus all values are *formally* relative. But this does not prevent some ends and end-directed processes, or at least one such end or process, from being absolutely valid and obligatory.

Such an absolutely valid and imperative end is the spiritual perfection and greatest possible ultimate well-being of personality, that is, of all persons; and such a process is the process of working in the wisest possible way for the realizing of this end. Or, to state what, from the standpoint of ethical theism, is the same thing viewed in its religious aspect, the absolutely valid end, or process, or value, is the realization of the good will of God. I admit that the taking of such an end, or process, or value as absolute involves appreciative intuition, but this is no argument against the truth of the value-judgment in which the intuition is expressed. And, as a matter of fact, absolute values are very familiar to us, in the logical sphere at least. The universal and eternal validity of the multiplication table in the sphere of number will serve as an illustration. Indeed the judgment that no values are absolutely valid is self-refuting, since the sceptic who sincerely makes such a statement really means that this proposition, at least, is absolutely true, that is, has absolute value for thought.

Following Professor D. H. Parker, Mr. Niebuhr calls attention to what he calls "the conflict and tragedy of values" (p. 109). The conflict may be admitted as between human values and those of certain injurious bacteria and forms of animal life, especially of insect life. But we have no right to abandon in despair the ideal of a harmonizing of the imperative values for human beings, or, in other words, the Kingdom-of-God ideal. "Social values," it is asserted, "require the sacrifice of the values of isolated persons, and vice versa" (*ibid.*). Ultimately considered, I do not think that this will turn out to be so. The rational

good is the social good, and with the postulate of immortality it is logically possible to believe that the individual who has sacrificed his goods and even life itself for the social good has not really lost his own highest ultimate and eternal good.

VIII

Toward the end of his trenchant and formidable article, Professor Niebuhr makes the striking statement that the important question for religion is not the question, whether a God exists, but rather, what realities have the value or potency of deity (p. 114). The religious need, he thinks, is not "for that which will conserve men's highest values," but "for that which makes life worth living" (p. 115). For myself, I cannot see that both are not concerns of tremendous importance. We need both the transcendent and the immanent aspects of deity. We need God both as means and as end. Life may be worth living and occasionally has been, even without *explicit* religion, provided it is lived for truth, or ideal beauty, or righteousness and human welfare. History can furnish examples to substantiate this statement. But, other things being equal, life can be much more worth living with the right sort of religion than without it.

What I have just quoted from my critic makes me wonder whether what we have here is not another interesting illustration of the tendency of extremes in philosophy to meet and partially coincide. If the question of a transcendent existing God be not important for his religious thought, just how different at this point is his position from that of Professor Bixler, whose similar indifference to the question of a really existent God was noted toward the beginning of this review and reply? Are we not to conclude that an exclusively valuational theology and an (at least initially) exclusively existential theology alike tend to agnosticism as to the existence of God, and tend to cover up the agnosticism by discounting the importance of the question? I recall that one of the reviewers of *The Nature of Religious Experience* expressed the opinion that Mr. Niebuhr's criticism of my position was "devastating." That I do not see at all; but I will go farther than the reviewer and say that, if either the extreme valuational theology of Professor Bixler, or the almost as extreme existential theology of Professor Niebuhr should prevail at all generally, the effect not only upon theology but upon religion and the life of the church will be

devastating indeed. These mutually contrary positions represent approximately opposite limits of the swing of the theological pendulum, the one, supported by a metaphysically agnostic phenomenology, in the direction of a negative rationalism; the other, influenced by Barth, Unamuno, Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and back of them all, by Kierkegaard, a swing altogther too far in the direction of a stultifying irrationalism. But, rationalism or irrationalism, what matters it to religion, if they both meet in an agnostic indifference to the existence of God? Or was it an underlying epistemological dualism and agnosticism that led them thus to choose, the one the path to the left called Danger, and the other the path to the right, called Destruction, instead of the task of climbing the Hill Difficulty between the two extremes, and thus making headway toward the House Beautiful, the Delectable Mountains, and the Celestial City?

It will be evident to the reader that my colleague and I differ sharply in our *opinions* at a number of points, and especially in our opinions about values. But I think we do not differ so sharply in our value-appreciations themselves. Nor would I, in saying this, plead guilty to any lapse into the irrationalism which I have been concerned to criticize. Far from it! I recognize that the heart may have its reasons which mere reason cannot fully comprehend, and I am far from denying to the heart any place in the attitude and judgment I am expressing; but I am quite as certain that it would be possible also to give for the attitude indicated perfectly good and amply sufficient reasons.

COMMUNICATIONS

THE ORTHODOX CHURCHES OF THE BALKANS IN 1939

By Clarence A. Manning

There is a new spirit moving in the Orthodox Churches of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, which promises to play an important role in those countries in the future, and which will, perhaps, not be without significance for the rest of Christianity. At first sight this may not be evident, for the movement for any form of liturgical reform is still very weak, and a superficial observer would not detect any change in the general religious life of the people. Yet it is impossible to talk with the leaders of these Churches without realizing that they are endeavoring to solve their peculiar problems in their own way, and many details of this endeavor will strike a sympathetic chord in the Western observer.

A new period of history opened for the Eastern Churches during the World War, when a number of the more intelligent and progressive of their younger clergy were forced to come to England and America. We all remember the work of Meletios of Athens, later Patriarch of Constantinople and of Alexandria, and that of Nikolay Velimirovich, now Bishop of Zhicha, in Yugoslavia. Incidentally, Bishop Nikolay is probably the only foreigner who has ever filled St. Paul's Cathedral, London, and the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, in New York, and, in his native language, he is an even more effective preacher. These men, and others like them, came to know the nature of Anglo-American Christianity, especially in its Anglican form, and when they returned to their native countries, they studied how to apply the lessons they had learned to their native Church life. The result has been surprising, and at every turn one sees evidences of their activity.

In Yugoslavia, Nikolay was ably assisted by Father Sebastian Dabovich, and in this quiet priest we have a good illustration of the complicated threads that are forming the web of Balkan Christianity. Father Dabovich is an American citizen, born in California nearly eighty years ago. He was educated in Serbia and Russia, and was for many years in charge of the Serb congregations in the United States. When finally a bishop was sent over, he returned to Yugoslavia to live

on a small pension, and within his humble means to introduce to his people some of the valuable innovations in American Christianity. The result of Nikolay's activity has been the more or less formal organization of a group of lay preachers, or lay missionaries, who are working to revive the religious life of the people. Some of these men and women are cultivated and educated. Others of them are peasants who still wear their peasant costumes and circulate among the peasantry, talking to them in a manner which they can understand. There has been a great development of singing among these people, not necessarily of hymns, in our sense, but of paraphrases of the New Testament and of the lives of the saints in the style of the old popular Serb poetry.

I went up, on the five hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, to the Monastery of Ravanitsa, founded by Knez Lazar who fell in the battle to gain a heavenly kingdom. In the car were about forty clergy and peasant missionaries, and the whole way from Chuprija to Ravanitsa they sang with a fervor and a zeal that would have done credit to the old Scotch Covenanters or Cromwell's Ironsides. At the church services there were gathered thousands of peasants, coming with their blankets and food to spend the night on the hillsides or under any shelter available (there was a driving rain the whole time), and it was easy to see the effect that the singing of these men, and the sermon of the Bishop opposing imperialism and internationalism, had upon the assembled multitude. Here we have the application of something directly new upon the peasant life, but in a manner that does not form a break with the past, but endeavors to save the values of the past, and to breathe new life into the traditions of past centuries.

Later I went out with Nikolay to his cathedral church at Zhicha. He is rebuilding and restoring the original plant, the ancient see of St. Sava. He is building churches all over his diocese, restoring those which have fallen into decay, and inspiring throughout the country something of his spirit. Here, too, he has built a memorial to the Patriarch Varnava, who died during the struggle to oppose a Concordat with the Roman Catholic Church which was grossly unfair to the Orthodox, and which marks one of the darkest pages in the history of Yugoslavia.

In Greece there has been organized similar work, especially under the influence of the Brotherhood *Zoe*. Here, too, schools, personal

religion, organized charities, etc., are being developed strictly in accordance with the Orthodox tradition, but with close attention to the best that Western Christianity has to offer. The new Metropolitan of Athens, Chrysanthos, is much interested in all these undertakings, and with him are some of the young Orthodox clergy who have been educated in the United States.

In Bulgaria all these movements gather around the Metropolitan Stefan, a personal friend of many of the American and British clergy, and again a fearless man who dares to stand out almost alone among public leaders to resist the insidious pressure which is being exerted on many aspects of the national life by the new philosophies of Europe. Around him are some of the more far-sighted Protestant leaders of the country, such as Dr. M. Markov, who, with his wife, is a graduate of the New York Bible Teachers Training School. More and more these people are coming to see that Bishop Horatio Southgate, who went out to the Ottoman Empire as a representative of the Episcopal Board of Foreign Missions one hundred years ago, was correct in his belief that better results could be secured by revivifying the Orthodox Churches than by attempting to create new religious bodies in the Balkans. The Near East Colleges, and such institutions as the Methodist supported American school at Lovech, are doing splendid work in spreading certain aspects of American culture and ideals, but they all are finding more sympathetic support among the Orthodox than among the Balkan Protestants. This is one of the paradoxes of Balkan religion.

All this does not mean that there is, as yet, a tremendous religious revival in the Balkan states. It would be too much to expect, and indeed, we could not say justly that in the United States there is such a revival. And here we are not bothered with the tremendous problems that are agitating peoples who are still almost in the first generation of freedom, and who have passed through nearly thirty years of constant struggle and political alarms. Yet the seed is planted, and with each successive year the Orthodox Church, though under the same forms, is showing more and more signs of vitality. This is evident in the sermons which are constantly being preached. Take, for example, the Cathedral of St. Alexander Nevsky in Sofia. The sermon comes at the conclusion of the service, but the attendance scarcely drops off. The preachers are well selected, and are fully aware of the meaning

of modern culture and of modern problems. The old accusations that were so often made in the past that the higher clergy cared little or nothing for their priests or congregations is rapidly passing. Stefan, Nikolay, and many others, are known and accessible. Perhaps the village priests have not felt the new spirit so markedly, but with the improvement of theological education this too is being achieved, and only a few years of peace and progress would be necessary to reform completely the church life of the people.

As regards the higher intellectual life of the scholars, we can say the same thing. It is true that, at present, there is no distinctly scholarly theological journal published in Bulgaria, but this does not mean that there is a lack of scholarship and of serious thought. In Yugoslavia there is a definite school of theology which can trace its descent to Nyegosh, and which has been made familiar to Americans by many of the addresses of Professor Michael Pupin and the work of Bishop Nikolay. It combines a full recognition of the material universe, as scientists have analyzed it, with a fervent belief in the Christian Faith, as the Orthodox world has inherited it. It does not uphold obscurantism, but it does recognize the limitations of the scientific method, and seeks to draw its reconciliation from human nature and the world as human beings know it.

Another problem that is concerning the Orthodox leaders more and more seriously is the future of Orthodoxy in America. It is true that attempts are being made to send bishops to America to care for scattered colonies and individuals, but the realization is growing that, under the pressure of American life and the English language, the younger members of the congregations cannot be expected to remain loyal to a church where the services are in a tongue which they barely understand. There are many problems here of jealousies at home, of the unfortunate embitterment of national feeling in the Balkans, and of changes in practice in the century-old Orthodox manner of doing things. At the same time the leaders have been confronted with the often still unsolved problems of the disintegration of the Œcumenical Patriarchate, of the changes that have come over Mount Athos in the past years, and they are not inclined to resist any solution which seems to be fair and satisfactory to all concerned. This does not mean that a solution is near or easy, but it is in the minds of the thinkers and the

men of vision, and we can look forward to attempts to solve the problems and yet maintain the fundamental virtues of Orthodoxy.

It will be a long while before the external form of the Orthodox services change. It will be still longer before many of our Western phrases acquire a real meaning in the Balkans. It is still all too easy to pick flaws in their thinking and their practice; fundamentally, however, we can be sure that the Orthodox Church is going to stand for those ideals of human life and liberty that we have long regarded as Christian. The Church may be compelled to bend before the storm of force, but it will remain loyal to itself, as it did during the long Mohammedan oppression. Today it needs sympathy and understanding and not condemnation, and if the Western nations, which are proud of their progress and their defence of the human spirit, will understand and do their part, we can be sure that the Orthodox Churches of the Balkans will do theirs. And, in all probability, when the last accounts are drawn up, we shall find that they have more to contribute than even their most enthusiastic friends think possible at the present time. Despite political uncertainty, and despite Fascist and Communist pressure (often disguised), the leaders and the people understand what they are to do, and with each decade the sad results of five hundred years of oppression are being thrown off. The Balkan Churches are taking within themselves the best aspects of the religious life of the West, and they are doing it without a violent overturn, without alienating the masses of the people, and without acting contrary to their own traditions and spirit.

Wei Shih Er Shih Lun, The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation-only. By VASUBANDHU. Translated from the Chinese version of HSÜAN TSANG, Tripitaka Master of the T'ang Dynasty, by CLARENCE H. HAMILTON. (American Oriental Series, Vol. 13). New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1938. 82 pp. $1.50.

In a careful Introduction, Professor Hamilton explains the value of Hsüan[1] Tsang's translation of this classical text of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Of the four extant translations this is the best. Moreover, we possess a Chinese commentary on this text by one of Hsüan Tsang's closest followers, K'uei Chi. For many years Professor Hamilton has been engaged upon a study of this treatise; he gratefully acknowledges the help received from such an authority as De la Vallée Poussin, whose translation of Hsüan Tsang's rendering of Vasubandhu's other fundamental text on Representation-only, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, prepared the ground for the present version. Hamilton's work, which fortunately also reproduces the Chinese text, is scholarly throughout. His notes are abundant and show a great deal of erudition, but nevertheless, I have certain reservations to make. From the translations which I have checked I have reason to doubt whether the author, while thoroughly at home in Buddhist terminology, possesses the necessary reading experience in Chinese to be always a safe guide.

On page 3, quoting K'uei Chi's introduction, Hamilton translates: "My master did not regard me as stupid. He commissioned me to make manifest his thought." This would sound like arrogance in the mouth of a humble Buddhist if the first part of the sentence did not simply mean: "The master, not regarding my stupidity. . . ." On page 4 he quotes from the same author: "Easy to intrust is a gem worth two cities, but difficult to glimpse is the Jewel of the Law," and he explains in a footnote, "In this pregnant saying the first two characters, as Dr. Hu Shih has kindly explained to me, convey the suggestion of a piece of jade in value equal to a double or 'twin' city." I think Professor Hamilton must have misunderstood Hu Shih, for the "gem," of which the first part of the phrase contains a suggestion, is no other than the Jewel of the Law itself, and I understand the

1. In the Chinese text, on page 18, the mutilated taboo-character for Hsüan has been erroneously printed.

sentence to mean: "(Although) easy to rely on (i.e., dependable) as a linked wall (i.e., a strong system of fortifications, or possibly a twin city), (yet) it is difficult to catch a glimpse of the Jewel of the Law."

More serious is the complete misunderstanding of the first Stanza on page 21. Hamilton translates: "If representations are without real objects, then their spatial and temporal determination, the indetermination of the (perceiving) stream of consciousness, and their action, must be unfounded." I understand this quite differently,— "If representations are without real objects, then, even though they be spatially and temporally determined, but the continuity is indetermined, their functioning will not correspondingly be established." The particle *chi* used antithetically with a negative phrase, is not merely "then," but has concessive force. The character *ying* is here, and elsewhere, wrongly translated "must," whereas it has its full sense of "to correspond with."

The end of the explanation of this first Stanza is also thoroughly mistranslated, owing to the translator's disregard of the antithetical relation of the different parts of the sentence. On page 23 he translates "then (1) their determination in space, (2) their determination in time, (3) the indetermination of the stream of consciousness (doing the perceiving), and (4) the existence of functioning things are all without foundation." I understand it as follows: "then, even though they be determined in space and time, if the continuity be not determined, then all the things of practical function will not correspondingly be established."

Again, on page 25: "From this, although there are no real objects apart from consciousness,[2] spatial and temporal determination are not unfounded." The text means: "From this, although there are no real objects apart from consciousness, yet, given a spatial and temporal determination, they may be constituted."

These are grave errors of construction—examples of the devastating effect which the reading of too much Buddhistic Chinese may have on one's grammar.

I also question the correctness of the translator's constant rendering of the word *teng* by "etc." It is true that, in the second Stanza on page 25, the word is explained in a sense approaching this, but I be-

2. *Li-shih* is here correctly rendered, but why not take it in the same technical sense on page 21, where it is translated: "If we abandon (the notion) that . . ." which certainly is not its meaning.

lieve that frequently it clearly retains its full meaning of "category." What, for example, does it mean that (p. 21) "(persons) having bad eyes see hairs and flies"; or (p. 23) "why is it that the hairs, etc., seen by persons with defective eyes do not function as hairs, etc.?" Even to a Buddhist philosopher this must seem nonsense. I believe that, in the first case, one should understand: "(persons) having bad eyes see hairs and flies (as being of one) category" (i.e., they cannot distinguish between them), and that the second sentence means: "why is it that (things belonging to) the category of hairs seen by persons with defective eyes do not function as (things belonging to) the category of hairs?" (because such a person also mistakes flies for hairs). This makes proper sense.

I regret that I have not had time to check all the Stanzas, but errors such as those indicated put one a little on one's guard, which is regrettable in a book of so much real merit and scholarship.

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A Bibliography of Shinto: A Collection of Shinto Literature from the Oldest Times until Kei-o 4 (1868). Arranged in chronological order with Goju–On index of the books and an alphabetical list of the authors, compilers, etc. Compiled and edited by Genchi Kato, under the auspices of the Meiji Japan Society. Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1938. vii + 646 pp. 13.50 yen.

The Meiji Japan Society, under whose auspices *A Bibliography of Shinto* was published, is one of the well-known learned societies in Japan and was organized, at the passing of the Emperor Meiji in 1911, under the leadership of Dr. Genchi Kato for the purpose of starting activities to further cultural enlightenment. Besides giving regular monthly lectures on the subject of Japanese religion and thought, the Society through its Research Bureau, headed by Dr. Kato himself, was instrumental in bringing to light a number of rare documents and hitherto unknown manuscripts, accompanied by scholarly annotations and critical comments. Some of the Society's publications were in English, such as *Kogo Shu-oi,* or *Gleanings from Ancient Stories,* an important Shinto work of as early as the ninth century, and, as a Shinto source, second only in importance to the earliest annals of Japan, *Records of Ancient Matters.* But no publication is as valuable

as this bibliography. It is concluded with the Restoration of 1868, and works of a later date are left out entirely, but as a bibliography of historical works on Shinto, it stands far above similar publications recently brought out.

In the first place, it is comprehensive; it includes not only all known writings on Shinto, but also quite a few works which have remained unknown and are here for the first time brought to public attention. Heuristic efforts were made to embrace the length and breadth of the country; the lists of works on Shinto in more than thirty important libraries were gone over; outstanding provincial shrines and temples also were inspected by Dr. Kato and his associates. The extent of the painstaking and hazardous research in this connection may be imagined, if one recalls that in a discussion of the Shinto pantheon many millions of deities are mentioned, and this vast number are enshrined in different parts of the country—the latest official number of shrines being 111,376. Being destitute of an organized theology which would bring them under one tenet, these many millions of deities have their own stories to tell—stories that quite often encompass two milleniums —and those stories, in writing, are preserved in their respective shrines as sacred documents that do not permit of public inspection. So the untiring efforts of Dr. Kato and his associates—those efforts which extended to a score of years in order to furnish a complete list—deserve in themselves unstinted and wholehearted appreciation from all students of Japanese religion.

Comprehensive as Dr. Kato's bibliography is, it is by no means exhaustive. Even casual examination may evoke certain omissions, especially in the field of Buddhistic writings that are considered to have important bearings on the evolution of Shintoism. In the Classical Period, for instance, Ennin's *Pilgrimage to China in Search of Buddhism (Nitto Guho Junreiko Ki)* is not listed, while Enchin's less important work *Memoirs of My Visit to China (Gyoreki Sho)* is. I am not going to discuss the relative importance of the two works just mentioned, but it is the part of justice to remark that one is just as indispensable as the other in the consideration of that interesting problem—the ever-growing rapprochement of Buddhism and Shinto in that period. In the list of the Kamakura Period works, Shinran's *Kyo-Gyo-Shin-Sho Monrui*, or *Extracts of Texts from Sutras that Reveal the True Teaching of the True Land of Buddha*, is also not included,

though it is well known that the last chapter of the work is important as evidence of the monotheistic reaction against the intricate polytheistic syncretism of Shinto and Buddhism of the preceding period. Another omission that caught my attention is that of important documents that explain the attitude of Zen towards the dual Shintoism of the period. Myoha's *Life of Muso Kokushi,* for instance, mentions the establishment of a Hachiman Shrine in the Tenryuji Monastery, a fact which seems to me highly significant.

In the technical matter of arrangement, as well, this bibliography lives up to the strict requirements of Occidental scholarship. It is chronological in order, and the entire list is divided into four sections: (1) Ancient Period (from early times to A.D. 800); (2) Classical Period (800-1200); (3) Medieval Period (1200-1600); and (4) Modern Period (1600-1868). As the period last mentioned, also known as the Tokugawa Period, was most prolific in writing, and as Shinto developed during that time into more than ten different schools, the list of that period is subdivided under as many different headings. In a glance, it will help to do away with the erroneous ideas held by Western scholars that Shinto is the ancient and indigenous faith of the people, and as such, primitive, pure and simple in character.

A commendable feature of this bibliography, especially from the standpoint of Western students, is that the complete list is arranged in alphabetical order, though another arrangement according to the Japanese syllabary is also included. Another beneficial feature is that all names of writers, as well as all the titles of the works, carry with them transliterations in Romanized form. The Japanese have an arbitrary and irregular way of pronouncing names and titles, since the Chinese characters used are subject to varied renditions. Therefore even a conscientious and well-trained scholar is liable to commit errors. In this bibliography, the date is carefully given, and when it is dubious it is so marked. Japanese works are oftener than not careless in this matter of dating; even when dating is made, it is done according to the Japanese calendar, with specific eras and sexagenary cycle signs. The mechanical attention needed to translate those datings into Christian ones is appalling. The bibliography is also helpful to students in that it mentions, not only different editions and the place of publication, but also the different series in which the publication is to be located. When the writing is a manuscript in the possession of a

particular person, or when it is in a private collection, it is so noted. This is especially useful for Shinto students, as Shinto manuscripts are often kept inaccessible in private collections as family or shrine treasures.

With such an intelligently planned and well executed bibliography available, students of Shinto are in a position to organize their research with more assurance and encouragement. So far the Western works on Shinto have been, as most pioneering works are, methodological but insubstantial, suggestive but sketchy, though the late Mr. Ponsonby-Fane's and Dr. D. C. Holtom's works are noteworthy exceptions. For this reason, the study of Shinto still remains in a large measure an open field for the academic ventures of Western scholars. It may be noted that in Japan there is a sort of revival of Shinto taking place, and innovations and renovations in growing numbers are being attempted in the interpretation of the native cult. As Shinto is still very much alive in Japan, and has an active interest in the nation's polity, especially through its traditional affiliation with the Imperial Household, it often defies objective and scientific scrutiny. There is a chance that the true story of Shinto will be written some place other than Japan, and by foreign students. For them, as for all others, this bibliography of Shinto will prove indispensable and invaluable.

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The Psalms. By MOSES BUTTENWIESER. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938. xix + 911 pp. $5.00.

The Book of Psalms is a reflection of the whole course of Hebrew religious devotion and piety. More than any other book of the Old Testament it affords a vivid insight into the "evolutionary process" of Israel's religious life and thought. Its various poems form a continuous literary development from the earliest period of Hebrew faith to at least the middle of the third century B.C. They do not represent a lowering in the vitality of religion; rather the spirit of great prophecy breathes through the whole book. The Psalms are an invaluable witness to the history of Israel during some of the most obscure periods of its development. Far from lacking in materials by which they may be dated, they frequently bear eloquent testimony both to the historical circumstances which evoked them and to their

actual authorship. In an encyclopedic work of almost 900 pages in which he elaborates the foregoing views, Professor Buttenwieser has given us as his final contribution to Old Testament studies a treatment of the Book of Psalms which enters upon a fresh discussion of many subjects which have long since been considered settled.

The originality and independence of Professor Buttenwieser's mind is apparent everywhere. When to originality and independence are added massive learning, warm appreciation, and mastery of technical equipment, a necessary prerequisite for the true apprehension of any Biblical work, scholarship is running in a high tradition. And yet, despite all the richness of the volume, there is a strange reversion to a stage of Biblical study which most scholars would agree to be long since outmoded. For Professor Buttenwieser concerns himself at great length with matters which seriously occupied another generation, but no longer our own. What is more difficult to understand is that he practically ignores whole areas of modern Old Testament study. His neglect of the criticism of literary types is a major defect in the work. His disposal of the important treatment of the *Thronbesteigung* hymns by Professor Mowinckel as "mythological rubbish" is surely inept. Considerations of rhythm and metre receive little attention and are nowhere discussed at any length. While he shows great familiarity with comparative literature of Semitic and other peoples, he seldom gives an illuminating comment showing the place of the Hebrew poem in its wider context of world literature and culture. Yet, it is to be hoped that while Professor Buttenwieser has revived what seem to us to be dead issues and has neglected some very live ones, his work may receive the study and attention it abundantly deserves.

The most striking feature of the commentary is its allocation of the various poems to their historical setting and situation. Thus twenty-six poems fall in the pre-exilic period, six in the exilic, and all the rest in the post-exilic. Psalm 68B is a companion piece to the Song of Deborah and is written by the same author. It belongs to the Book of the Wars of Yahweh and constitutes an extremely important source for reconstructing the political history of the period. Psalm 81B (81: 6-17) comes from the time of Joshua and is an authoritative source for the earliest history of Israel. It was written to promote the great religious enterprise described in the original form of Joshua 24 and has the Decalogue for its immediate source. Psalm 65B is an incanta-

tion for rain and is primitive in extreme. Psalms 60A and 57B/60B are genuine psalms of David. Psalm 24B, a liturgical hymn celebrating the entry of the ark into the sanctuary, is also to be attributed to David. Psalms 48, 76, and 78 were evoked by the deliverance of Jerusalem from Sennacherib. The exilic psalms of Deutero-Isaiah include 68A, 85, and 126; the two great poems inspired by the nation's rebirth, 107 and 93, 97, 98, 96 (the four are a single poem) are also his. The author of the Book of Job is to be credited with four poems (73, 139, 39, and 23). Very interesting is the attribution of a number of psalms to "the great crisis of post-exilic history," which is not the desecration of the Temple by Antiochus Epiphanes but its actual destruction by Artaxerxes III Ochus in the year B.C. 344. No fewer than fifteen poems are assigned to this period, and many of them (6, 31, 71, 30, 38, 88, 22) are by the same author. The appearance of Alexander the Great inspired at least six psalms (e.g. 118 and 103). It will be observed that not all these datings are by any means new, but it is a long time since a scholarly commentary has assigned practically every poem in the Psalter to a definite historical locus.

Many of the psalms have a long and checkered history and in the course of transmission have lost their original form. Professor Buttenwieser makes frequent attempts to restore them. Psalm 55 represents fusion of three distinct pieces: a complete psalm expressing the cry of the nation in distress, a fragment of a complaint, and the original conclusion of 57A. Psalm 57B was originally a part of 60B (8-12a^{a}). Psalm 81:1-5 is the remnant of a lost psalm; 81B (vss. 6ff) is without its original beginning. Psalm 36 is an instance where two distinct psalms have been combined into one. Psalm 31 is restored as follows: 2, 3a^{b}, 3a^{a}, 3b; 71:3ab; 71:4; 31:4ba; 5a, 5b; 71:7b; 31:6-9, 10ab; 11a-b, 10c, 11c, 12, 13-35. A number of other equally complicated restorations might easily be cited. It must be admited that the changes do occasionally improve the metrical arrangement. In many instances individual psalms, as they are preserved for us at the present time, are to be divided into their original separate parts; in other instances they are to be combined into a single poem (e.g., 93, 96-98). That the hymns of Israel did undergo radical change is altogether possible in the light of such obvious poetic catenae as Jonah 2, I Samuel 2, I Chronicles 16:8ff, and a number of the psalms themselves; such universally recognized unities as 9-10, 42-43; such striking doublets as

14 and 53, 40:14-18 and 70, 57:7-11 plus 60:5-12 and 108; and not least of all the numerous divergences of the Greek text. We should be sensitively aware of these and many other equally striking features of the present form of our Psalter before passing judgment upon the task to which Professor Buttenwieser has set himself. But even after due allowance has been made for all these factors, I believe that the procedure of breaking up psalms and restoring them from broken pieces of other psalms will be felt by the majority of cautious scholars to be highly precarious, and that Professor Buttenwieser's actual changes must be called nothing short of drastic.

A happy feature of the commentary is the general excellence of the rendering of the psalms into English. The diction is frequently felicitous and apt. *The Lord* is used throughout instead of *Yahweh*. In many instances the Authorized Version is followed very closely, e.g., in the twenty-third psalm, where in the last verse AV follows the original Hebrew order more closely, and translates *chesed* by "mercy" where Buttenwieser, as everywhere in the Psalter, translates "love." In Psalm 8, which begins "Yahweh our Lord," Buttenwieser renders "O Lord our God"; the difficult second line he reproduces "Thou whose majesty is reflected in the skies" (cf. Montgomery's suggestion in *Record and Revelation*, p. 18, note). 8:3b he translates "to refute thine enemies, to silence unbelievers and doubters"; in 4b *kûn* is given as "created"; in vs. 5 "I reflect" is supplied at the beginning of the line producing a subtle effect, though the meaning is obviously the same without it. Psalm 29 is another interesting example of Buttenwieser's translation: the opening lines follow AV by the use of "give" instead of RV "ascribe." The *bene elim* is rendered simply "ye gods" (AV "ye mighty," RV "ye sons of the mighty"). Strangely, the first *qōl* (vs. 3) is translated by "voice"; all other occurrences by "thunder," e.g., "The thunder of the Lord is overpowering." In vs. 9 Buttenwieser reads the text:

> The thunder of the Lord splits the oaks,
> And strips the forests bare. (cf. Franz Böhl in Kittel, *appar. crit.*)

An important element in Buttenwieser's translation throughout is his conception of the Hebrew sequence of tenses. His discussion of the precative perfect (18-25 and *passim*) deserves careful consideration. We have still far to go in our understanding of Hebrew tenses, and

Buttenwieser's proposed solution has the distinct advantage of frequently making very good sense.

The Book of Psalms has probably suffered more from banal comment than any other single book of the Bible. It has also suffered from the patronizing condescension of such scholars as Bernhard Duhn. Buttenwieser shows discriminating taste in his observations. He knows what he does not like. Psalm 19B is "commonplace and artificial, void of warmth and depth of emotion," Psalm 119 is "anything but a profound psalm being void of the essential qualities of literary creation—spontaneity and originality." On the other hand Psalm 19A is a poem of singular beauty, Psalm 104 a poem "of such grandeur that one hesitates to venture a synopsis." Such generalizations are invariably followed by fresh and illuminating discussion. The estimates of Henry Ward Beecher and Spurgeon are quoted in the commentary on Psalm 23; the description of the thunderstorm (cf. Psalm 29) quoted from R. W. Stewart, *The Tent and the Khan: A Journey to Sinai and Palestine* (1857), is extremely effective. Matthew Arnold used to write about *immortal lines* in great poetry; Professor Buttenwieser has discovered many immortal lines in the Psalms.

The great majority of the psalms seem to be the expression of the community. The "I" of the psalmist is usually the community (e.g., 11, 17, 62, 27, 16, 5, 7, 35). Psalms 6, 13, 30, 31, 22, 38, 71 and 88 are generally interpreted as prayers of an individual fatally stricken, but all references to bodily disease and death must be interpreted figuratively as the ebbing away of the life of the nation. On the other hand, Psalm 62 is pre-eminently a portrayal of the innermost soul of the poet, though his grief is inspired by his country's misery, and Psalm 27 exhibits an interfusion of "I" used personally and "I" used collectively. Psalm 16 is pre-eminently the voice of an individual, though inspired by the extreme peril of his country.

Professor Buttenwieser would agree with Professor Torrey that Hebrew prophecy did not die at the time of Ezra-Nehemiah. He believes that the faith and vision of the prophets continued to dominate the writing of Psalms to the very completion of the Psalter. Contrary to the very commonly prevailing view, he says that the period from the last quarter of the fifth to the close of the fourth century B.C., during which most of the psalms were actually written, is not a barren, obscure century, but rather "belongs to the spiritually great ages

of history, ranking second to the age of pre-exilic spiritual prophecy." Psalm 23 is the ripe fruit of the preaching and religious ideal of the prophets, and Psalm 31 is convincing evidence that the transcendent faith of the prophets was the spiritual force at work. The great affirmations of prophecy, the majesty of God, the dignity of man, God's presence in man, what God demands of man, how man can worship him—these are the themes which permeate many psalms. Of the exilic psalms "more than half are imbued with the prophetic spirit," and of the post-exilic psalms a much larger proportion (77 out of 115). One would have to go a great way with Professor Buttenwieser in what he says, and yet one is forced to wonder whether the powerful and uniquely *social* interest of the prophets is represented very strongly in the Psalter. That it is there, no one can doubt; whether it is there to the extent of Professor Buttenwieser's claims is another matter.

This new commentary on the Psalms will have to be read discriminatingly. It is stronger in some respects than in others, but even where it is strong it should be read with care. The linguistic discussion is on a high level, and the treatment of the text conservative. The arguments advanced for historical orientation of the poems are not likely to win conviction. Nor will Professor Buttenwieser's restoration of the original poems attract many followers. It is unfortunate that these features are so prominent in the structure of the book. They are liable to blind the reader to the value of the commentary in other respects. Despite the regrettable omission of any discussion of literary types and the meagre consideration given to metrical matters, there is much judicious literary comment, though more or less in the nineteenth century tradition. Indeed, there is not a little in the book which suggests the point of view of another generation. The book is marred by numerous *errata* (e.g., Mowinkel for Mowinckel throughout). The list of books at the beginning of the volume is a strange mixture, especially in the light of the abundant references arising throughout the commentary. The reference to Ehrlich's *Randglossen zur Hebräischen Bibel* is singularly unfortunate, since the Book of Psalms is practically omitted from the *Randglossen* because of Ehrlich's own commentary on the Psalms. But these details while numerous are not as important as the strength of the commentary as a whole.

James Muilenburg

Pacific School of Religion

Solomon Schechter, a Biography. By NORMAN BENTWICH. Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America. 1938. xvi + 373 pp. $2.50.

Solomon Schechter was not only the foremost rabbinic scholar of his time, he was also one of its most fascinating personalities. His discovery of more than one hundred thousand Hebrew, Arabic and Aramaic manuscripts in the ancient synagogue of Cairo would alone have assured him immortality. The transfer of this hoard of literary treasures from the room in which they had lain for centuries to the Library of Cambridge University was a turning point in Jewish historiography. It is no longer possible to say that the Palestinian community disappeared after the seventh century, for we can now trace its history to the time of the Crusades. We can no longer speak of Eleazar Ha-Kalir as the founder of medieval Hebrew poetry; we have the works of his predecessors. We no longer have to depend on hostile sources for a study of the heretical Jewish sects; we have a few of their own documents.

Schechter was not merely the fortunate discoverer of a hoard of manuscripts. He was enabled to make his epochal discovery because of his vast erudition and his indefatigable energy. Coming to England at the age of forty, he determined to use his knowledge to make Rabbinic Judaism better understood in the English-speaking world. To achieve this purpose, he, who at that time knew hardly a word of the English language, set himself to the task of mastering its intricacies. He succeeded so well that the various essays included in his three volumes of *Studies in Judaism*, and in his *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, are masterpieces of English literary style, as well as timeless contributions to Jewish learning.

Towering above these Herculean achievements was the amazing personality from which they emanated. To be in Schechter's presence was to fall under the spell of an elusive, dominating, magnetic power. This power, imperfectly reflected in Schechter's own writings, required a talented and well-informed biographer for its portrayal. Fortunately, Professor Norman Bentwich was able to bring to this character of Johnsonian impressiveness and proportions, an almost Boswellian skill and knowledge of his subject. He had seen Schechter both at Cambridge University, where he was a student while Schechter was Reader of Rabbinics, and in the intimacy of the Bentwich home,

which Schechter frequently visited as house guest. His admiration and affection for the great savant have persisted through the more than two decades which have passed since Schechter's death in 1915. Schechter's son, the lamented Dr. Frank Schechter, considered Bentwich an ideal biographer of his father, and gladly entrusted to him all the papers and letters bearing on Schechter's life and character. The author further supplemented his personal memories of Schechter with indefatigable efforts to gather information from Schechter's surviving relatives and friends, coming to America twice in order to interview those who live in this country. The result of this thorough research is a biography which recreates Schechter as a living person, bringing those of us who knew him in life once more under his spell, and introducing him to the many more thousands who have studied his works, but did not see him.

For us in America the most interesting chapters of the biography are doubtless those which deal with the last thirteen years of Schechter's life, the period which covers his Presidency of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America (1902-1915). This part of the work is as important for its contribution to American Jewish history as it is for the portrayal of Schechter. Bentwich shows how Schechter undertook the task of creating a great school of learning at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

For the student of American religious life it is even more interesting to observe that in the short period of his American life Schechter was able to inaugurate a revival of Jewish religious observance in wide circles. Thoroughly imbued with love of his adopted country, Schechter felt that, to make their most complete contribution to American life, the Jews must preserve and enrich their ancient faith. In a series of addresses and papers, remarkable for their insight and beauty of expression, and published under the title, *Seminary Addresses and Other Papers,* Schechter developed this theme. His program gained strength and durability from the creation of the Conservative movement in American Judaism, which still looks to him as its founder and principal sage.

Curiously enough, these last years of Schechter's life which must seem to us, as to his biographer, to have been the climax of a brilliant career, were not happy ones. Nurtured in the arms of Rabbinic scholarship, Schechter could never adjust himself to the life of the pioneer-

ing statesman and administrator. He loved people and felt his responsibility for the advancement of religion in his generation. But he wished the task had fallen on the shoulders of someone who liked it more, and that he had been left to devote his energies to his books and his manuscripts. He made desperate attempts to continue his scholarly research, and produced several interesting and illuminating volumes. One of them, *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, became the subject of some of the most fruitful historical discussions of the period. But the effort to lead what his son called "the double life" exhausted even the leonine strength of Solomon Schechter; and in November, 1915, a few hours after he had returned from a lecture in class, he breathed his last.

The work of publishing the manuscripts he recovered from Cairo has occupied numerous scholars during the last forty years; and the books which have resulted from these studies already constitute a considerable library. Yet the enormous hoard of papers has not been fully explored; a whole generation will probably have to pass before we can fully assay Schechter's significance for the study and understanding of Judaism.

Louis Finkelstein

Jewish Theological Seminary of America

The Thousand Years of Uncertainty. Volume II of *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938. viii + 492 pp. $3.50.

The second volume (the third must be nearing publication) in what is expected to be a monumental work on the history of the missionary work of the Christian Church covers the thousand years between the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the Reformation. *The Thousand Years of Uncertainty*, Professor Latourette calls these years, and a more apt expression would be difficult to find. The very history of the time has been uncertain due to the mass of conflicting legend in which so much of the early period is shrouded, and the sources have been difficult to obtain and no easier to use when reached. But Professor Latourette has done much to remove that uncertainty, and in his phrase he refers to the uncertain fate of the Christian faith in that period.

In the first five hundred years Christianity had established itself

within the Roman Empire. The struggle with its rivals had been arduous and prolonged, but by the end of that time only the parent religion, Judaism, remained as a noteworthy competitor. But the prize of the Empire was a doubtful asset. There was only a short time left for the Church to enjoy its victory within the Empire when the whole political and social structure of that vast organization began to crumble. With the onset of barbarian inroads, the Church was faced with the alternatives of extending itself outside of and without the Empire, or of allowing itself to become identified with the fading culture and sinking into oblivion. Had Rome been overcome by a superior culture with its own advanced religion, instead of falling prey to her own inner weaknesses, the fate of Christianity would have hung in the balance. But the conquerors were more than a little impressed by the tradition of grandeur which had belonged to their victim, and were disposed to adopt her cultural patterns. Moreover, to quote, "The more advanced religions, like the more advanced cultures, tend to supplant the more nearly primitive ones." Against the loose and inconsistent religious beliefs and practices of the northern tribes, the more fully developed theology and organization of the Christian Church proved too powerful to be withstood. Nonetheless, it was another and even more prolonged struggle to assure the Christianization of Europe, and during the period covered by this book, Christianity lost almost as much in territory and population as it gained.

The great crisis, once the Church had proved that its interests were not limited by the Empire, was the challenge of Islam, which arose while the issues on the continent of Europe were still uncertain. The loss of Spain and the constant menace in the East were decided handicaps in the Church's missionary enterprise. Islam, it might be said, both in religion and culture proved to be the greatest menace to Christianity in the Western world, outside of the indifference toward religion which the last century has brought. And the two chapters in Professor Latourette's book, on "The Rise and Spread of Islam" and "The Counter-Advance against Islam," are a brilliant portrayal of the forces at work in a great drama upon earth.

There were other issues at stake also. It was in this period that the Roman Church asserted its spiritual rule over Western Europe, largely because of its superior organization and ability to develop national

leadership through providing education for candidates for the ministry in their own countries. Partly, of course, the magic of the name prevailed. But, on the whole, such conflict and competition as there was between Rome and the disorganized Eastern Patriarchates was somewhat easily decided in Rome's favor.

The task of Romanizing Europe, however, did not always mean the work of introducing Christianity into the various localities. Often it was more a matter of regularizing the work which had already been started. Frequently the introduction of Christianity had been the work of unnamed missionaries who had blazed the trail. One prolific center of missionary activities was the Celtic Church, whose own origins are obscure. Certainly a far different type of organization obtained in the British Isles from that which was found in the Mediterranean. The seat of authority lay with the monasteries, and the ecclesiastical authority of the district was more often the Abbot, whose territory was more or less undefined, than the Bishop whose diocese was precisely limited. In the date of Easter and in the form of tonsure the Celtic usage varied from Rome's, although there seems to have been no denial of the primacy of the Bishop of Rome. How far these two types of Christian culture really were from each other appeared even later in the divergent points of view of Duns Scotus and St. Thomas Aquinas. Although it seems absolutely impossible to pierce the clouds of mystery which surround the problem, the early Irish Church in many ways seems to exhibit much closer affinity with Greek and Alexandrian tradition than with the Western.

Still, while the work of the Romanizing missionaries was often a matter of regularizing existing Churches, these men were likewise called upon to reform conditions which they found. For example, when St. Bonifice went to Thuringia in order to bring the work of Celtic missionaries into line with the Roman tradition and organization, he "found, too, a Church suffering from political disorder and Christians who adhered to pagan rites. Some priests administered baptism with an improper formula, some said mass for pagans or for Christians living in open sin, and among the clergy were those who were distributing Bible texts as amulets to be worn as protection against disease. Worship of the old gods continued. Christians ate meat offered to idols after making over it the sign of the cross. The Church's marriage

regulations were not always observed. Some young women had taken the vow of chastity, but instead of entering a nunnery were living in perilous fashion out in society."

And, indeed, when one speaks of the superiority of Christianity over tribal beliefs and culture, it must be remembered that one is speaking in comparatives. In the actual procedure by which Christianity spread, one is not always convinced that its superiority was either very great or the principal reason for its adoption. Among the reasons for its being adopted were, of course, the conviction that the God of the Christians was a superior God of battle, or the imposition of the Christian God upon a conquered people. Not infrequently Christianity was no more than a plank in a political platform when two parties were contending for control. The conversion of a people was often the result of the conversion of the tribal chief or king, sometimes the result of marriage. And the spread of the Gospel of peace was occasionally accompanied by brutal persecution.

It would be rather too much to expect that the religion adopted for motives that were often suspect, and propagated by means which at times denied the very genius of Christianity, should in its popular form come up to the standard of its Founder. One illustration of the popular conception of Christianity we have already given, but speaking more generally of the appeal of Christianity to the common people, the author writes, "Its belief in the miraculous, its reliance upon the magic power of the sign of the Cross and the rites of the Church to expel demons, to cure disease in man and beast, and to fend off physical disaster, had an appeal to the untutored mind. Its imposing ceremonial inspired awe, and its claim to determine the eternal destiny of the human soul wakened both fear and hope." But he adds, "Along with accretions from the environment, much of the original content of Christianity persisted." It is perhaps a tribute to the nature of the faith that, in spite of the handicaps to which it was subjected, it remained superior to its environment, and at length showed its own nature and the insight of its origins once again.

In the concluding chapters of the volume the author weighs the mutual influence of Christianity and the environment upon each other. Professor Latourette himself stands in no doubt as to the authority of the Christian faith, and yet is able to view the situation with no little degree of the sociologist's detachment. He will not blink the effect of

the environment in the shaping of the course of Christian belief and practice, nor can he overlook the power of Christianity to impress new standards upon the culture in which it is set. Throughout his history, the writer does not neglect to notice the role of circumstance as favorable or unfavorable to the missionary enterprise, but he can never allow his reader to forget that, above the accidents of time and place, stand the inherent appeal of Christianity and the indomitable courage of the Christian missionary.

In the clear and readable style of Professor Latourette, many familiar figures live again. Between legend and history he draws a distinction, but while so many histories lose the charm and flavor which legend keeps alive, Professor Latourette has clothed fact in an attractive style. The reader will find that the old saints of the Church were not merely men of retiring devotion, but highly practical, zealous and unafraid, in their effort to spread the truth which burned like fire in their bones.

It seems clear that Professor Latourette's *History of the Expansion of Christianity* is on its way toward becoming the standard reference for those interested in that phase of Christian history. And if the excellence of the work itself were not sufficient guarantee, the completeness of the research into source materials, and its exhaustive bibliography would assure its being consulted. The author limits himself strictly to his purpose so that the work is not what might technically be called a History of the Church. Because of the necessity of following out each line of expansion within the country in which it appears, something of the grand sweep of the history of the Church is missing. A page of comparative chronological tables has been set in the back of the volume which helps a bit in the co-ordination of the various lines of advance. There is little or no reference to the development of Christian thought in the Middle Ages. The great figures of the Church are mentioned only in so far as they influenced the missionary enterprise. But these are limitations which the author imposed upon himself in attempting a task which has not been done adequately before, at least, not in the English language. Whatever shortcomings there may be in this volume, and probably the author is more keenly aware of them than anyone else can be, for he is perhaps more cognizant of the vastness of the enterprise which he has undertaken, we are rather more than less anxious that he should complete his work with all the

speed which is consistent with careful scholarship, so that the last quarter of Christian history, so prodigiously active in expanding the Christian message to all peoples and countries, may be as well chronicled as are the first three.

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Bernhard von Clairvaux: Zur Typologie des Mittelalterlichen Menschen. By Olavi Castrén. Lund: Gleerupska Universitetsbokhandeln, 1938. 382 pp. Kr. 4:50.

The religious outlook in the Middle Ages during the eleventh and twelfth centuries is in many ways more difficult for us to interpret than the preceding periods when dogmas of the church took definite form. The Middle Ages is the only period in history in which culture, the very thoughts and mode of living, were shaped by the Christian Church. Early Christianity was greatly influenced by its contact with the culture of antiquity. But in the early Middle Ages the church dealt solely with peoples of primitive culture, and was therefore able to influence and mold them.

The outcome of this process is an intensive Christian realism. Christianity teaches that the sinfulness of mankind is due to one man's sin, and that one savior has arisen to save mankind. The man of the Middle Ages did not see these facts as symbols. He lacked the background of the early Christians, who, like St. Augustine, with their background of Platonic philosophy, saw in these Christian teachings the mystical paradox. He believed that Christ was the head of the church (the body) and men its limbs, that the cross gave strength to this body, and that communion was nourishment of mankind. These facts were for the man of the Middle Ages more real than his daily bread and water. An example of this type of thinking is found in the words of Anselm of Canterbury: "Your mouth is Christ's mouth, your eyes are Christ's eyes. Man is not just a human being but a representative of that force, to whom the body belongs. For Christ transfigures the Christians unto him, the baptized children are part of his body."

Olavi Castrén's book on Bernhard of Clairvaux[1] as the man typical of the Middle Ages takes into account none of these facts; the title

1. Inaugural Dissertation, Lund, 1938.

of the book is misleading. This painstaking research attempts to analyze the various types of Bernhard's religious thoughts, to show from which sources Bernhard's religious beliefs are fed,—the New Testament, Old Testament, and ancient philosophy. The method by which the author proceeds is in itself satisfactory; it is the *Grundmotivforschung* of the Scandinavian school. If it were true that Bernhard's concept of love is not that of the New Testament, the result of all this research would be very meager. In no way is Bernhard's thought presented as typical of the religious life of the twelfth century. Bernhard is not shown either as a leader of religious thought, or as an "ideal type." In fact, the sociological background is so utterly overlooked that the results of this research are necessarily unsatisfactory.

The method of research used by Castrén aims to analyze the thought which through the ages is typically Christian. It attempts to show its indebtedness to various sources: New Testament, Jewish, Greek, etc. Castrén thinks that this method of research is applicable only when the Christian religion is believed not to be the answer of absolute truth to the religious quest, but "one particular and special answer to the many possible answers" (p. 43). This conclusion is without sound basis; the *Grundmotivforschung* is independent of that other question that is so vital to Christian theology, the question of the uniqueness of revelation. It compares the various types of Christian attitude in each of them. The New Testament is the standard of value for the various Christian types. If one uses this method of research for analyzing the typical Christian outlook as in this book, the New Testament becomes the absolute measurement, during this particular research. The question concerning the absolute truth of the Christian revelation is not touched in this method of research; Castrén's idea that this method can only be used by one who does not ask this question is incorrect. In other words, a Christian fundamentalist belonging to the group of Barth or Bultmann could use this method to analyze some specific types of Christian thought and still be a fundamentalist.

Castrén is a pupil of Anders Nygren and has been greatly influenced by the latter's excellent study of eros and agape. In his own research he overemphasizes the importance of the agape motif in the New Testament. He goes so far as to say that if, in Bernhard's religious

thought, the spirit of agape cannot be traced, then the whole of Bernhard's religious thinking is alien to New Testament thought (p. 30). Castrén seems to forget that agape is one important feature in the analysis of the New Testament, but not the only one. If one analyzes, for example, the religious writings of Luther and Calvin, a lack of the pure "agape motif" can be noticed; but the Christian concepts of grace and faith are everywhere in evidence.[2]

Castrén's analysis of Bernhard's religious thought has the following pattern: the first main part is given over to Bernhard's thoughts on "God as creator" and "God as source of Love"; the second part, to the salvation of men's souls and the method of salvation.

The result of his analysis is to show that Bernhard's method provides no place for the New Testament idea of love, agape. Bernhard's love is a planned and not a spontaneous love, and thus contrary to the New Testament agape. God's love awakens self-love in man, and through this self-love the desire for supreme happiness. Bernhard's thought is greatly influenced by Neo-Platonic philosophy as exemplified by his idea of love shown by men for God. This love is eros not agape. When it comes to showing that, in addition to the Neo-Platonic influence, the Old Testament is a far more important source for Bernhard's religious thought, Castrén is again inaccurate. What is really regrettable in this otherwise very painstaking research is the absence of any investigation of the question of how far the New Testament type of love, namely agape, can be found undiluted in other sources. If Castrén had investigated more thoroughly he would probably have reached the conclusion that there is hardly one great Christian in whose system of thought the New Testament idea of agape is presented in its original form.

Bernhard is the first of the great mystics of the Middle Ages who has created in his system of thought the merging of the Platonic idea of love (eros) and St. Paul's doctrine of agape. For the first time in the history of Christian mysticism one finds two types of love closely interwoven. God's love, the love which God gives to man, is for Bernhard always the New Testament love of agape. The love which man feels for God and Christ is a pure mixture of the amor intellectualis of Areopagita and the Neo-Platonic eros. Castrén should

2. M. Fuerth, *Caritas und Humanitas* (Stuttgart, 1933), pp. 165-81.

have pointed out that, since Bernhard, the religious idea of love in the Middle Ages has been, nearly always, a mystical love combining agape and eros. As agape it can be described as the gift of God through grace, as eros it is the love of man reaching out to God in the guise of self salvation.

In summing up Castrén's analysis of Bernhard's religious outlook, one can fully agree that the trend of his mystical religion is much more closely related to the great forces of love, namely eros and amor intellectualis, than to the spontaneous and paradoxical New Testament love. If one compares Bernhard's religious thinking to another Christian saint of the Middle Ages, St. Francis, this is still more evident. In Bernhard's thought a certain harmony of amor, eros, and agape can be found. The motives of amor-eros, as motives of self-salvation, are the more outstanding. St. Francis' life is in itself a harmony of those two motives. But in contrast to all other saints of the Middle Ages, as well as to Bernhard, the knowledge that God's love (agape) has reached him, and has taken hold of him, is so overwhelming that the mystical eros-amor motif of self-salvation is in no way important. But St. Francis is a unique phenomenon. Bernhard's religious thought, in its mixture of agape and eros, has become typical for the Middle Ages.

MARIA FUERTH-SULZBACH

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Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. By ETIENNE GILSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. 110 pp. $1.50.

In this small volume of three chapters—the three chapters were originally three lectures delivered at the University of Virginia—the author undertakes a double task. In the first place he outlines the development, through some seven or more centuries, of a number of related and contrasted doctrines concerning the nature and the interrelationship of faith and reason. In the second place he sets forth what he believes to be the essential points for a correct understanding of the true relationship between these two concepts.

The handling of the historical material is extremely skillful. Professor Gilson has an unusual gift (probably he himself would disclaim the gift, maintaining that the ability in question is the result of good French training) for presenting complex material in such a way as to

make it seem intelligible and significant to the relatively inexperienced student, and yet to suggest, at the same time, the finer points of interpretation that are of interest to those who already know something of the problems under discussion. In the first chapter of this volume, both likenesses and divergencies in the thought of a number of medieval writers who asserted the primacy of faith as against reason are displayed, and some of their implications suggested. In the second chapter, a similar treatment is given to the work of other medieval writters who asserted the primacy of reason. It is difficult to see how any thoughtful person can read these chapters and fail to be convinced of the soundness of the author's thesis—a thesis that is implied rather than directly stated—that the philosophy of the Middle Ages cannot be summed up in any one simple, glib formula.

In the third chapter the treatment by St. Thomas Aquinas of the problem of the relationship of revelation and reason is summarized. And a review is given of some of the issues of the controversies that occurred in the late medieval and post-medieval periods between theologians and philosophers. Although this review is necessarily brief, it contains a number of interesting suggestions concerning the connections of particular writers with general trends of thought; the *Imitation of Christ* is, for example, given its place as "a late medieval protest against the vanity of all philosophy" (p.88).

If the three chapters are considered together, and attention is directed, not to the details of historical exposition, but to the general direction of the philosophical discussion, they are seen to constitute a dialectical argument for Professor Gilson's conclusion that St. Thomas' doctrine concerning the character and the interrelationship of faith and reason is a balanced synthesis, and a true and final synthesis, of older, conflicting interpretations. In the first chapter the author points out the inevitable logical difficulties into which an attempt to develop without due qualification the doctrine of the primacy of faith—as St. Anselm, for example, attempted to develop it—is bound to lead. In the second, he emphasizes the unsatisfactory character of the results that follow from the opposite, but equally ill-judged, attempt to insist without due qualification upon the primacy of reason. In the third chapter St. Thomas' solution of the problem is shown to have consisted in marking out two fields, that of revelation in which truth can be known only by faith, and that of science and philosophy

in which truth can be known only by reason. Faith is defined as "an assent to the word of God accepted as word of God" (p. 76). It is not the result of rational evidence and it entails an act of will (p. 74); but it does presuppose the existence as a matter of history of sure signs—those offered by miracles and by the life and growth of the Church—that God has spoken (p.81). Since faith and reason are in the last analysis both divine gifts, there is no possibility of a disagreement between them. And Professor Gilson's summary of the Thomist position is that:

> To any sincere believer who is at the same time a true philosopher, the slightest opposition between his faith and his reason is a sure sign that something is the matter with his philosophy. For indeed faith is not a principle of philosophical knowledge, but it is a safe guide to rational truth and an infallible warning against philosophical error. A man who does not like to believe what he can know, and who never pretends to know what can be but believed, and yet a man whose faith and knowledge grow into an organic unity because they both spring from the same divine source, such is, if not the portrait, at least a sketch of the typical member of the Thomist family (p. 84).

Whether or not the reader of this volume will accept the philosophical and theological conclusions set forth in it will depend upon whether or not he accepts the account given of the nature, the authoritative character, and the content of Christian faith. It seems to this reviewer clear that anyone who does accept these conclusions must regard all the controversies between philosophers and theologians that have been taken place since St. Thomas' day, or that are being carried on today, concerning the relationship between faith and reason, as simply the result of a failure on the part of at least one contestant in each case to appreciate the valid and conclusive character of the distinctions drawn by St. Thomas. And a number of the observations made by Professor Gilson in the concluding pages of this book suggest that this is his point of view. On the other hand, the careful, if brief, account of post-medieval thought in itself suggests that the author does not wish to mark off all such discussion as essentially futile. But just how, on the premises accepted, it can be anything but futile remains for the reviewer a puzzle.

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The Rise of Puritanism. By William Haller. New York: Columbia Press, 1938. ix+464 pp. $4.50.

As he says in his Preface, the writing of Professor Haller's book was prompted by a desire to discover the springs of that "extraordinary vitality of Puritan thought and character" which fed the genius of Milton, and which, as he believes, by its influence "as a new way of life" provides the only reasonable explanation of the genius of modern England as a whole. It is in the Puritan sermon that he has sought the central fire of that vitality; and, in his search, he has limited himself almost exclusively to the origin and development of its distinctive forms between 1590 and 1642, the sources of its imagery, the doctrinal and political implications of its teaching, its influence, in short, as propaganda, not always conscious, but none the less effective in precipitating the revolution of 1642. Thus, to the contentment perhaps of the brooding spirits of his eight great-uncles by marriage, he has collected, examined and discussed in a running commentary the almost forgotten words of their spiritual forebears, both Puritan and Separatist, from the death of Cartwright to the Westminster Assembly. His most careful bibliographical labors have resulted in what might be called a compendium of religious divagation—an ample book of reference for those whom he stimulates to work the Protestant field in England still further. His own enthusiasm of discovery is infectious. His Puritan preoccupations, together with Professor Knappen's even more recent work on Tudor Puritanism, may both be signs of the times. For whether treated sympathetically or unsympathetically, the movement cannot be discussed without a re-affirmation in some form of the spiritual forces which the Puritan opposed to the temporal in his theory of the state; and also a disclosure of the strong under-current of practical opposition to the growth of the Royal Prerogative which his earliest pamphlets first set in motion.

As Monsieur Constant has recently pointed out in the first volume of his *La Réforme en Angleterre,* the power of the Crown after 1534, though in temporal matters constitutionally limited by Parliament, was in its headship of the Church absolute—a power without legal let or hindrance. It held in its hands "the two swords," and thus could exercise theoretically, as under Henry VIII it did so excerise practically, such a "tyranny" as even Machiavelli had hardly envisaged. As long as the crown was set upon the head of that godly "Josias,"

Edward VI, the English Reformation in its left and right wings acquiesced. But when "Jezebel" assumed it, the left wing, realizing the full implications of the Royal Supremacy, went into opposition and voluntary exile. The springs of its birth as a movement against tyranny, give to the life of Puritanism both continuity and direction. And though Professor Haller seems to be unaware of this earliest phase of the movement, his own literary researches have provided new and convincing evidence in support of the belief in a working alliance between Puritan preachers and Puritan gentry against the domination of the Crown in matters spiritual.

The Bibliographical Notes with which he closes his study provide an imposing witness to the industry with which he has ploughed his acre. But one wishes that he had more often quoted whole passages from these pamphlets, rather than paraphrased their drift with an occasional illustrative quotation. For a paraphrase is, after all, but the author's gloss upon the sermon's context, and the reader may well find other matter of interest, even for different interpretation, in the same words. Moreover, the very narrow limits that he has imposed upon his inquiry lead almost inevitably to a false perspective and so considerably lessen the value of his work to the student. By drawing his conclusions almost exclusively from the Puritan sermon, he makes of the Puritan preacher the criterion of that sermon's influence, the judge of the extent to which his words have been heard, understood and acted upon. Frequently this has led to what we believe to be false estimates of the numbers and the classes of Englishmen that Puritan eloquence converted; while so inclusive does it make his term "Puritanism" that one questions whether he is always sure himself of what the essence of it really was in contradistinction to Protestantism in general and Separatism in particular. To the contemporary Anglican layman, it must have been quite impossible to distinguish from among the doctrinal niceties of unorthodox thought, who was what. All were conveniently "Puritans" for where there is no canon what precise meaning has any label? So the "Puritan Presbyterian," to use Dr. Scott Pearson's terminology, has come in time to be confounded with all those deviators from his orthodoxy that he himself most detested and feared. Neither Cartwright, nor his predecessors abroad, nor his disciples as late as the Westminster Assembly, had any toleration for Separatism. Separatism was in fact a negation of their own position. Even the Marprelate

Tracts would allow "no Brownist to be a Puritan." The Girondin cannot with impunity be confused with the Jacobin, even though the Girdondin provide the Jacobin with his opportunity and some of his weapons.

Apart then, from the term "Puritan thought," Puritanism as a great movement in history can, we believe, be defined within certain very clear limits. And, unless it be so defined, its tremendous implications as one phase of the age-long struggle *against tyranny* (rather than *for individual liberty*) are lost. It should never be forgotten that when Queen Mary came to the throne the spiritual and the temporal swords were both still in her grasp. And the rise of Puritanism should be dated in time from her accession. Thus Professor Haller's choice of a title lays him open to certain criticisms which his main thesis may not deserve. In point of fact, he deals very little with the *rise* of Puritanism, but rather with the period of its heyday and decline. The majority of the sermons from which he draws his deductions belong to the years from 1603 to 1642. And except to suggest that the Calvinist bias of its theology was perhaps due to the English sojourn in Geneva under Mary, he would trace the roots of Puritanism to the soil of popular unrest at home. For him the gentle figure of Chaucer's poor parson is the prototype of the historic Puritan.

Yet, upon the showing of his own valuable evidence, the Puritan may have had quite other ancestry—not the Lollard priest, but the Dominican friar. And again upon his own showing, the Puritan sermon, qua sermon, cannot be made to bear the full weight of revolutionary responsibility which he lays upon it. That rests directly upon the working alliance between Puritan clergy and Puritan gentry, dating back to 1554, for whose effective existence he has supplied so much documentary support. We strongly suspect that, without the financial backing of those same gentry, the Puritan sermon would seldom have been preached and never printed. For it must not be forgotten that the Puritan press, which he would have the preachers' "handmaid," was from the beginning (again in 1554), a secret one and privately subsidized. And it would seem a grave loss to the drift of his own argument that Professor Haller omits all mention of the two *Admonitions to Parliament* printed by that secret press in 1572. Yet in the second of these was first defined the system of church government which he justly makes the crux of the Puritan-Anglican struggle.

For the doctrine of predestination as the source, not only of Puritan vitality, but of an impulse to social equality as well, his claims appear somewhat dubious. Belief in election and predestination were not exclusively Puritan articles of faith. Cartwright protested categorically that his quarrel was not with Anglican theology. And many of the bishops whom he opposed were probably as convinced predestinarians as he. Among the most illuminating (as well as befogging) documents on that difficult question are those which concern the controversy that arose among the imprisoned Edwardian clergy in the winter of 1554-55. *Trewe's Narrative* of *the cause of contention in the King's Bench as concerning sects in religion*, together with John Bradford's *Treatise on Predestination* and Augustine Bernher's contribution of Bishop Latimer's views (MS. Bodl. 53), reveal not only that this dogma was one mutually held by the contestants, but also that, as between the "orthodox" and "heterodox" interpretation of it, the line was so fine as to be almost indistinguishable. Before ever it went to Geneva English Protestant thought was marked by a strong predestinarian basis. Why then should the distinguishing marks of a Puritan be derived from a "doctrine of assurance" that he shared with many an Anglican?

The phenomenon of Puritanism, we believe, was something in origin apart, apart from Lollardry, apart even from Calvinism, and having its roots, not in popular, but in aristocratic discontent. Indeed the word "popular" used in connection either with its genesis or its influence would seem to be historically inaccurate and misleading. One of the chief barriers to the success of Cartwright's presbyterian ideal was the rigid stratification of society in Tudor and Stuart England, while, on its theological side, the movement was essentially an intellectual one, a product of the universities, and, as Dr. Pearson freely acknowledges, Puritanism remained to the end an affair of ministers, who, except in a few instances, were unable to carry their congregations with them. No doubt it was for this very reason that Cartwright declared "pure Congregationalism"—the democratic germ within the presbyterian system—to be "unworkable."

If Dr. Pearson would trace the intense and vital type of character that the movement developed to its "application of the idea of local self-government to ecclesiastical affairs," his sentence implies without naming it, the existence of the Puritan "Discipline." And it was this idea of a "Discipline," a *police des moeurs*, that the English refugees to

the Continent borrowed from Geneva, after actual contact with that clerical city-state whose struggle for autonomy had been co-existent with its life. The weapon was conveniently two-edged. In the hands of any pastor it could be turned either against an erring parishioner, or (as in Hooker's phrase) against "the supreme power of the Highest" whose "prerogatives . . . your discipline will constrain it to resign. . . ."

Late in the summer of 1555 a Discipline was attached to the liturgy of the English refugee congregation at Frankfort composed of fugitive Edwardian clerics and exiled gentry who feared the loss of their abbey lands. The day of its adoption marks the organization of that "something like a Puritan party" of which Dr. Haller recognizes the existence at Elizabeth's court. Even as early as 1554 it possessed a press. The English printer had thrown in his lot with the left wing of the reformers from the beginning, though rather in the active role of publicist, than the passive one of handmaid. An efficient system of propaganda was already in operation during the party's infancy. Yet Professor Haller says nothing of John Day, who, abroad and until 1584, played so conspicuous a part in shaping Puritanism into an ecclesiastical and political instrument against an omni-competent prince. The material of which this instrument was fashioned was English, but *the form given to it was foreign.* Rather conspicuously there was no turning back to Wycliffe for a model. After 1548 only one tract of Wycliffe's was re-published in England (though many in Germany), and that an obscure one on Bible-reading brought out by Robert Crowley the economist, in 1550; while among the Exiles abroad John Foxe alone made reference to him by placing at the end of his *Commentarii,* presented to the Duke of Württemberg in 1554, a selected list in Latin of Wycliffe's anti-Papal *Articuli sive Aphorismi.* Quite obviously Foxe's purpose was to persuade the Lutheran Duke of the orthodoxy of Germany's English guests. Otherwise Wycliffe's support of the temporal power as against the spiritual was found, both then and afterwards by the Puritan, to be inconvenient. His social teaching, so easily to be confused with Anabaptism, was of course anathema. When Wycliffe's name reappears in 1608 and 1612, it is in an attempt to prove his "conformitie with the now Church of England."

Perhaps because the victors over Knox at Frankfort took to themselves the name of "the Prayer-Book party" their "Church" has never

been recognized for what it actually was—a congregation patterned after "the best foreign model," and a realization for two years, though in petto, of Cartwright's presbyterian dream. The name and office of bishop was discarded; a government of pastor and elders was substituted. Its liturgy, though revised, was still not Knox's, but nominally that of the Edwardian Prayer-Book of 1552. What disrupted this Frankfort church-state in 1557 was the foreign Discipline it had adopted, which provoked a congregational revolt against pastoral autocracy so entirely English, and so bitter, that its echoes were heard again in England in 1574, and still again in 1642. The decree passed by the Frankfort insurgents in February 1557 "that iff the pastor and elders were required to be present at an assemblie and woulde not come, that the assembly was lawfull notwithstandinge their absence" are in substance the words of Henry Parker in 1642 as paraphrased by Dr. Haller—if the king "failed to approve the acts of parliament, parliament was still free" by reason of conscience and natural right. It is obvious that in principle these two declarations of policy are identical, in spite of the eighty-five years intervening between Frankfort and Westminster. And we wonder how many of his ideas on natural law and the social contract Parker had drawn from Ponet's *Treatise of Politic Power* of 1556, re-published in 1639. In Frankfort the controversy forced a democratic modification of the Discipline to which a majority of the gentry and merchants, both at Frankfort and Strasbourg, eventually subscribed. Among them will be found many of the names of those who supported post-Cartwrightian Puritanism, and Professor Haller's evidence goes far to prove that the alliance between gentry and Puritan preachers of 1555 remained an unbroken one until "incontinent the Generation of the Separatists did start up." It is a loss to historians which we trust he will soon repair, that no list of Puritan "patrons" has been given in his Appendix, since that of R. G. Usher must be very incomplete.

But we regret far more that Dr. Haller has abandoned as a minor theme, one which, by his suggestive illustration, may well prove to be a major one of arresting importance. Like Scott Pearson he finds in Puritanism a throw-back to medievalism. But in his provocative chapter on the "Spiritual Brotherhood" of Cartwright's disciples, he has gone much further than Dr. Pearson in the precision of the analogy he draws between this informal confraternity of ministers and "the

older preaching orders of the Church." Even the problems that their association presented to those in authority he claims to be similar. By which he probably means that Elizabeth feared the presbytery and this itinerant brotherhood for the same reason that Melanchthon feared the monastery, because they "set up a different bond of society to that of the commonwealth." Yet he goes even further when he says of this brotherhood that it was "essentially mendicant," and that it formed "a professional intellectual class"; while in the Puritan "diary" he finds a substitute for the confessional, since the preachers' own self-communings provided him with medicine for the "perplexed souls" that came to him for guidance. In other words, the Puritan preacher was meeting by essentially the same means as did the older faith those human needs left unsatisfied by the suppression of the religious houses. And Dr. Haller only fails to say of Emmanuel College, from which his Puritans went forth "to preach the word in plain English" (p. 55), that it was built on the site of the Dominican House at Cambridge in whose library at the dissolution was found the only instance among the friars of a Bible in the vernacular.

Yet upon what facts does he rest this close analogy? In the older orders was embodied pre-eminently the "corporate" idea. How much of conscious association was there among the spiritual brethren? On one page (54) he says definitely that they never "entered upon anything like formal corporate organization." If so, where does he find authority for his name, "Spiritual Brotherhood"? Yet on the preceding page he declares, in what would seem to be flat contradiction, that they became so "strongly organized" as to endeavour "to establish a permanent specially endowed foundation for planting preachers . . ." Which statement are we to believe? or do both have kin with that too frequent inexactness of statement (such as "went everywhere among the populace"; "popular adherents steadily grew"; the number of preachers in the next fifty years was "well nigh legion"; and, especially, Laud's efforts that "came too late to preserve prelacy," which makes one question whether in many other assertions he has not been led astray by the enthusiasm of his preachers, whose hopes, as Usher points out, frequently did service for facts.

The term "popular," even in the England of today, must be used with the greatest circumspection. In Tudor and Stuart England it means practically nothing unless rigidly defined. One cannot deduce

from the number of Puritan preachers the number of congregations that were Puritan. For at just this point the interference of the Puritan gentry must be reckoned with. To them, as the new possessors of monastic lands, Henry VIII had assured the old right of presentation to livings, thus giving them a practical control of the parish priests within their boundaries. This system, which in practice amounted to a *cujus regio ejus religio*, made frequently for complete disharmony between the pastor and his people. A few congregations of course there were, devoted to their Puritan pastors, but, in proof of the above statement, these are mainly to be found in the freeholding districts of East Anglia. In fact, it is almost impossible to make any generalization in regard to Puritanism without a geographical qualification, yet Professor Haller's discussion of it (again, it would seem, through too exclusive use of Puritan sources), is almost innocent of geography. Of the distribution of Puritanism, so important a factor in studying its origins, we are given no idea; towns are named without their counties; counties, indeed, are seldom named at all; and numerical generalities are limited neither in space nor time. England is treated as one missionary field in dispute only between Anglican and Puritan. Of the great counterforce of Jesuitism we are made aware through the bare mention of the name Jesuit, though it was contending for the domination of England with much the same subversive political theory as its Puritan rival. Evidently he has followed too literally the now discredited belief that the majority of Englishmen at Elizabeth's accession were Protestant.

But Dr. Haller may say that these aspects of the subject lie beyond the scope of his own purpose, which is to trace the Puritan struggle to find the New Jerusalem. Yet do they really lie beyond it? Has not his original theme been actually lost in the rising tide of politics which the movement generated? Milton the poet gives place to Milton the pamphleteer. And Haller's own word "propaganda," used to characterise the Puritan sermon, whether in its militant or passive period, shows clearly that the religious and political aspects of the movement cannot be separated. In spite of him the gentry, like King Charles's head, keep cropping up unbidden in his narrative. What he has actually done is to contribute largely to a history of the "press" of the earliest Whig party. While on the religious side, and again in spite of him, the "genius of place"—a factor never to be ignored in England whatever the theme—has pressed for recognition in his half-veiled

belief that the Dominican is father to the Puritan. To my knowledge, such an arresting idea as this has never been formulated in words before. Does Professor Haller know that of the sixty-seven Edwardian clergy who took refuge on the Continent, at least twenty-four were ex-religious? and that, of these twenty-four, more than a third had been either Dominicans or Augustinians? Does he also know that, whereas the drift of the secular clergy in their sympathies was towards Zwinglian Zurich, that of the ex-preaching friars was as definitely towards Geneva, then transformed into a Calvinist "City of God" by means of a "rule" known as a Discipline?

And the saga of the fall of man, was that exclusively Puritan? What of the twelfth century *Mystère d'Adam* of probable English origin, based on the Bible and a pseudo-Augustinian sermon? Augustinian-Dominican-Puritan: we seem to have come full circle. Can any historical thread of continuity be established between these early ex-Dominicans and the later "Spiritual Brotherhood"? That is a question for which both reviewer and reviewed should seek an answer. Professor Haller is to be congratulated that he has raised it.

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Das Kirchenproblem der Brüdergemeine in Schweden. By HILDING PLEIJEL. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1938. 199 pp. 6 Kr.

This monograph recounts in an instructive narrative the details of an effort on the part of the Governing Board of the Moravian Church in Germany, in the last years of the eighteenth century, to secure permission from the government of Sweden to found in that country a Moravian Church colony, or closed settlement—a "Brethren's Etablissement," according to Moravian Church terminology of that time. In the event, the project, issuing as the fruit of a slowly ripening development, did not meet with success and proved to be but an episode of Moravian Church activity in Sweden. Yet it does afford interesting insight into the church situation of the Sweden of the enlightenment period, and throws some light on the ecclesiastical legal situation of the Gustavian epoch in the church history of Sweden.

For the unfolding of the narrative abundant materials were available in the archives of the Moravian Church at Herrnhut, in Saxony,

consisting of reports, letters, minutes, articles, and biographical sketches and similar documents in Swedish archives. With the subject matter these sources have yielded, the author of the monograph deals fairly and gives, therefore, an effective, well authenticated statement of the matter.

In the interest of better understanding of the ill-fated project, some knowledge of the half-century of Moravian activity in Sweden prior to development of the plan is necessary. For that reason, Pleijel gives a wholly adequate account of Moravian "diaspora" efforts—a form of inner mission service independent of all confessional and national organizations, that sought the promotion of vital godliness without endeavor to detach members from their state church connections—which had extended into many parts of Sweden and had achieved a widespread revival of Christian life. Supplementing this form of activity had been the influences that reached out to Sweden from the annual ministers' conferences at the Moravian center of Herrnhut, a kind of *colloquium amicum* in which the ministers of various confessions discussed the practical problems of their pastoral relationships, as well as the impressions made by Moravian literature of a devotional character then enjoying wide circulation in Sweden. Unfortunately for the project, these influences of Moravian activity were subjected to the critical survey of the authorities of the Swedish State Church, then intolerant of any movement that might disturb traditional ecclesiastical ideals, the more so, as the Moravian movement had suffered, for the period of five years, an inner degeneracy known in Moravian Church history as the "time of sifting." This difficult period, characterized by exaggerated emphasis on the human nature and the physical sufferings of Christ, as well as by distorted, sentimental expressions concerning the believer's relation to Him, is treated by Pleijel with the sure, discriminating touch of one thoroughly informed of all its features. While there was complete recovery from that fanaticism, and Moravian "diaspora" activity has continued in Sweden to the present day, this sad experience could not but militate, in the event, against the success of the effort to secure permission for the establishment of a churchly independent Moravian settlement in Sweden. Meantime, however, the promoters of the project seemed to find encouragement in the development of conditions in Sweden that tended to break the undisputed sway of the orthodox State Church of the time, and that culminated

in the edict of toleration of 1781, though this instrument assured liberty of conscience only to foreigners of other confessional persuasion who had been induced to settle in the country through the opportunities afforded by the industrial revolution.

Immediate impulse to initiate steps toward realization of the project came from Councilor Johan Gustaf Haldin, a favorite of King Gustavus III. While on a visit in Copenhagen, Haldin had heard of the recently founded Moravian settlement at Christiansfeld, in Denmark. He wrote to Jonathan Briant, superintendent of Christiansfeld, suggesting that the Moravian Church authorities apply for permission to establish an independent Moravian settlement congregation in Sweden, offering to use his influence to favor the project. Briant, a native of Sweden, and conversant with the intolerant attitude of the Swedish State Church, communicated with the Governing Board of the Moravian Church, though he was doubtful as to the outcome. This Board—headed then by the veteran Bishop August Gottlieb Spangenberg, a noble character, scholarly and of keen practical intelligence—entered upon the negotiations with caution, encouraged by the flourishing state of the "diaspora" activity which, at the time, had through influential friends acquired substantial footing in centers like Stockholm and Göteborg.

At first, the prospects inspired hope. One of the bishops of the State Church, Wingård of Göteborg, favorable to the project from the outset, declared his willingness to co-operate. Friends of the Moravian Church in Sweden were enthusiastic in their support of the matter. A member of the Moravian Church, Ulrich Roslin, who was a native of Sweden and had served the Moravian Church in various capacities in Germany, was deputized to join with Wingård in the conduct of the negotiations. And the authorities of the Moravian Church drew up a statement of the conditions under which that Church might enter upon the project, the main considerations being that the proposed colony should be recognized as representing an independent episcopal church, that it should come directly under the authority of the king and the royal council, and that exemption from military service and the taking of oath should be granted.

Pleijel traces with care and skill the progress of the negotiations in the midst of complicated political and ecclesiastical conditions. Prospects for the project, at first bright, were soon clouded by various issues.

Hope had been entertained that the matter would receive attention at the sessions of the Riksdag convened in the spring of 1786. But the subject could not then even be broached, for King Gustavus III, at the time engaged in a struggle with members of the Riksdag and the aristocracy for the restoration of the royal authority, wished to placate the clergy who were solidly opposed to the Moravian Church project. For his sympathy with it, Bishop Wingård was severely criticized, yet he continued active support. The newly appointed Archbishop von Troil, though professing great regard for the Moravian Church, was evasive in his reply when the proposal was submitted for expression of his opinion. There were disheartening delays. There were disturbing efforts to modify the terms upon which the Moravian Church authorities were prepared to undertake the establishment of a Moravian Church settlement in Sweden.

Eventually, long-deferred decision came with a change in the government's church policy. For King Gustavus III, in an effort to win the good will of the clergy, appointed an Ecclesiastical Commission (*Ecklesiastika Beredningen*), consisting of two clerics and one layman, which was charged with preparing all affairs relating to the Church for presentation to the government. The leading figure of this Commission was the newly appointed royal Councilor Nordin. He did not hurry negotiations to a conclusion. His utterances, however, at various interviews foreshadowed what the disposition of the matter would be. The legal statement that was, finally, issued proved to be a most interesting document. It recites due appreciation of the Moravian Church of the time, indicating that as a new movement it had encountered more severe criticism than it merited, though in expressions used, during part of the Zinzendorf period, it had departed from the simplicity and solemnity of divine truth. Next, it urged that the Moravian Church, with all its exemplary practices and services, must be regarded as a sect, and granting of its application might initiate developments that would disturb the peace of the Swedish Church. Certain of the special privileges applied for are represented as endangering safety of the kingdom, e.g., exemption from bearing arms would attract to the Moravian Church all who would escape military service—a war with Russia was then in prospect. There is allusion to other dangers involved in the project that might conceivably imperil the peace of the realm. The determining consideration, however, was that of the pre-

servation of the unity of religion and ecclesiastical organization as essential to the good of the land.

So ended what had appeared to be a promising undertaking. The author's treatment of it uncovers inner political conditions, over which neither the King nor the Moravian Church had any control, that cut across plans they jointly sought to further. And the narrative discloses the hierarchical-orthodox character of the Swedish State Church as then strong enough to insist upon maintenance of uniformity of religion for the inhabitants of the country. The idea of a Moravian Church establishment did not, indeed, entirely die out. It continued to assert itself. But not until the time of legislation governing dissent, in 1860, were conditions created that were favorable to the realization of such plans.

Appendix additions, in considerable volume, are valuable as illustrating the kind of reports, diaries, letters, and similar documents on which the narrative is based and as supplying details of information prized by the student of history.

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Cross and Swastika. By Arthur Frey. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 224 pp. $2.50.

Dr. Frey, a Swiss political economist, for eight years head of the Swiss Evangelical Press, becomes theologian in his interpretation of the German Church and State conflict, largely from the point of view of the Continental 'crisis' theology, and his study is introduced and commended by Karl Barth, its outstanding prophet.

The contemporary struggle in the land of Luther is not "a transitory phenomenon." It takes us back into a long history which made way for it. The background reveals preceding centuries in which "the creature has severed himself from the Creator," and during which "all fields of culture experienced a blossoming time," when Immanuel Kant, instead of fortifying Christianity—as he thought—"decisively" departed from it. The mystics of the sixteenth century moved away from the doctrine of the Reformation. A German idealist, Hegel, became the father of Marxist materialism. In the nineteenth century the foes of the Gospel were idealism and mysticism—and not materialism. Liberalism was the product, "rooted in the view that man is by

nature good," and had "the power to free himself from all evil."

A special form which this idealized humanity has assumed since the end of the eighteenth century, and which is today more potent than all other expressions, is belief in the People (*das Volk*), which is the basis of National Socialism. This is not Goethe's faith in humanity; it is one which is resident in the "special community of blood, speech, and terrain," and conceives the Fatherland "as the highest of all gods." Each nation is a special creation by God, for a special purpose.

Thus, National Socialism did not create the contemporary issue; its elements "existed long before the Third Reich." The philosophy of Enlightenment, and idealism; mysticism, Liberalism, and Socialism had supplanted the God revealed in Jesus "with the myth of man who is himself God in us."

In the meantime a serious opponent to the Christian Church appeared in the movement led by Schleiermacher to form "a scientific synthesis between Christianity and the modern religion and world-view." The ensuing liberal theology was "open . . . to all sides," and it became, in Germany, "wide open even to the 'national' movement." Richard Rothe's prophecy that the Kingdom of God would be realized in the completed State, and that thus the State would take over all the functions of the Church, is now seen as, in part, a forecast of what is going on in Germany.

This attempt to reconcile religion and the modern world-view resulted in an invasion of the field by a so-called 'natural' theology. In this way of thinking, Christian thinkers did not simply substitute natural theology for the revelation in Jesus Christ; they sought compromise, and accepted side by side with it "a revelation alleged to be discernible by man in creation, in nature, in man himself, and in his history. . . . The Church pursued the way of accommodation." Dr. Frey, however, sees that, in the days since the War, a counteracting theology takes seriously "the Gospel, God's grace and God's judgment," so that, when the trend that had been taking place in theology for the past two hundred years moved towards completion in 1933, God was ready to meet it with a restored theology, God—and Christ—centered.

But in view of the apostasizing of the preceding centuries, "it is not surprising that, at a time when the authority of God was dwindling away, State absolutism put on strength," with Hegel as the arch-

instigator of the theory of State divinity. Carried to its ultimate analysis, this brings Church doctrine under the State's domain. Under these same propulsions in thinking, for which Fichte is largely responsible, the German *Nation* becomes something divine, and we have a national mysticism, or a mystical patriotism. Thus, while Hegel creates the totalitarian State, Fichte is the father of the pagan cult, under Alfred Rosenberg, contending for supremacy in Germany at this moment.

It would be a mistake, however, to charge up the account to the liberal and democratic movements of the nineteenth century. "The German State was never built on a democratic foundation"; it was a hierarchy of officials. Social Democracy, with its internationalism, could not withstand the enlarging ideal of the German Empire, gradually conceived of as based on "soil, blood, and race." This led to the conviction that "the German People has got to cultivate a religion of its own, . . . that flows from its own nature, from the German race, and that has grown upon German soil." This is what the National Socialist ideology is.

By the war settlement democracy was forced on Germany. What really held the nation together in post-war years was the apparatus of bureaucracy. For a century the German people had been prepared for anything but a democracy. They had been prepared for the inflated nationalism which broke through in National Socialism. Political Catholicism had been no more successful in stemming the tide than had Social Democracy. Thus it is a great mistake to permit the German State to lay all its ills to the Treaty of Versailles. German nationalism was one of the causes of the war. The Church had not been able to induce any penitence, because she had no real voice to utter God's Word. She had become "the handmaid of worldly lords and worldly powers." She, too, looked for salvation in a new union of State and Church. In protecting nationalism she had promoted the growth of the national myth.

From these conclusions, the author carries us directly into the contemporary situation which has resulted. Before following, the reviewer is constrained to observe that, while Dr. Frey has at points lost his sense of direction and discrimination, leading sometimes to an approach to caricature rather than portraiture, has been diverted by falling into the Barthian paradoxes and antitheses, the employment of the cate-

gorical "yes" and "no," and has thus failed to witness the relevancy of "natural" to "revealed" theology, nevertheless, if we avoid his by-paths, he gives us, in the large, a fair historical background for his succeeding study.

The two quite special characteristics of the Nazi State, which constitute its being, and have their roots in its spiritual history, are: first, that it is not just a particular state, but has a world-view (*Weltanschauung*) of its own; second, that it wants to be a totalitarian state in the completest conceivable sense. Its world-view is to be the solvent on the Christian age now coming to an end. In its totalitarianism, economics, law, science, art, and religion are political entities. All is mediated to the entirely disfranchised and mute individual or institution through the National Socialist Party. Thus the State becomes the source of religion, and the Church, if it exists, will have as religion a "folkic" religion given it by the State. Religion must promote "activity in business, the creation of values for the community, and devotion to God and eternity,"—but all "folkic."

Anti-Semitism is due (with, I should say, other even less commendable causes) to the charge that the "Judaizing" of the people had brought Germany to the verge of the abyss. It was really for racial purity that two million war-heroes died. Thus has arisen "The Myth of the Twentieth Century" as expounded in Alfred Rosenberg's book. Dr. Frey pauses to say that this "is a judgment on the Church which had ceased to proclaim the divine Word" (in the Barthian meaning), and had "to a large extent put in its place modern world-views." As a result, "the German God is He who is active in racial soul and blood, and who created the national honor," which is, according to Rosenberg, "the beginning and the end of all thought and action," and to which all, even the Church, must minister. The Nordic *Sagas* are symbols to take the place of Old Testament "stories of pander and cattle-dealers." The new age must eliminate all in the Christian age, now passing. This is the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. This myth is being incarnated more and more in Führer Adolf Hitler, its Messiah. According to Professor Wilhelm Hauer, "the domination of Christianity . . . was nothing more than an episode." Blood, Race, and Soil are holy. The Christian conception of sin is rejected. The Yule Festival takes the place of Christmas. To this German cult children and youth are dedicated by appropriate ceremonies. It is not co-ordinated; there

are several organized forms of the "German Faith" idea, but in the extremes of the wildest individualism they bear identical marks in substance.

Over against all this, where stands the German Evangelical Church? Divided, of course. It is weak, for reasons already given by Dr. Frey. Life had already been flowing past it. Lack of space forbids reproducing the author's historical narrative. Following confusion and vicissitude during these five years in which the State has sought to subdue the Church, we come to the issue of the moment. On one side we have the "German Christians" (the name suggested by Hitler), who do not reject Christianity in toto, but seek a (Nazi) German Christian Church, some putting the accent on "German," some on "Christian." Many among them sever the relation between Judaism and Christianity. Some seek a Jesus of "heroic mould." Most of them would apply the "Aryan paragraph" in the selection of Church officials—perhaps even members. In all directions some are moderates, others, as in Thuringia, put the Church at the service of National Socialism. Various bodies of "German Christians" have issued a succession of "Theses," some of which approach very closely to Rosenberg and his Nordic myth.

The Government, through "Ministers for Church Affairs," has tried to reorganize the Church and induce order, and there is now in existence an ecclesiastically official German Evangelical Church. One thing is clear, "all the efforts of the German Christians, whether the attempt of the Reich Movement of German Christians to create a synthesis between Christianity and National Socialism, or the attempt of the National Movement of Thuringian German Christians to form a "German Christian National Church," must lead to the dissolution of the Christian Church, into whose place steps the myth of the twentieth century."

All hope lies in "the renewal of the Church" through the rebellious Confessional Church, for this renewal is essential to any victory for Christianity. (This body is seemingly weaker and more divided today than it was when Dr. Frey wrote.) The author (and I think, justly) credits Karl Barth with the search for renewal, although the "Young Reformation Movement" and Niemöller's Pastor's Emergency League started the conflict with the then (1933-34) seemingly victorious "German Christians." Here there have been divergent leaders, and Dr. Frey believes that effective action and utterance have been

largely due to those who reflected Barth. In the call of the Confessional Synod in 1934, Dr. Frey finds no room for "Natural Theology," or "natural knowledge of God," (to which the reviewer dissents, except so far as emphasis is concerned). To this utterance of the Synod there was Lutheran criticism. The author fears that the Lutherans—and not only they—are continually in danger of taking the course followed by the Russian Orthodox Church in czarist Russia (to which the reviewer assents).

In the meantime, the German Christian Bishop Müller, with state help from political supervisors, "went on with the work of destroying the Church." Some Confessional leaders took a compromising attitude. The Reich Minister for Church Affairs, Kerrl, has forcefully, but vainly, sought to reduce the Church to order (since Dr. Frey's book was written the Confessional Synod has been ecclesiastically outlawed). The necessity for the Confessional Church to define relations with a Reich Church Committee led to a cleavage among its leaders, some leaning towards pacifism. In all this the author sees the basic contest for the "renewal" of the Church. On Reformation Day, 1937, a common manifesto by Church groups took issue with Rosenberg on his continual attacks, and Dr. Frey concludes (in 1937) that the Confessional Church struggle is not at an end.

Dr. Frey seeks, in the midst of the varying positions within the Confessional body, to define its attitude towards the National Socialist State. Alfred Rosenberg was deputed to educate the people in the new world-view, and the destructive aim of the State is made clear through the legion of publications describing Christianity as an alien religion. The effort has been made by stages. First was the attempt through the big majority victory of the German Christians, which simply wrought havoc. The Confessional Church, in October, 1934, protested against the "police force" methods of the Reich Church Government, declaring that "the creation of Church organization is the Church's concern, and that it is to be carried out exclusively according to Church points of view." Its utterances, given in some detail, are bold. There were even protests against the deification of Hitler, on the ground of the latter's own disclaimer. The author quotes freely from pronouncements which are lofty and courageous—but on principles every one of which has been, and is being, violated often, with true Nazi *Schrecklichkeit*. Hitler answered all these appeals when, in 1937, he referred to "old

dotards of whom nothing can be made," and added, "but we are taking the children from them." Dr. Frey is desirous, mainly, of bringing out the significance of the conflict and the need for the "renewed" Church to meet it, and he does not go into a description of the methods, often sadistic, by which Nazism has sought to wear down the Confessional Church leaders.

The author finds the whole world, as well as Germany, "at a turning-point of human history." He goes back to the main cause: "God's Word was humanized" and "made subject to human knowledge." In National Socialism and Christianity "two worlds stand over against each other." And "only a Church which possesses a clear and common Confession really has the strength to confess." His study makes this abundantly clear, even though one may need to distinguish between his main contention that the Church must preach the Word of God and speak on divine authority, and his contention that God has revealed himself *only*, as well as supremely, in the Jesus Christ of the Scriptures. And all will agree that the Church can no longer build on human hopes.

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Philosophie de la religion: introduction critique: étude des systèmes modernes. By PAUL ORTEGAT, S.J. Bruxelles: l'Edition Universelle, S.A., 1938. 475 pp. Fr. 55.

It almost goes without saying that in philosophical circles the dominant strain of thought within the past few decades has been empirical and naturalistic. Accompanying this trend have been anthropological, psychological, and sociological studies which have greatly augmented our understanding of the origin of religion and its place in society. These forces have combined to criticize and even to uproot many of the traditional views of religion and to suggest not only new ways of approaching the subject, but also new interpretations of its essential nature. The first excitement over the unique possibilities for the future of religion permitted some, such as Guyau, to suggest the final overthrow of religion as it has existed in the past. Later maturation of this tendency has led rather to reinterpretation of religion in terms of its meaningfulness in the cultural milieu of the present. While its influence has broadened, and early broadside attack has given way to honest scrutiny of its merits and demerits, the case for a less radical interpre-

tation has strengthened, and defenders of more traditional religion have been sharpening their weapons in preparation for a clearer statement of their own position, as well as for more cogent attack upon the new. In Protestant circles this has recently expressed itself in terms of a new supernaturalism, as well as in other ways. In Catholic circles it has meant a renaissance of scholasticism, on a thirteenth century pattern to be sure, but with more adequate understanding of the issues which have divided men as naturalistic thought has acquired greater influence. The names of Gilson, Maritain and Dawson are comparatively well known and their works widely read. Although Ortegat has not been as prominent as these others, his *Philosophie de la religion* does mark him as a scholar of considerable critical acumen, as well as an able exponent of personal realism in its Catholic setting. Ortegat believes that the gospel of science as such has demonstrated its own limitations, that the real antinomy today is that which opposes the dynamic to the static, action to thought, and immanence to transcendence. His own object in the present work has not been to favor one side of this antinomy over against the other, but to find a way of reconciling them in an all-inclusive metaphysical position which gives to religion ontological as well as social standing, permanent as well as transitory value, and certainty as well as possibility of modification. This reconciliation, one might gather without even reading the book, is on the basis of Aristotelianism as modified by thirteenth century and subsequent Catholic realism, not however without giving adequate attention, as he does throughout the book, to figures as diverse as Hegel and James, Kant and Nietzsche, Spencer and Schopenhauer, along with many others he treats less extensively.

Religion Ortegat defines as "the social, vital, speculative union of the individual with God, Personal Being and Creator" (pp. 464-5). According to him, the philosophy of religion should occupy itself with the necessary conditions of religious experience, should decide what Being is, and the nature of the relationship between the human and the divine. It should determine the transcendental origin of religion and judge its value. It is not subject to postulates as is science, because it is not concerned with the limited; instead it is fundamental and ultimate, because its object is that which is unconditioned and supreme. It can reach real certainty because it seeks to know that which has reality in itself, not that whose existence is derived or dependent.

Of interest to American readers, as well as of importance to his

whole case, is the chapter on "The Absolute Norms of Action" in which he criticizes James and defends absolutism against James' relativism, meliorism and pragmatic theism. He argues that the problem of knowledge is insoluble on the basis of radical pluralism, because it superimposes being on Being; its explanation is found only in the thomist analogy of being which, he contends, justifies human knowledge and permits it to pass from the relative to the absolute because of man's dynamic connection with pure being. He regards the pragmatic criterion of truth as insufficient, because it makes truth relative and misstates the relationship between thought and action, each of which for him has correlative importance as a determinant of man's existence. If James really meant to make truth a matter of temperament and milieu, Ortegat holds that the position is subjectivism. Again, for him the existence of moral choice indicates that there is a real choice to be made, that there is a hierarchy of values and a real norm, and that this norm is discoverable through finite apprehension. Furthermore, he argues that intelligence and volition (although unified in the substantial person whose being is derivative from God) are distinct, that to make intelligence subservient to volition is as erroneous a conclusion as that of the rationalist who attempts to make volition subservient to intelligence. According to Ortegat, each has a proper sphere, and each has a criterion which is final. These norms are not individual, but universal; to speak of the good and the true in other than universal terms is to relegate morality and truth "to the tomb." He further argues that God is more than a human hypothesis: He is a real Being, the sovereign condition of finite being, of finite power, and of the synthesis between the possible and the real. His existence is necessary as the explanation for and cause of all finite existence.

Basis for authority Ortegat finds in a realistic epistemology. He contends that agnosticism offers no valid explanation of knowledge, since doubt itself is based upon the knowledge of certitude. Idealism is invalid because the only certainty it provides is a certainty of logical coherence, not a certainty of real existence. Mysticism is equally invalid because its certainty is subjective. The realist, Ortegat holds, has adequate basis for knowledge because he defines being in terms of its relationship both to thought and to action. Hence he judges being "not solely by its intelligibility but also by its dynamic activity, by the actuality of its presence" (p. 109). The existence of God, therefore, is

defended on the basis of its explaining neither intelligence nor will alone, but rather because it is the necessary condition of both of them as they are unified in the spiritual substance, man. The intellectualist defines God as thought, the voluntarist as will; Ortegat believes only an ontological synthesis of the two in terms of a subsistent Being to be sufficient.

Religion, for Ortegat, is an intimate relationship between God and man. Man on the one hand is a dynamic being, synthesizing the seemingly antagonistic forces, thought and action, although in a relative way. God, on the other hand, is personal in that he not only is perfect will and perfect thought, but also their perfect synthesis. The perfection of God does not, however, isolate Him from the finite world, for He is not alone its ontological basis but also its activating power and its final end. The relationship between God and man is not restricted to momentary contact, not achieved by moral or intellectual techniques alone, but is an intimacy of substantial being which is thorough and continuous.

No mention thus far has been made of Ortegat's interpretation of the Church. He regards it as the organism through which the individual achieves his personal relationship with God. The individual, while a synthesis in himself as far as intellect and will are concerned, is, in the ascent toward God, a part of which the spiritual community, the Church, is the organic whole. Ortegat holds that man individually can never fulfil his divine destiny; only as he becomes associated with an historical community can he be spiritually orientated. To be moral, he contends, is to conform to a common ideal; to be religious is to revere what ought to be revered, as determined by a social medium which has historical continuity and objectified social (universal) judgment. Recognition of the absolute value of personality alone will not suffice; only as man realizes his obligation to others through a spiritual organ which has external as well as internal relationships, can his pilgrimage issue in happiness and sublimity.

Ortegat's point of view is essentially metaphysical in the traditional sense of that word. He goes to considerable length in criticizing the empirical approach to religion. He holds that the history of religion is valuable if it offers an account of a selected tradition which has metaphysical basis, but it is quite insufficient when it seeks only to relate the empirical facts of religious phenomena. It is helpful if it

leads to religious action. He charges the sociological and anthropological interpretations of religion with causing the moral and religious anarchy of the present. It is perhaps helpful for Ortegat to remind us once again of the difficulties of the empirical approach, but it is doubtful if outside of his own circle he can find wide support for making the empirical consideration of religion quite secondary to the speculative. Empirical study is at least a check upon unwarranted deductive inference in metaphysics; if it becomes merely a tool to be used as a defence for given truths determined on an a priori basis, the most obvious and essential means of reconciling differences has gone by the board. With all due credit to the conscientious and able presentation of Ortegat's position, the present writer would like to see a more empirical procedure adopted in the defence of a similar position, if such is possible. The criticism and displacement of naturalism can hardly be augmented by evasion of the empirical facts in religious history, and in fields which have contributed much to our present understanding of religion.

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Revelation and Response. By Edgar P. Dickie. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. vii + 278 pp. $2.50.

Revelation and Response, by Edgar P. Dickie, Professor of Divinity at The University of St. Andrews, contains a number of lectures which represent his share in "a fresh examination of basic philosophical principles" to which, he feels, philosophical thought in Scotland has in recent years been forced back. Having been delivered at various places, these lectures do not form a closely knit and interrelated whole. Besides, no correlating or summarizing section is found in the book. As a consequence the author's full views on revelation and response must be gleaned from arguments and statements throughout the book and correlated by the reader.

Attempting this, we find that Dickie believes that the discovery and satisfaction of our own needs is not enough. We should also know what ought to be desired, and for this we require revelation. Man is radically unfit to achieve unaided knowledge of spiritual reality. Human discovery can do no more than convince itself of its own impotence in this sphere. Quoting Karl Heim, Dickie affirms: "If God is a Reality

and not to be explained away in the manner of Idolatry and Pantheism, then it is impossible for us, by any observation or any thinking of our own, to reach what He is and what He wills. We are thrown back on God's own revelation" (p. 41). Both morality and religion are dependent on "the initiative of God."

This suggests what the general content of revelation is, according to Dickie. Specifically, it is divine holy love revealed in the life and death and resurrection of Jesus (p. 147). This love implies divine forgiveness and salvation from one's personality. The content of revelation is also the light on the problems of time and eternity, and of good and evil, that we have in Jesus. Again, it is God, who has nowhere left man without a witness of Himself, and has given the supreme and final revelation of Himself in Jesus, though in every revelation He remains ultimately incomprehensible (though not unknowable) for man.

The means and method of revelation, as Dickie conceives them, include Jesus, the Bible, the religious community, and history. "In Jesus," says he, "we have the pattern of true faith in God the Father. He was mankind's Supreme Believer. And it is because of this that Jesus 'brings the Father near.' Revelation and response go hand in hand. Every right response is the vestibule of a new revelation" (p. 253). Dickie believes Jesus was sinless, and that He came to reveal what God was like. Jesus is God incarnate, God the Son, God manifest. God was in Him reconciling the world unto Himself. Yet he does not believe that it will do to say bluntly that Jesus is God, just as the Father in Heaven is God. Jesus was a man, though He was different from all other men. He was not even inerrant in all matters under the sun. His authority is confined to those matters about which He was concerned—God, sinful man, redemption. Jesus, however, is not the only personality through whom the divine revelation is mediated. According to Dickie, God communicates His will also through other historical personalities (the prophets), and entrusts His revelation to a historical community.

Dickie sees in the Bible the greatest external authority, because it gives the record of the most profound religious experience, leading up to and culminating in Jesus Christ. But he rejects its "verbal inspiration." In one place he admits that historical criticism in connection with the Bible, presents a very difficult problem; in another he affirms that historical criticism, so far from emptying it of its content, has enriched

the understanding of it, and has given a new and nobler idea of God. He is no longer bound by the letter of Scripture, confined to a static revelation (cf. p. 148).

Though Dickie denies that there is an external and final authority in the church, he holds that the religious community plays an essential part in revelation. A society of Christians is needed, because of the restraint it exercises on moral and intellectual idiosyncracies. "The voice of the Church is the voice of God" (p. 123).

Speaking of revelation in general, Dickie asserts that the divine coming is not an *evolutio* but an *ingressio*. Yet the divine movement in the world does not involve discontinuity. God is in control of the historical process at every point. When He intervenes it is not a new situation that is created, but the old one transfigured. The unity and the character of God are enough by themselves to justify Christians in finding revelation in history. The evolution of history may be the evolution of sin, but it is also the story of redemption.

Dickie accepts the findings of Form-Criticism. It appears that we cannot know, with certainty, what kind of *person* Jesus was, nor can we say precisely what was the content of His teaching. But though Form-Criticism can lessen the evidence available for knowing what the historical Jesus was like, at the same time it adds evidence for the interpretation of the Person of Jesus by His early followers. The impression made by Jesus upon those who knew Him, or were members of the early Church, is exceedingly important, Dickie holds, for determining what manner of man He was. "Even false anecdotes may be good history," he writes (p. 165). With a life which does not end with any date, ante-dating is not a serious mistake. What must be affirmed, he says, is the legitimacy of trusting the "communal memory" where the community has been faithful.

In the last two chapters of the book, Dickie espouses the finality of the Christian gospel. This finality he seems to find especially in the offer of forgiveness. "Nothing can be conceived greater than divine holy love as it is in Jesus," he says. But he immediately adds, "Of fundamental importance is the declaration of Jesus Himself. He knows of no task more sacred than to point men to Himself" (p. 270).

When we turn to Dickie's conception of man's response to God's revelation, we find many evaluations and characterizations of reason and faith. He quotes Nicolas Berdyaev on faith to the effect that faith

knows nothing of external guarantees. "To demand guarantees and proofs of faith is to fail to understand its very nature by denying the free heroic act which it inspires" (p. 117). Elsewhere he says that faith does not consist in making an intellectual survey of the universe or a philosophical analysis of man, but is really a question of taking sides, of making a personal decision. The quest of spiritual truth demands renunciation of sensuality, of pride, and of self-will. By renunciation of pride Dickie means putting off all confidence in our own wisdom and waiting on God in a purely receptive spirit. Faith is not an achievement, but a response. And in connection with faith in Jesus, he writes: "We know *about* Him, ever more and more. But the ascent is not gradual to the end. There is a vertical leap; no new fact is added, but all facts are suddenly polarized" (p. 128).

Yet reason is not entirely excluded from man's response, nor should we try so to exclude it. The Word of God has intellectual content, and man's reason, directed and illuminated, not only may but must work on it. Christian faith must philosophize, since Christ is the Truth, as well as the Way and the Life. Besides, it is right that we should have what justification is available for what we believe. Faith is not reason, but it is reasonable, and it must make use of reason. The latter validates conviction. Its task is to make impossible all religions save the best.

There is a condition that must be fulfilled to have faith or to apprehend revelation. "Faith is an 'holy experiment,' for spiritual truth can be achieved only by the devotion of the whole personality to the leading of God, and that on His bare promise that this is the way by which light will come" (p. 17). The nature of God is revealed only to those who trust and act on their trust. Again, the Scriptures must be read with understanding. Otherwise they will not be revelation at all. This understanding, however, is not man's own contribution; it also comes from God. It is God who turns the pages and speaks each word afresh to us. Quoting Barth, Dickie states: "The work of faith and the work of the Spirit are identified" (pp. 129 f.).

When speaking of the certitude of faith, Dickie affirms that there is such a thing as non-logical conviction. It is the type of conviction which might be rationalized if sufficient knowledge were attained. Furthermore, he affirms that morality and religion have their own particular type of certainty, determined by the nature of their subject matter. Faith is not something magical, not a substitute for other methods of

knowing. It is somewhat like our knowledge that we can trust a friend. In one place Dickie says, "In the experience of faith there is something creative and inexplicable which carries its own conviction within it" (p. 118). Religious certitude is *there*, a fact to be acknowledged, a certitude of its own distinctive type. But it is quite a different exercise when we come to speculate about the nature of it. To examine the experience changes it.

When discussing the authority of Scripture, Dickie takes the side of the Reformers, contending that they taught that the Christian consciousness is absolutely sure of itself and cannot be subject to any authority other than the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit, witnessing to an objective Word of God. In another place he says: "If there is one certainty in human life it is that God is speaking in conscience. A conscience stabbed awake . . . is God's voice; is man in touch with very God" (p. 189). The real creed of the Christian believer is the prayer uttered in the moment of experience. The *unio mystica* is a momentary thing, but it is a living thing. To dissect it, to ask reasons for it, is to destroy the life and to alter its character. Yet in it is to be found unassailable certainty (p. 211).

Such in broad outlines appears to be Dickie's conception of revelation and response. Generally speaking, it contains some suggestive and thought-provoking features, but it leaves us with many questions.

To begin with, if the Word of God has intellectual content, on which man's reason must work, and the task of reason is to make impossible all religions save the best, if it validates conviction, and if it is right that we should have what justification is available for what we believe, is it not going too far to say that in the quest of spiritual truth we must put off all confidence in our own wisdom and wait on God in a purely receptive spirit? If reason can and must do what Dickie says, is it not implied that it can and does support faith to a greater extent than he admits?

In defining reason, Dickie says that it includes an element akin to personal trust, as well as syllogistic reason and the ethical attitude, and that therefore there is a type of judgment which is a judgment of reason, though it is not capable of syllogistic proof. We have no quarrel with him on this conclusion as such, but what type of judgment has he in mind? What is this element that is akin to personal trust? It seems Dickie here includes both too much and too little for his

definition: too much, because this trust taken by itself, as Dickie takes it, seems to be a non-intellectual element; too little, because he makes no room for man's inclusive reflection on and attempted ordering of all his experience.

Dickie holds that in the experience of faith there is something creative and inexplicable which carries its own conviction with it. If he is thinking of Christian faith in general when he says this, the experience he speaks of seems highly questionable. That there are certain self-evident truths and facts we gladly admit, but these are of an intellectual rather than non-intellectual kind. How can Dickie be intelligently assured that even the strongest faith is dependable, if he cannot and does not somehow check it? His mere acknowledgment that reason cannot or does not invalidate his faith, or his belief that a self-authenticating faith is possible, would already imply some outside support to his faith. In this connection, we may ask just how Dickie would reconcile what he says on page 120 with his contention: "Moreover, the evidence from our own inner experience alone must always be ambiguous, at its best it cannot meet the charge of self-deception. It is in historical revelation that we have that testimony which is at once normative and self-authenticating."

Another question of a general nature that we would ask is: Just where in Dickie's conception of the matter does the sphere of discovery end and that of revelation begin? Nowhere is this made clear. It is particularly obscure when Dickie contends that Christians are justified "in finding revelation in history" (p. 161), and that the evolution of history may be the evolution of sin, but is also the story of redemption. Many other theologians distinguish between special and general revelation, but Dickie does not use these terms. Yet it seems that these would help him make a distinction that ought to be made to give greater clarity, precision, and consistency to his thought.

In raising the preceding questions, which include only such as concern Dickie's own conception of revelation and response, we do not imply that the Christian faith is unacceptable, but merely attempt to show that, notwithstanding many apt observations, Dickie has failed to describe and espouse it satisfactorily.

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

State Population Census by Faiths. Meaning, Reliability and Value. By H. S. Linfield. New York: Hasid's Bibliographic and Library Service, 1938. 72 pp. $2.00.

This compact monograph came to my attention during an attempt to make a world map showing the geographical distribution of religious groups. It served to reveal the limitations as well as to summarize much of the content of present knowledge on this complex subject.

Already the First International Congress of Statisticians held at Brussels in 1853, discussed the introduction of the rubric "religion" in population census questionnaires. The International Institute of Statistics, which took over the functions of the International Congress, continued the discussion of this matter at its second meeting in Paris in 1899, and again at its fourteenth meeting in Vienna in 1913. Since then the matter has been discussed from time to time. But to date, no summary has appeared giving the experiences gained by the countries that have practiced this type of census. This is the purpose of this monograph, which aims to discuss the present extent of the state population census by faiths; the nature of the question on religion in the census questionnaire; the summation of the census returns; the utilization of the census results by state authorities and by church bodies; and finally, the meaning of the state population census by faiths, its reliability and value. The survey covers every independent country and every colony or dependency which in its last population census sought to determine the religious affiliations of its inhabitants (pp. 6-7).

The second half of the monograph summarizes the nature and results of recent censuses on the following points:

A. The text of the question on religion in the census of each independent country, dependency, colony, or mandated country taking such a census.
B. The types of summation applied to the results in each case.
C. The names of the faiths or religious bodies returned in each population census by faiths.
D. "Detailed tables," giving the figures for majority groups, minority groups (assembled in one figure), non-confessionals, unknown or indefinite.
E. A bibliography of communications from government census offices and from church bodies.

Dr. Linfield has prefaced this unique collection of data with five brief chapters, discussing respectively: (1) "extent of population census by faiths," (2) "nature of question on religion in the census sched-

ule," (3) "summation of the census returns," (4) "utilization of census results," (5) "meaning of the state census by faiths, its reliability and value."

The United States, Brazil, Argentina, China, Japan, France, Russia, and Great Britain are among the principal countries that do *not* take a population census by faiths. Such a census is taken, however, in many parts of the British Empire, including India (listed, by the way, among the "independent countries" in Dr. Linfield's tables).

Extreme differences of practice exist with regard to the nature of the question on religion asked in the census. For example, "In the North European countries of Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden the function of the state population census by faiths is to determine whether a person is affiliated with the state or established church, another religious body, or none." In New Zealand, on the other hand, an attempt was made to record all individual professions of faith, and census takers were instructed that "there are almost innumerable religious professions," with the result that the census of 1936 in that country actually reported some 247 names of different faiths (cf. pp. 49-51 for the interesting list)!

The summation, utilization, and value of the results are all matters which defy generalization. "In India the information on religious affiliation is utilized, first, for the allocation of seats in the Indian legislatures, and secondly, for the purpose of securing adequate representation in the various government services for the principal (religious) communities. . . . The census data is more widely used for the purposes of the collection and allocation of church assessments and for the allocation of government grants for church schools or for church functionaries." So, for example, is the case in Germany, Austria, Palestine, Norway, Roumania. In still other cases, such as Czecho-Slovakia, Netherlands, South Africa, census directors claim the data on faiths are used to serve various purposes of the church organizations. But there is little clear evidence of such use, and Dr. Linfield states that "church bodies in their communications to this writer claim that the census data are not utilized in church work."

In most cases government offices state that the census data on religious population are used merely "for statistical purposes," or "for scientific purposes," or "for purposes of record only." Such statements to some degree reflect a wide-spread popular conviction "that a man's

religious belief is no concern of the State, and information regarding it should not be made the property of the idly curious or even of the representatives of ecclesiastical systems." The same statements also raise questions of the significance and reliability of the data for scientific purposes. Hungary, in 1930, and Canada, in 1931, made unusually detailed analyses of their religious census figures. But after reading Dr. Linfield's comments on these and other more typical summations, one can only conclude that much remains to be thought out and done before meaningful correlations and trends can reliably be determined from census data on religion.

Horace L. Friess

Columbia University

BOOK NOTES

India's Quest for Reality. By R. J. Jackson. London: The Buddhist Lodge, 1938. 47 pp.

This small booklet contains in its forty-seven pages a whole treasure of information about Hinduism, and might well serve as an appealing introduction to a study of Indian thought. At the same time it is a real contribution to recent research which is presented here in such a clear and illuminating way that every lay reader will be able to follow its ideas.

The first two essays on "The Quest in the Upanishads" demonstrate how in this very stage of Indian history we may find "the beginnings of a conception of the intrinsic value of knowledge" (p. 4), and the growing up of a consciousness that life must pass through a phase of no-life to reach fuller life.

One essay deals with Yoga-philosophy. Here the widespread idea, that Yoga has something to do with "union" in the sense of joining the deity is criticised, and Jackson prefers to follow Bhojadeva's commentary on the *Yoga-Sutras*, where Yoga is explained really to mean *Viyoga*, separation, or *Viveka*, discrimination between subject and object, self and nature (pp. 25 ff.).

Another general prejudice is rejected in the chapter on "The Indian Doctrine of Maya." In most cases Maya does not mean "illusion," as most Westerners understand the term, but has rather to be taken in its original meaning as power, *Sakti*, which produces the whole world. Following up these ideas Jackson points out that true rest is not quietism, but a well balanced activity (p. 37).

The last essay on "Time, Its Meaning and Mystery," faces the problems opened up by J. W. Dunne and Sir James Jeans, and leads to the conclusion that through the right attitude and meditation man may gain "magical power over time."

A special item in this book worth mentioning is the good and intelligible etymological considerations which provide the sound scholarly background for so many inspiring ideas.

Friedrich Spiegelberg

The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion. By Sādhu Śāntināṭha. 2 vols. Amalnar, India: Seth Motilal Manickchand, 1938. 1110 pp.

Māyāvāda, or the Non-dualistic Philosophy (Vedānta). By Sādhu Śāntināṭha. Poona, India: Published by the author, 1938. 153 pp. + Appendix and Index. As. 4.

These three volumes represent together an extensive Indian *summa theologica* which circles through more than a thousand pages around the basic problem of how to find an expression for the Supernatural Power within the reality of our world.

The preface to Volume I of *The Critical Examination* is unusual as to Western viewpoints, and so interesting that its main passage deserves to be repeated here (General Introduction, pp. 1-2):

> I began my spiritual career at the very dawn of my youth. I practised "Bhakti-Sadhana" . . . for ten years, some forms of "Yoga-Sadhana" . . . for three years, and meditation according to the non-dualistic Vedantic method for about twelve years. . . . During the major part of this long period of the incessant practice of meditation, I passed days and nights almost without break in sitting posture in a secluded spot . . . the brain was in a strained condition on account of the incessant struggling effort at concentration. For this indifference to the physical necessities and excessive strain on the brain, I was attacked by a severe pain in the head. In order to divide and divert my attention and thereby to be relieved of pain, I gave some attention to the study of philosophy. At that time I acquired some discriminative capacity, as the result of which the thoughts like the following agitated my mind.

After all, the result of the whole enterprise is the non-acceptance of any metaphysical doctrine, of which the author writes: "I am convinced that this is the inevitable end of a sincere and unbiased philosophical inquiry" (p. 11). And he ends his preface by saying: "I began as a staunch believer and end as an inveterate agnostic and critic."

This trend is to be seen throughout the volumes, and finds its confirmation in the fact that the last word of *The Critical Examination* is "insoluble," and the last word of *Mayavado is* "ignorance." Yet Śāntināthа's agnosticism is basically different from a mere scientific renunciation-attitude, because it means insight into the impossibility of expressing in human thought that mystery of the Absolute Reality which is more real that the supposed reality around us.

To mention one interesting detail: the author tries to explain the existing divergence of opinions about Truth through the fact that after waking from Samadhi the different aspirants explain it according to pre-conceived notions and previously accepted modes of reasoning.

The whole work, though written in English, is thought in Sanskrit, and is a valuable Indian contribution to research in the initial problem of all metaphysical speculation.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

The Pageant of Japanese History. By MARION MAY DILTS. New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938. xvi + 380 pp. Illustrated. $3.00.

In this compact volume the author, whose recent residence in Japan is obvious from her presentation of the subject matter, has attempted the difficult task of giving to the general reader and students of senior high schools and colleges an intelligent and interesting history of Japan from earliest times to the beginning of hostilities in 1937. With special emphasis placed upon artistic, literary and cultural aspects of Japan's development, the volume will appeal to any concerned with world cultures. The descrip-

tions of the function of the early Buddhist priests as the disseminators of culture, and of the elegant life of the court and capital from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, are especially pleasing. Throughout the entire work, however, the material has been selected and presented so as to make agreeable reading, whether the author is discussing the role of the early Christian missionaries in the latter part of the sixteenth century, or the uneasiness of modern Japan faced with a suspicious Occident at the Washington Conference in 1922 and a powerful military group at home eager for expansion on the Asiatic continent.

The selection of pertinent facts from a mass of material has been accomplished unusually well, but slightly different emphasis would have made these even more significant. For instance, when describing the power of the Soga family (p. 27), the successful reform instigated by Kamatari, founder of the Fujiwara clan (pp. 28 ff.), or the rise in power of Ashikaga Takauji in the fourteenth century (p. 169), and elsewhere, their similarity might have been pointed out. They are excellent examples of those in Japan who championed the imperial cause, soon became intoxicated with their own power, and finally were forced to give way to rival factions. Another even more characteristic feature of Japanese government which might have been emphasized, prevalent from the twelfth century when the dictatorship of the Minamoto family was established (Chapter VIII), down to the present time, is its duality. As is rightly intimated, during the first dictatorship and later, the imperial court at Kyoto wielded little real power, but the existence of this duality should not be overlooked. That it baffled the first American consul, Townsend Harris (p. 279), is extremely important, for in the middle of the nineteenth century it caused the military government continual embarrassment. To make the picture even more vivid, it need only be pointed out that the direct access of the War and Navy Ministries to the throne today (a point omitted by the author) is a form of duality, especially noticeable in the "dual diplomacy" of recent years.

Certain inferences and conclusions seem open to question. For instance, it seems unlikely that Fukuzawa Yukichi did more than Prince Ito or other clan leaders "in making Japan what it is today" (p. 286). The work as a whole has only a few errors, such as the date of Hideyoshi's death (1598), but such is not the case for the map of Japan (pp. 344-5). There, in spite of comparatively few entries, the towns of Shimabara and Kamakura, and the province of Choshu are badly misplaced. The notes, glossary and index are all valuable additions, and the innumerable photogravures, skillfully chosen, add to the general interest of the work. In fact, the study of this book, a colorful description of a country's growth, should not only help the reader understand modern Japan, but make him anxious to know more of its past pageantry.

HUGH BORTON

The Basis of Israelite Marriage. By MILLAR BURROWS (American Oriental Series. Vol. 15.) New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1938. viii + 72 pp. $1.00.

Professor Burrows' monograph on the origin of ancient Israelite marriage poses anew the much discussed problem as to whether marriage in Israel was an economic transaction, a matter of purchase and ownership, or, a purely social affair, entered freely by two contracting parties. References to marriage in the Old Testament are scanty. The etymology and the exact meaning of the term *mohar,* i.e., that which the bridegroom gives to the bride's father or guardian as the final settlement before the marriage is consummated, are uncertain. Fortunately, however, this term and its equivalent (*terḫatu*) were also employed in the neighboring countries, in Babylonia, Assyria, Nuzi, and Syria (Ras Shamra). A comparative study of the material pertaining to marriage from these countries with that of the Old Testament may, therefore, be of great value in an attempt to solve the vexing problem. This the author does in a most admirable way. Every bit of information relevant to the subject (source material and its interpretation, including even anthropological and Talmudic sources) is systematically presented. The arguments of the various schools are succinctly stated and a conclusion arrived at.

The mongraph contains five chapters: (1) problems, materials, and methods; (2) thesis; (3) arguments for marriage by purchase; (4) arguments against marriage by purchase; and (5) alternative explanations. The author's thesis may be summarized, in his own words, as follows: In ancient society marriage was not so much an affair of the individual as an affair of the family, the clan, and the tribe. The purpose of marriage, as conceived by all the peoples of the ancient Near East, was to ensure the survival of the family by providing male successors. The woman was both a worker and a potential mother, and as such a valuable and valued member of the group. This being the case, it is not surprising to find that among many peoples, a group which gives up one of its women to another group in marriage expects, in return from that group, a woman or a compensation equivalent in value to the woman given up. The Old Testament *mohar* and the Babylonian *terḫatu* represent such a compensation which, however, is not a purchase-price, but rather a compensatory gift presented by the bridegroom to the bride's father in order to enhance the prestige of the giver, to express and confirm the social bond between him and the recipient, and to put the latter under an obligation to him. "The basis of Israelite marriage was the continuance of the husband's family. This required securing a wife from another family, which had to be induced to give her up, and this was done by a gift, creating an obligation, sealing a contract, and establishing a family-alliance. Other gifts were exchanged and feasts were partaken to strengthen and confirm the alliance. Economic development eventually caused some formal approximation to the system

of sale and purchase, but the nature of the transaction remained essentially the same."

The argument, so ably presented by Professor Burrows, that the *mohar* was not a purchase price but a compensatory gift, is not very convincing. The Hebrew husband was called *baʿal* (owner), and the *mohar*, like the *terḥatu*, consisted of money or goods, and varied in value according to the age and station of the woman. By maintaining, as many scholars do, that early Israelite marriage was marriage by purchase, one does not necessarily imply that women were treated in the ancient Near East like slaves. They were not. Besides, what really is the difference between purchase-price and compensatory gift? Are they not both essentially the same?

In ancient Babylonia and in Nuzi there were two ways open for parents who were forced by adverse circumstances to sell their children. The one was straightforward and outspoken: the parents received the price offered them and the buyer received the child; the other was euphemistically called adoption,—the purchaser "adopted" the child and the parents received a compensation in money or goods as a "gift." Juridically, an adoption is not a sale, and a gift is not a purchase-price; economically, however, they both mean the same thing.

I. MENDELSOHN

A Descriptive Catalogue of Greek New Testament Manuscripts in America. By KENNETH W. CLARK. The University of Chicago Press, 1937. xxvii + 418 pp.; lxxiii plates. $5.00.

It is a pleasure to welcome this piece of genuine pioneering work, which has cleared a path for all New Testament scholars. Dr. Clark has sought out all the New Testament manuscripts at present existing in the United States and Canada. He has found that, in the last generation, the number has increased by more than two hundred, many of them concealed in private collections, or in forgotten recesses of the public libraries. He has catalogued all the material on an admirably clear system, with careful notes which give just the information which the scholar requires. He has added to the book no fewer than seventy-three plates, beautifully executed, which reveal at a glance the characteristics of all the more important manuscripts. No one can have been aware, before the appearance of this work, how much of the most valuable material for textual criticism has now found its way to America, and it may be hoped that one effect of the book will be to stimulate the zeal of collectors. Much of the ablest recent work on the New Testament text has been done by American scholars, and it is only right that they should have at their disposal, in their own country, a larger proportion of the manuscripts. This is the more advisable as many of the European Universities are now dead for all higher purposes of scholarship, and the irreplaceable material preserved in their libraries has ceased to be entirely safe. Dr. Clark has done a very real service, and the Chicago University

Press must also be thanked for issuing at a reasonable price a book for which they might fairly have demanded twice or thrice as much.

E. F. Scott

History and the Gospel. By C. H. Dodd. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons., 1938. 189 pp. $2.00.

In his latest book Professor Dodd has followed up the idea with which the many readers of his previous volumes are now familiar, at the same time enlarging it and applying it in new directions. He maintains that the Gospel history is to be regarded as a "realised eschatology," in the sense that in the life and work of Jesus the Kingdom of God became an actuality. Within the framework of general history, according to Professor Dodd, there has always been another history, in which the divine purpose has unfolded itself, and which was consummated in the coming of Jesus. In him the inner meaning of the whole historical process was finally disclosed. This thesis is worked out in the present book with all the wealth of scholarship, and the precision of thought and language which we have learned to expect from Professor Dodd. Whether he has proved his main contention may still be considered doubtful. It seems to belong to the very essence of Jesus' teaching that the Kingdom lies in the future. When it is pushed back into the present, the element of hope, which is one of the chief incentives to Christian action, is in danger of falling away. One cannot but feel, too, that Professor Dodd's conception, impressive as it undoubtedly is, tends to revive that sharp distinction between sacred and secular which has always in the end proved harmful to religion. But whatever may be thought of its general thesis, the book is one of the most important of recent contributions to New Testament study. Its value consists not so much in its presentation of a given theory as in its incidental discussion of critical and historical questions. The author writes out of a full mind, and in almost every paragraph he throws out some observation which is new and illuminating. Sometimes in one concise sentence, he gets at the heart of a bewildering problem, and speaks what may be accepted as the final word. No one who wishes to understand the early Christian history, as it appears to a first-rate modern scholar, can afford to neglect the book.

E. F. Scott

The Cornerstone of Christianity. By W. A. Campbell. La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1938. 63 pp. 50 cents.

This slight book is described as an "Introduction to the symbolic criticism of W. B. Smith," and in it, the author concludes that, not only the resurrection of Jesus, but even the conception of him as a single historical individual, should be regarded as an elaborate myth. This conclusion is reached partly from an affirmation of the unplausibility of the miraculous, and partly from a consideration of the difficulty modern criticism has in attempting to get behind our Gospel records with their various contradictions.

It need hardly be said here that most scholars agree that some historical figure was the dominant influence in the formation of the Christian tradition, whatever our difficulties may be in determining the character of this figure in detail.

The author also holds the old-fashioned view that the historical Jesus meant nothing at all to St. Paul.

G. STYLER

Le Problème du Christianisme primitif. Quatre conférences sur la forme et la pensée du Nouveau Testament. By KARL LUDWIG SCHMIDT. Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1938. 104 pp. Fr. 30.

At the age of twenty-eight, in 1919, the author published the work that made him famous, *Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu.* Since then Schmidt has written numerous essays and brochures, including eleven articles in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.* One of these on *Jesus Christus* consists of forty-two columns. He edited *Festgabe für Adolf Deissmann* and contributed *Die Kirche des Urchristentums* to it. Until recently he was one of the chief contributors to *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.*

In September of 1937, Professor Schmidt delivered four addresses in German at the University of Copenhagen. These were later translated into French and published in the *Revue d'Histoire et de philosophie religieuses,* 1938 (pp. 1-53 and 126-173). The present pamphlet is a reprint of these. The first lecture is concerned with the basis, purpose, and limits of the *formgeschichtliche Methode* as applied to the New Testament; the second, with Jesus of Nazareth, Messiah and Son of Man; the third, with the Trinity as subject and object of faith; and the fourth, with Kingdom of God, Church, State and People, relations and contrasts. Schmidt's discussion reveals acquaintance with not only the German literature but the Dutch, French, British and American as well. His former conclusions are in general maintained. Form criticism must be carried on within the framework of historical method. Matthew 16:18 is genuine and to be referred to the Christian church as taking over the prerogatives of the holy remnant of Israel, i.e., the church is the true Israel of the time of the end. Jesus regarded himself as Messiah and may have pointed the title with Son of Man significance. Emphasis is laid upon approaching the trinitarian issue from the experience of the early Christian community. Yet a growth of the concept is admitted.

The discussion of church and state, which musters all the New Testament data and reaches conclusions rather opposed to Nazism, demands biographical comment upon one who is not merely a distinguished New Testament scholar but also a great hero of the Christian faith. Born in 1891 in Frankfurt am Main and educated at Marburg and Berlin, Schmidt was severely wounded while fighting in the German army on the western front. A Privatdozent in New Testament at the University of Berlin in 1918, he

became full professor from 1921 on in Giessen, Jena, and Bonn. Removed by the Nazis in 1933, Schmidt migrated to Switzerland serving as pastor, and thereafter as professor and dean of theology at the University of Basel. Recently a victim again of Nazi hate, because he was and is a friend of Karl Barth, Dr. Schmidt has now been deprived of his German nationality, and will be prevented from making further contributions to the *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. O tempora, O mores!*

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

Medieval Handbooks of Penance . . . and selections from related documents. Translated by JOHN T. MCNEILL and HELENA M. GAMER. (Records of Civilization, No. XXIX.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. xiv + 476 pp. $4.75.

It is only within recent years that medievalists have seriously pursued the study of the history of penance as contributory to the social history of the Middle Ages. Until the appearance of the present volume none but research specialists could, without great labor, become acquainted with one of the most important sources for that field of history, the long series of penitentials. The series begins with the canons attributed to St. Patrick and closes with the Milan penitential of St. Charles (Cardinal) Borromeo in the sixteenth century. The volume under review, with certain omissions which are carefully indicated, covers the entire span of eleven centuries, emphasizing of course the period previous to the thirteenth century when the penitential books proper were written and widely used as guides to confessors. The work makes no pretension to be a history of penance, but it will readily serve as an introduction to the study thereof; used in conjunction with recent work by other specialists in the subject, it will shed new light for students of the Middle Ages on various ecclesiastical and legal institutions, and especially upon many aspects of social history in general.

In the short but interesting introduction there is a section on penance in the ancient Church and its inadequacy to meet western conditions; another on the rise of a new method of penitential discipline and the need of confessors for guides to the imposition of private penance, followed by a suggestive passage on the long effort to repress folk-paganism, and by some admirable pages on penance as a medicine for sin wherein the deep humanity of many churchmen in a barbaric age receives new emphasis. These pages of necessarily brief and compressed treatment will appear insufficient only to the specialist for whom they were not intended, but will not be disappointing to the readers whom the translator and the editors of the series of which the book is a part had in mind. The introduction, in other words, is a suggestive guide to the reader of the documents of what he may expect to find in the lines and between the lines of the texts of the body of the book. It closes with an excellent description of the texts, of the editions of those which have been published, of the problems involved, linguistic and

paleographical, in the presentation of the translations; in this section a definite scholarly contribution has been made.

The documents translated are grouped into nine sections: penitentials from the early Irish, Welsh, and Anglo-Saxon churches, those by Irish authors on the Continent, Frankish and Visigothic books, selections from penitential documents of the twelfth and succeeding centuries, selected penitential elements in public law, synodical decisions and ecclesiastical opinions concerning the penitentials from the eighth to the seventeenth century. The translations, all by Dr. McNeill, are smooth and apparently accurate, overcoming many difficulties. The reader is never in doubt of the meaning of the text and is aided by footnotes on unusual expressions presented as safeguards against the suspicion of arbitrary renderings. The paleographical problems confronted by Miss Gamer have obviously been great, and have involved examination of nearly a hundred manuscripts in a score of repositories abroad either directly or by photostatic copies. The reviewer, only once confused as to the meaning of a passage, is not captious but congratulatory in citing a single instance: *seland* on page 423 does not seem there, in the phrase as translated, to be a measure, as it is defined on page 160, note 4.

There are five appendices, one of which is a descriptive list of documents omitted from a necessarily selective work. The selected bibliography is too brief and omits histories of penance which might well have been included, even though some of them have been mentioned in the footnotes. The index proves satisfactory.

E. H. B.

The Commentaries of Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, Pius II. Translated by Florence Alden Gragg. Introduction and notes by Leona C. Gabel. (Smith College Studies in History, Vol. xxii, Nos. 1-2) Northampton, Mass.: Smith College, Department of History, 1937. 114 pp.

A very readable translation into English of the first of the twelve books of the Commentaries of Pius II, is now available. The chief interest of the publication lies in the pages wherein the events of the conclave in which the famous humanist was elected to the papacy are recorded in considerable detail, a unique account from the hand of a successful candidate. The original Vatican MS discovered by Pastor forms the basis of the work. The publication of the text and translation of the entire twelve books is promised, with notes indicating the differences between the MS and the printed editions such as accompany the present installment.

E. H. B.

Pre-Reformation England. By H. Maynard Smith. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. xiii + 556 pp. $8.00.

This work is a careful and well documented account of the religious situation in England, during the years immediately preceding the Reforma-

tion. It is attractively written, well arranged, and genuinely judicious in its appraisals. Every chapter is packed with historical detail, and is constantly illuminated by colorful incidents. This volume cannot be said to have added greatly to our knowledge of the period, but it has about it a certain freshness, and all the qualities of a readable and convenient standard text. Each chapter presents a concise statement of one of the factors involved in the ecclesiastical picture of the time—e.g., "Popular Religion"; "Ecclesiastical and Social Churches"; "History of Lollardy"; "The English Mystics"; "The Catholic Reformers," etc. The method is admirably adapted to the treatment of purely historical and biographical material, but it is less successful in dealing with the history of Scholasticism, where the full significance of scholastic thinking can hardly be compressed into summary accounts of the different schools. The biographical sketches of Wicliff, Peacock, Erasmus, More, Colet and others are admirably done. Similarly the history of Lollardy is very capably treated. The author is genuinely careful and judicious, but his bias against the Reformers is evident from time to time, and his comparison of Lollardy with Communism (p. 292) is somewhat grotesque. He has scant sympathy for "Colet, the Puritan," and is perhaps over-anxious to excuse the medieval relic-mongers of fraud. All in all, however, the work is a valuable and competent addition to the standard texts on English Church History.

C. C. R.

Son to Susanna: The Private Life of John Wesley. By G. Elsie Harrison. Nashville, Tenn.: The Cokesbury Press, 1938. 377 pp. $2.50.

The Bi-Centenary of the Birth of Methodism produced a flood of literature on its origins, but it is doubtful if any more interesting book was published than Mrs. Harrison's *Son to Susanna.*

The author has a distinguished Methodist lineage. Her father, the late Dr. John S. Simon, was the leading Methodist historian of his day; and her husband, Dr. A. W. Harrison, is an eminent theologian. But Mrs. Harrison is possessed of striking literary ability in her own right, and that ability is manifest in a marked degree in *Son to Susanna.* The book is a delight to read; its style is lucid; and there is present throughout a remarkable power of portrait-painting. The author is thoroughly steeped in the details of Methodist tradition, but she uses them always as an artist—and never as an artisan.

Mrs. Harrison has sketched a side of Wesley's life—some say she has over-sketched it—which has too often been ignored by his devout followers. The pious are prone to forget that he was, first and foremost, a man, and, moreover, a man with a mother-complex. Indeed, it is said that one of the reasons why he did not marry until late in life was that he never expected to see his mother's like again; and when a man marries in that vein, trouble is sure to lie ahead! One can only say that it is remarkable that a man, brought up by a woman of the dominating character of Susanna

Wesley, should have exhibited those powers of initiative for which he afterwards became noted.

The great danger of seeking to write realistically is that of doing less than justice to the subject under review. There is often a tendency to swing from a high idea of a man to the other extreme, and to minimize his excellencies. Most people are not happy unless they can classify and categorize men and movements. But unfortunately life is not to be disposed of so easily, and while it simplifies matters to regard men as either gods or devils, and movements as good or bad, it simply is not true to life. Mrs. Harrison does not fall into either extreme in depicting the life of one of the most complex personalities this world has ever seen, whose relationships with women, while always innocent, were surely not always wise. The author has performed a difficult task with a deft pen, a beautiful style, and an unrivalled knowledge of the history and literature of Methodism. She is to be congratulated on her achievement, as also is the Cokesbury Press on the format of the book.

GEOFFREY WARDLE STAFFORD

Le Problème de la Méthode. By MARIN STEFANESCO. (Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine) Paris: Librarie Félix Alcán, 1938. 360 pp. Fr. 40.

The author of this treatise on method is Professor of Logic in the Roumanian University of Cluj (formerly, before 1919, the Hungarian University of Klausenburg). The problem posed is to find a method by which all the various methods of searching for truth may be brought into a unity. In other words, the writer believes that the painful struggle of the modern world for a unity of knowledge may be solved in the discovery of a method for arriving at truth through a diversity of methods. He brings to his task the gifts of a skillful logician and a believing Christian. His purpose is practical, not academic. He does not seek to establish a method, an epistemology, relevant to his own system or exclusive of others, but to find one common to all forms of knowledge, based on the nature of man and residing inherently in all approaches to knowledge.

The first section on the diversity of methods states the problem. The great thinkers of all ages have earnestly sought to find true knowledge, but each has found merely his own way to truth. Even among thinkers in Christianity, there is a great diversity of interpretation. What then is the truth? what is scientific truth? or philosophical truth? or the truth in art? Even among scientists in the fields of physics, chemistry and biology, immense variety exists. After an analysis of all the methods used by great men from Socrates to Bergson, this writer concludes that diversity of method is not only inevitable but desirable. Each apprehends his own portion of truth. It is then a useless task to try to find unity in the content of knowledge.

In the second section on the unity of methods, he seeks a comprehensive

solution in terms of Christianity. Here again, he is not interested in the content of Christian faith but the way in which the faith works. The most interesting part of the book is also the heart of his argument. It is an extensive (pp. 200-271) exposition and analysis of the method of attaining truth used by Jesus and the New Testament writers. It is marked by originality, and the resultant solution is somewhat novel. There is not space among these notes to elaborate the steps in his procedure. It is sufficiently provocative to the readers of this journal to know that this author finds the all-inclusive method in man's search for truth in the practice of prayer by Jesus. Prayer in this sense is void of any necessary content. It is a method, the method, by which Jesus did, and by which all others may apprehend the truth. For prayer involves first the attitude of faith that there is truth to be known; then it purifies the heart, gives objectivity to the problem, steels the conscience, provides emotional balance and control. It can be universally applied as a method because in every man there is a spark of the divine, whether he be a pre-Christian (Socrates) or an unbeliever (August Comte). What is truth, found by this method? It is that which each one discovers who acts sincerely, and in faith, of whatever degree. Sincerity is the criterion by which any method is to be judged. Integrity of knowledge is dependent upon moral integrity, and the latter is inert, inactive unless expressed in the method of prayer as defined above.

Although an earnest Christian and a believer in the superiority of Christianity as a way to complete truth, the writer is remarkably free of dogmatism and institutional prejudices. At times it is not clear what he means by such terms as the good, evil, perfection, God, truth, faith. He probably implies that this is irrelevant. In this he reflects the tendencies in certain contemporary theologies, but he reveals no first-hand acquaintance with the writings of Protestant theologians, either in the text or the footnotes. One would have more confidence in his analysis of the New Testament had he indicated some recognition of the work of critical scholars. References were all taken at their face value. There are a number of interesting facets to the book; his treatment, for instance, of patriotism. The logical thoroughness of the writer is at times brilliant, at others tedious and redundant. Those who have read the volumes on the Harvard Tercentenary will be interested in this subsequent contribution to the quest for a unity of knowledge.

MAYNARD CASSADY

The Humiliated Christ in Modern Russian Thought. By NADEJDA GORODETZKY. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. pp. xiv + 185. $3.50.

This volume is a striking example of a type that is all too familiar to those who have much to do with Russian students abroad since the Revolution, for it contains an enormous mass of material which is not always too well-digested. At the same time, it will undoubtedly appeal and be valuable

to many people who desire to know more of Russian religious thought both in theological and in literary spheres.

The author has taken as her theme the picture of Christ that we find so often in Russian literature, that of the poor and humble man of sorrows. Yet she does not bring out clearly what is the essential difference between that attitude and the attitude toward Christ in the Western world. Throughout all the references, we realize very definitely that, to the Russian, Christ is never the good man, the carpenter of Nazareth, the man who was somehow taken as God by his admirers. Perhaps it was only Tolstoy who accepted that philosophy, and even with Tolstoy who was so interested in the Sermon on the Mount, Christ was not a good man; perhaps He was someone who should not have existed at all, because his personality only detracted from the teachings which He gave.

As a result, the parts of the book dealing with the literary opinions are definitely the weakest. The author's views of the Slavophiles can be exempted from this criticism, for there she has brought out the interesting combination of belief in Russia as a Christian and suffering country, and the willingness to face conditions as they really were. There is, however, a tendency to press the kenotic theories, held unconsciously by the authors to an extreme degree, although she realizes that Karatayev in *War and Peace* cannot be definitely Christian (p. 46).

The author has confined herself to the nineteenth century, but undoubtedly the peasant attitude of submission (which was not always practiced in reality) was of far more ancient growth. It would be of the greatest interest to trace that through the ages, and to show how it was merged into or developed into the nineteenth century attitude toward literature.

It is interesting also to note that the great masters of religious thought in fiction were able to separate their aspirations and meditations as to Holy Russia from the reality offered by the Russian Empire. We find this in Dostoevsky, in Gogol, and in many other authors, and it deserves close study and consideration.

Finally, in the latter part of the volume, the author pictures the kenotic writings of the later theologians, based largely on Florovsky's *Puti russkago bogosloviya*. Here again we realize that none of them were allured by temptations to deny the deity of Christ in the middle of their kenotic theories. These chapters are perhaps the most valuable in the book, for there is little material available for the study of the outstanding thinkers of the Russian Church. The world has been too long content to repeat the facile remarks that the Russian Church was spiritually and intellectually dead. Yet the sudden emergence of such men as Berdyayev and Bulgakov is no real marvel. They have had worthy ancestors.

On the whole the volume will have a salutary effect in impressing upon its readers an aspect of Russian thought that is too often overlooked. Had the author pointed out that the Cross and the crucifix have never played the role in Russia that they did in the West, that the Russians have been

more concerned with the risen Christ, perhaps returning in humble garb as in the Western legend of St. Christopher, she could have improved the work, but as it stands, it is a real contribution to the small number of serious studies of Russian religion, and we can only hope that it will have a wide circulation and influence.

C. A. M.

Layman Speaking. By GEORGE K. MORLAN. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1938. 242 pp. $2.50.

A useful idea prompted the writing of this book, namely, that clergymen could get great help if they knew which sermons made the deepest impression, and which techniques were most effective in getting their message across to the layman. The questionnaire method of Teachers' College and personal interviews were relied upon to reveal the secret. A study of the replies is very discouraging. Not only because preachers betray a low level of intellectual production, but because the laymen themselves show little capacity for direct aural assimilation. Of the one hundred and ninety-one people interviewed, 54 per cent were unable to recall anything of the sermon they had heard prior to the two weeks of the interview. The major responsibility for this amazing condition must be attributed to the ministers. The author gives many excellent suggestions that preachers would do well to heed. He is enlightened and progressive, and writes forcefully on disputed points. The value of this book lies in its forthright advice and the fires that it stirs. Its chief weakness is that it fails to develop the questionnaire, which was probably too narrow for fruitful development.

The operational theory of meaning has impressed the author, and he never wearies of telling the reader that words without action are futile. There is value in this reiteration, but he could be of greater help if he explored and developed the consequences of this theory. To suggest that a congregation picket a department store whose executive kept mistresses, or a five-and-ten-cent store that paid starvation wages is not a promising beginning. The argument pales when steps beyond exhortation and advice are attempted.

The book suffers greatly from its loose and rambling arrangement. There is endless and tiresome repetition, and one gets the impression of notes and reflections scooped up without plan or clear purpose. Frequently there is a lapse into the trite and commonplace that detracts seriously from the informative portions of the book. Most of the sins of preachers are exhibited in the book itself: unwarranted moral conclusions drawn from insufficient experience, superficial and unfair comparisons, verbosity made to substitute for development, extremes of statement that are palpably false, and continuing to speak long after the argument has been completed.

If a minister were to correct every fault pointed out in this book there would still be much to desire. Ministers are ineffective only partly because their sermons lack thought content. Any intelligent minister knows that

most people stay away from church, not because the sermons are illiberal or unintelligent, but because most people find secular activities and interests sufficient for their mental and spiritual needs. The line of battle drawn here hardly coincides with the front were modern ministers are having their greatest difficulties.

FREDERICK REUSTLE

It Began in Galilee. By REGINALD J. BARKER. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1938. 317 pp. $2.50.

This book was written out of a concern to show that Christianity is a revolutionary religion. It does not throw any fresh light on the problems with which it deals, but there is a good deal of effective writing in it. It is homiletical in the main, and one can imagine that the sermons which probably went into the making of the book were excellent sermons. The emphasis of the book, the author of which is an English Wesleyan, reminds me a good deal of what Stanley Jones has been writing in recent years. The author uncritically assumes that the message of Jesus in its original context is to be understood as a socially revolutionary message, that the Kingdom of God was understood by Jesus as a new social order. There is much impatience in the book toward those who resign themselves to the fact that Christians will always differ on social and political programs. Though I should criticize the historical assumptions of the book, its essential point in relation to the present situation is sound and much needed. Christianity must be a revolutionary religion today if it is to be true to itself. The following sentence gives the spirit of the book: "Jesus would repudiate the preaching of class hatred, but He would equally have repudiated the refusal to take sides in the issue raised by the class war." The author calls the Church to recognize that there is an essential conflict between the present economic system and Christianity. The latter half of the book is a series of studies of Jesus in his relations with various human groups—women, the sick, the poor, the rich, etc. These studies are not based on careful criticism, but they are suggestive, and all support the author's main emphasis upon the Christian social revolution.

JOHN C. BENNETT

Signposts to God. By W. R. MATTHEWS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 92 pp. $1.25.

This little book by the Dean of St. Paul's contains five radio addresses, one sermon, and a chapter of answers to questions raised by radio listeners. It is not intended to be a scholarly work, but, rather, is aimed directly at the man-on-the-street in his perplexities regarding the existence and nature of God. Dean Matthews discusses Nature, History, Conscience, and Authority as "Signposts" which would confirm the reality of man's experience of a God whose nature is Creative Mind, Goodness and Holy and Loving Will. However, he holds that "there is something more important than any

signpost or indication of God's existence and that is immediate experience."

Dean Matthews succeeds admirably in his purpose to present the prevalent theism in popular form. His method is sweet reasonableness rather than dogmatism. He obtains his end without sacrificing characteristic Christian doctrine. The book is an excellent one to put in the hands of young people troubled with mental growing pains.

ROBERT G. ANDRUS

Naturalism in American Education. By GEOFFREY O'CONNELL. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1938. xxvi + 285 pp. $3.75.

This product of the Catholic University of America aims, by a painstaking recital of the obvious, to prove that American educational leaders have not derived their chief inspiration from Christianity. Christianity is identified with supernaturalism and hence all anti-supernaturalists are naturalists, atheists, and ought to be communists. America must choose between "Christian democracy" (which is represented as an American institution in spite of America's educators) and atheistic totalitarianism. As a piece of propaganda the work is entertaining enough; as an historical survey it is a pathetic mixture of meticulous documentation and misconstruction. Dr. O'Connell has at least brought together telling testimony of the growth of secular educational ideals in America, whether he is justified in labelling them "naturalism" or not. But in his Preface, Professor Louis J. A. Mercier of Harvard regards the naturalism of Dewey and his associates as a monism concocted by mixing Hegel, Haeckel, and Marx; to accuse the pluralistic, democratic Dewey of monism and totalitarianism is ludicrous, even on the basis of the exposition given in this volume.

H. W. S.

The Pendulum Swings Back. By MARVIN M. BLACK. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1938. 229 pp. $2.00.

A well-constructed case for the need of a synoptic science by means of which the vast chaos of unrelated facts which modern experimental science has produced can be co-ordinated and assimilated. Beginning with the bankruptcy of the mechanistic theory the author traces the renascence of teleology in contemporary thought, culminating in a new school of idealistic philosophy in the "great tradition." He finds that biology, psychology, medicine, anthropology, and sociology, as well as the new physics, are all rapidly reinstating Mind in its position of pre-eminence in the universe. Especially psychic research, with its latest development of laboratory techniques, is presenting a serious challenge to mechanistic theory. The book is well-documented, and each chapter has its own selected bibliography, but unfortunately there is no index. It is to be hoped that this deficiency will be remedied in a second edition.

M. B.

Über kultische Motivverschiebungen. By ALFRED BERTHOLET. (Sonderausgabe aus den Sitzungsberichten der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Phil.-hist. Klasse. 1938. XVIII). Berlin: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1938. 23 pp. R.M. 1.50.

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